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FOREWORD 
. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will soon be a reality.  The Amsterdam 
Summit has definitely adopted the institutional framework for the introduction of 
the euro on January 1,  1999. The time has come, therefore, to shift our attention 
from the legal and technical issues of  the transition to the more economic topic of 
the actual functioning of  monetary union. 
Since the publication of  One Market,  One Money in 1990, there has been intense 
academic debate on EMU.  This  debate has been extremely valuable,  shedding 
light on key policy matters. Over the years, the Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs has both contributed to and benefited from the academic 
discussion. As the date for the introduction of the euro approaches, we felt the 
need to reflect on this discussion so as to further our economic understanding of 
the opportunities and challenges offered by EMU. 
We proceeded in two directions. A number of  seminars were organised, at which 
some fourteen distinguished academic economists participated. Simultaneously, a 
group of about twenty DG II  economists were asked to elaborate papers on a 
number of relevant policy  issues.  These papers  are  published as  two  separate 
Economic Papers.  The frrst Paper (Part A) presents a broad assessment of the 
economic debate on the functioning of  EMU. The second Paper (Part B) explores 
a number of  policy issues in greater detail. 
I hope that these two Economic Papers, which pave the way to further analytical 
work  by  DG  II,  will  bring  valuable  insights,  and  thereby  contribute  to  the 
elaboration of  appropriate policies for the successful functioning of  EMU  . 
Giovanni RA  V  ASIO The present study, by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, was 
directed by Giovanni Ravasio, Director-General, and coordinated by Herve Carre and 
Jan  Host  Schmidt,  respectively  Director  for  Monetary  Affairs  and  Director  of the 
Economic Service. 
Marco Buti and Andre  Sapir are  the  main contributors to  Part A and editors of the 
overall study. 
A number of  authors contributed to Part B: 
The main contributors to the section on the monetary policy and the exchange rate are 
Antonia Carparelli, Sean Berrigan, Fabienne Ilzkovitz, Jiirgen Kroeger, Mary McCarthy 
and Tuomas Saarenheimo. 
The main contributors to the section on budgetary policy are  Ali Bayar, Marco Buti, 
Servaas Deroose, Daniele Franco, Mads Kieler and Hedwig Ongena. 
The  main  contributors  to  the  section  on  shocks  and  market  adjustment  are  Tassos 
Belessiotis, Guillermo Davila Muro and Carlos Martinez Mongay. 
The main contributors to the section on real and nominal convergence are Martin Hallet, 
Filip Keereman, Delphine Marsault and Carlos Martinez Mongay. 
The  following  have  also  contributed:  Pierre  Deusy-Fournier,  Adriaan Dierx,  Around 
Holmsen,  Rolf Kaiser,  Kieran  McMorrow,  Claudia  Ohly,  Theodoros  Papaspyrou, 
Manfred Teutemann, Sammy van Tuyll and Francis Woehrling. 
The  study has  benefited  from  comments  and  suggestions  by  many  DG  II  officials. 
Excellent secretarial and editorial assistance was provided by Cecilia Mulligan. 
Appreciation is expressed to  the  following  academic economists who  participated in 
four  DG II  seminars which were  held prior to  the  elaboration of the  present study: 
Michael Artis, Giuseppe Bertola, Willem Buiter, Paul De Grauwe, Barry Eichengreen, 
Charles  Goodhart,  Daniel  Gros,  Jacques  Melitz,  Jean  Pisani-Ferry,  Christopher 
Pissarides, Luigi Spaventa, Niels Thygesen, Jtirgen von Hagen and Charles Wyplosz. 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
• 
PARTB 
SPECIFIC TOPICS 
CONTENTS 
I.  Monetary Policy and the Exchange Rate 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
II. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
III. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
IV. 
12. 
13 . 
The conduct of  monetary policy 
Monetary policy and long-term interest rates 
The impact of  monetary policy on the real economy 
The external dimension 
Budgetary Policy 
Achieving budgetary discipline 
Budgetary adjustment 
Automatic budgetary stabilisers 
Budgetary policy coordination 
Shocks and Market Adjustment 
Shocks and cycles 
Adjustment channels 
Economic adjustment and the labour market 
Real and Nominal Convergence 
Regional specialisation and catching-up 
Productivity and inflation differentials 
Page 
1 
20 
26 
35 
48 
69 
97 
108 
123 
138 
147 
165 
177 • 
• 
(1.1) 
THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The full picture of  the monetary policy of  the European Central Bank (ECB) will only 
be finalised once the ECB is established and operating. However, the foundation for 
the  future  European monetary  policy  is  already  laid,  and  a  significant part of the 
building blocks is also ready and waiting to be put in place. The foundation was laid 
by the Heads of the Member States in 1992, when the Treaty on European Union 
(better known as the Maastricht Treaty) was signed. The Treaty established the two 
central  principles  for  the  ECB  and  its  monetary  policy.  These  are  the  primary 
objective of  price stability and the independence of  the central bank. 
Price stability as the primary objective means that the overriding goal of  the ECB is to 
provide low and stable inflation. Although the ECB is obliged to support the general 
economic policies of  the EU, such as high economic growth, employment, and social 
protection, the ECB can only pursue such goals to the extent that they do not interfere 
with the primary objective of price stability. The exact operational content of price 
stability is not prescribed in the Treaty, but will be chosen by the ECB  itself.  The 
principal economic rationale behind the price stability objective is that price stability 
contributes  to  an  optimal  allocation  of  production  factors,  thus  promoting  a 
sustainable high rate of  economic growth and a high level of  employment. 
Independence of the ECB refers specifically to independence of the ECB'  s decision 
making bodies from governments, parliaments, and all such institutions and bodies at 
the European or at the national level. Under the Treaty, when carrying out the tasks of 
monetary policy, decision makers of the ECB are prohibited from seeking or taking 
instructions from any such body. Correspondingly, the Treaty obliges all such bodies 
the respect the ECB 's independence and to refrain from interfering with the European 
monetary policy. The principle of independence is to protect the ECB from political 
pressures  and  to  enable  it  to  carry  out  its  tasks  with  the  appropriate  long-term 
perspective. 
This chapter starts by describing  what is known of the  operational  framework  for 
European  monetary  policy  framework  (section  II):  it  presents  the  instruments  of 
monetary policy, ranging from open market operations, standing facilities, and other 
instruments of monetary control to the functioning of the future  European payment 
system. The major part of the task of setting up the operational framework has been 
the responsibility of the European Monetary Institute (EMI),  the  forerunner  to the 
ECB.  At the  time  this  was  written,  the  framework  was,  albeit  not  yet  finalised, 
nevertheless sufficiently enough to provide a fairly accurate picture of  what the ECB'  s 
monetary policy will look like at the operational level. It is safe to say that the set of 
policy instruments available to the ECB will look very much like what is currently in 
use by most modem central banks. It  will bear a reasonable resemblance to all existing monetary frameworks  in Europe today, without being an exact copy of any one of 
them. 
From the nuts and bolts of  the ECB'  s monetary operations, the discussion proceeds to 
broader  strategic  issues:  how  will  the  ECB  operationalise  the  objective  of price 
stability, and what strategy it is going to follow in the pursuit of  this objective (section 
III)? The discussion centres around the two candidates for monetary policy strategy 
identified by the EMI, namely monetary targeting and inflation targeting. The section 
concludes  that  this  choice  is,  to  a  large  extent,  about  how  price  stability  is 
communicated to the public; it will have few consequences for the actual conduct of 
monetary policy. 
II.  OPERATIONAL FEATURES OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE 
EUROAREA 
11.1.  Institutional framework 
When the third stage of EMU is launched on 1 January  1999, there will be a single 
monetary policy for the euro-area Member States.  Responsibility for the euro-area 
monetary policy will inevitably be more centralised, requiring important adjustments 
in the current institutional framework for monetary policy within the Community.I  In 
particular, a European System of  Central Banks (ESCB) will come into existence. 
Structure of  the ESCB 
The  ESCB  will comprise the new European Central  Bank (ECB)  and the national 
central banks (NCBs) of all the Member States including the non-participants in the 
euro area.  The ECB will be the supreme monetary authority in the euro area and will 
be  located  in  Frankfurt,  Germany.2  To  the  extent  that  day-to-day  operations  in 
implementing the euro-area monetary policy will remain decentralised, the NCBs will 
form an integral part of the new institutional framework.  However, all the activities 
of  the ESCB will be governed by the decision-making bodies of  the ECB. 
The ECB will have two principal decision-making bodies: 
•  The  Governinll  Council  will  be  responsible  for  the  formulation  of euro-area 
monetary  policy  and  for  setting  the  guidelines  for  policy  implementation;  its 
responsibilities will include decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives, 
key interest rates and the supply of  reserves in the ESCB.  The Governing Council 
2 
The new institutional framework to apply in the third stage of EMU is described in some detail 
in the Treaty and, more particularly, in the annexed protocol on the statute of the ESCB and 
ECB. 
The capital of the  ECB  will be  held by the NCBs  in  proportion to the  individual countries' 
demographic  and economic  weights  and  the  external  foreign  reserves  of the  NCBs  will  be 
pooled at the ECB within certain limits.  The sum of the seigniorage income of the ESCB as a 
whole will be allocated to the national central banks, while national practices with respect to the 
distribution of  profits will be unchanged. 
2 
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will  be composed of the  members  of the  Executive  Board (see  below)  and the 
Governors of the euro-area NCBs.  Each member of the Governing Council will 
have one vote and monetary policy decisions will be taken by simple majority.3 
The President of  the ECB will chair the Governing Council and will have a casting 
vote in the event of  a tied vote in the Council. 
•  The  Executive  Board  will  be  mainly  responsible  for  the  implementation  of 
monetary policy and, in this. context, will provide all necessary instructions to the 
euro-area NCBs.  The Executive Board will be made up of the President and vice-
president of the ECB and four other members.  Members of the Executive Board 
Will serve for a fixed term of  eight years which will not be renewable. 
Reflecting the likelihood that not all member states will participate in the euro area 
from the outset, a third decision-making body - to be known as the General Council -
will be constituted.  The General Council will comprise the Governing Council of  the 
ECB and the Governors of  the non euro-area NCBs as voting members, and will deal 
with  more  general  issues  - mainly  not  directly  related  to  monetary  policy 
affecting the euro and non-euro areas.4 
Objectives and tasks of the ESCB 
The primary objective of the ESCB  in formulating and implementing the euro-area 
monetary  policy  will  be  to  maintain  price  stability.  Without  prejudice  to  this 
objective, the ESCB will be required to support the general economic policies in the 
Community with a view to achieving specified economic and social objectives.s  The 
main tasks to be carried out through the ESCB will be: 
•  to define and implement monetary policy in the Union; 
•  to conduct foreign exchange operations; 
•  to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of  the Member States; and 
•  to promote the smooth operation of  the payments system. 
The ESCB will also have a limited role in relation to prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and the stability of  the financial system. 
Accountability of  the ESCB 
A  defining  feature  of the  ESCB  will  be  its  absolute  independence  from  political 
interference.  Neither  the  ECB  nor  the  NCBs  will  be  permitted  to  seek  or take 
instructions  from  other  Community  institutions  or  from  national  governments. 
3  The limited circumstances in which simple majority voting will not apply relate to institutional 
issues and are listed in Article 10.3 of  the ESCB Statute. 
4  These issues are listed in Article 47 of  the ESCB Statute. 
5  These  objectives  are  listed  in  Article  2  of the  Treaty  and  are:  a harmonious  and  balanced 
development of economic  activities,  sustainable  and  non-inflationary  growth  respecting  the 
environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance,  a high  level  of social 
protection, the  raising of the  standard of living  and  quality of life  and  economic  and  social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
3 Meanwhile, the Treaty embodies a commitment from these other bodies to respect the 
independence of the ESCB.  In the interests of accountability, the ECB will publish 
reports on the activities of the ESCB  at least quarterly and a consolidated financial 
statement will  be  published each week.  An annual  report on the  activities of the 
ESCB  and  on  the  single  monetary  policy  will  be  addressed  to  the  European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission and to the European Council.  In addition, 
members  of the  Executive  Board of the  ECB  may  be  asked  to  appear  before  the 
competent Committee of  the European Parliament. 
Relationship of  the ESCB to other Community bodies 
In order to ensure a smooth interaction between monetary policy and other policies in 
different fields, the ECB will be consulted regarding any proposed legislation relevant 
to  its area of responsibility.  The President of the Council (normally Ecofin) and a 
member of  the Commission may participate (without voting rights) in meetings of  the 
Governing Council of the ECB.  The President of the Council may submit a motion 
for deliberation to the Governing Council of  the ECB.  Correspondingly, the President 
of the ECB will participate in Ecofin Council meetings when matters of relevance to 
the  ECB  are  discussed.  A  more  formal  relationship  between the  ECB  and  other 
Community bodies will exist in the context of  exchange rate policy.  6 
11.2  Monetary policy instruments, counterparties and collateral 
Monetary policy instruments 
As with any central bank, the ECB will have at its disposal a set of monetary policy 
instruments in pursuing its primary objective of  price stability.  As the implementation 
of monetary policy will  be decentralised,  access  to  these  instruments  will  in most 
cases be available only through the NCBs.  However, the same set of  instruments will 
apply throughout the ESCB.  The  choice of instruments - which can be modified by 
the  ECB  Governing  Council  at  any  time  - reflects  different  features  of current 
monetary  policy  frameworks  in the  Member  States.  However,  it  is  not  an exact 
reproduction  of  any  one  national  framework  and  so  adjustments  to  the  new 
environment will  be  required  in  all  euro-area  Member  States.  Monetary  policy 
operations within the ESCB will be carried out on uniform terms and conditions in all 
Member States and the choice of  instruments has been made so as to minimise the risk 
of divergent  behaviour  among  NCBs.  The  set  of instruments  chosen  implies  a 
predominantly  neutral  role  for  the  ECB  in  its  dealings  with  market  agents, 
presumably reflecting  a desire  to  avoid the  risk of market discrimination  between 
Member States and to allow a euro-area market to evolve efficiently. 
The monetary policy instruments to be used by the ESCB will be: 
a)  Instruments used in the conduct of  open market operations. 
6  This relationship is outlined in more detail in Article 109 of  the Treaty 
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Open market operations  within the  ESCB  will  play  an important role  in steering 
interest rates, managing money-market liquidity and signalling the stance of  monetary 
policy.  The main instrument used in these open market operations will be reverse 
transactions in which the ESCB buys or sells assets under repurchase agreements or 
conducts credit operations against eligible assets as collateral.  Other instruments used 
- albeit less frequently - in these operations will include outright transactions, forex 
swaps, the collection of  fixed term deposits and the issuance of  debt certificates  . 
Open market operations within the ESCB will take four forms: 
•  main refinancing operations with a weekly frequency  and a two-week maturity, 
which will be executed by the NCBs on the basis of standard tenders and will be 
used by the ECB to send policy signals to  the market;  these will be the main 
vehicle of  liquidity management; 
•  longer-term refinancing operations with a monthly frequency and a three-month 
maturity, which will be executed by the NCBs on the basis of standard tenders but 
will be less frequent and will not be used by the ECB to send policy signals to the 
market; 
•  fine-tuning operations on an ad hoc basis which will normally be executed by the 
NCBs through quick tenders or bilateral procedures; and 
•  structural operations also on an ad hoc basis, which will be executed by the NCBs 
on the basis of standard tenders whenever the ECB wishes to adjust the structural 
position ofESCB vis-a-vis the financial sector. 
b) Standing facilities to manage liquidity on a day-to-day basis 
Standing facilities will be used to provide and absorb overnight liquidity.  The ESCB 
will have two standing facilities: 
•  the  marginal lending facility which will allow counterparties to obtain overnight 
liquidity  at  a  pre-specified  interest  rate  against  eligible  assets.  In  normal 
circumstances, this interest rate will provide a ceiling for the overnight market rate. 
•  the deposit facility which will require counterparties to make overnight deposits at 
a  pre-specified interest rate.  Under normal  circumstances,  this  interest rate  will 
provide a floor for the overnight market rate. 
The interest rates applied to these standing facilities will offer the ECB another means 
by which to transmit policy signals to the market by providing a corridor for overnight 
interest rates. 
c) Minimum reserve obligations to impact on structural liquidity conditions. 
The ECB may require credit institutions to hold minimum reserves on accounts with 
the  NCBs  subject  to  standardised  terms  and  conditions.  A  decision  to  impose 
5 minimum reserve requirements is - within the limits set by the Council of Ministers 
- the responsibility of  the ECB Governing Council. As is the case with all operations 
of  the ECB, any decision to impose minimum reserve requirements should be put into 
effect  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of an  open  market  economy  with  free 
competition and  must favour  the  efficient  allocation of resources.  The  minimum 
reserves system would be  used to  stabilise money market rates,  create or enlarge a 
structural liquidity shortage and to control monetary expansion.  However, the system 
would  not  operate  in  a  manner  which  would  induce  large-scale  delocation  or 
disintermediation.  The  ECB  will  establish  a  list  of credit  institutions  subject  to 
minimum  reserve  obligations.  All  credit  institutions  established  in the  euro  area 
would be subject to minimum reserve obligations, whereas their branches established 
outside  of the  euro  area  would  not  be  subject  to  these  requirements.  Minimum 
reserves  holdings  will  be  subject to  an  averaging  procedure  and  will  be  held  on 
account at the relevant NCB and the ECB may decide to remunerate reserve holdings. 
If an institution fails to meet its minimum reserves obligation, the ECB may impose 
progressive sanctions. 
Counterparties to monetary policy operations 
The set of  monetary policy instruments chosen for the ESCB will ensure the eligibility 
of a broad range of counterparties and underlying assets.  Counterparties to  ESCB 
monetary policy operations will  be  required to  fulfil  certain criteria,  which will be 
applied uniformly throughout the euro area.  If minimum reserve obligations apply, 
eligible counterparties will be confined to those credit institutions which are subject to 
these obligations.  With respect to  the other monetary policy instruments, all credit 
institutions  in  the  euro  area will  in principle  be  eligible.  Counterparties  must be 
financially sound and must fulfil any operational criteria specified in the contractual 
or regulatory arrangements applied by the relevant NCB.  Eligible counterparties will 
have access to ESCB  standing facilities  and will participate in ESCB  open market 
operations  based  on  standard  tenders.  As  a  reflection  of decentralised  policy 
implementation,  the  access  of eligible  counterparties  to  the  standing  facilities  and 
participation in open market operations will be possible only through the NCB of  the 
Member State in which they are established.  Counterparties to  forex  swaps will be 
limited to those institutions able to conduct large-volume operations and will again be 
carried out with the relevant NCB.  The NCBs will also have a restricted subset of 
counterparties  for  some  other  operations,  e.g.  fine-tuning.  In  exceptional 
circumstances, the  ECB  may  bypass  the NCBs to  carry  out fine-tuning  operations 
directly with this subset of  counterparties. 
Several procedures will exist for tenders and bilateral operations in the execution of 
ESCB open market operations and in the settlement of transactions. Tenders will be 
either  standard  or  quick,  to  which  identical  procedures  will  apply  except  for 
differences in time frame. Standard tenders will be normally executed within 24 hours 
from their announcement while quick tenders will be executed within one hour.  The 
ESCB will have the option of conducting either fixed rate (concentrating on volume) 
or variable rate  (concentrating on interest rate)  tenders.  Tenders  for the main and 
longer-term refinancing operations will be executed in accordance with a pre-specified 
calendar  and  the  results  will  be  publicly  announced  by  means  of wire  services. 
6 Tenders for fine-tuning and structural operations will not have a calendar.  Different 
allotment procedures will apply depending on the type of tender involved.  Bilateral 
operations, involving transactions between the ESCB and counterparties without the 
use  of tenders,  may  be  executed  directly  or through  stock  exchanges  and  market 
agents.  Settlement  of transactions  in  respect  of open  market  operations  and  the 
standing facilitie~ of  the ESCB will be effected through the counterparties' accounts at 
the NCBs or through their accounts at settlement banks in the TARGET system. 
Collateral in monetary policy operations 
All  ESCB  credit  operations  will  be  based  on  adequate  collateral  provided  by 
counterparties either in the form of  a transfer of  ownership of  assets or in the form of  a 
pledge of  assets.  These underlying assets must fulfil certain criteria to be eligible for 
ESCB operations.  The eligibility criteria will be standardised as far as possible but 
due account will be taken of differences in financial structures across Member States. 
For operational reasons, a distinction will be made between 
•  tier one assets: marketable debt instruments fulfilling standard eligibility criteria; 
and 
•  tier  two  assets:  additional  instruments  - marketable  and  non-marketable  - of 
particular  importance  for  national  financial  markets.  The  eligibility  criteria 
applying to tier two assets will not be standardised but will be vetted by the ECB. 
No distinction will be made between the two tiers in their eligibility for the various 
types of ESCB  operations?  and  both tiers  will  be  subject to  specified risk control 
measures.s 
Foreign exchange intervention 
Movements in the euro exchange rate will indicate how financial markets assess the 
monetary policy stance in the euro area and, particularly in the early years of EMU, 
will be a barometer of credibility in the new currency.  The credibility of the euro 
exchange rate will depend primarily on the performance of  the euro area economy and 
on  the  consistency  of the  internal  macroeconomic  policy  mix  (see  section  4.3). 
However, the ESCB will also wish to have the capacity to influence the euro exchange 
rate directly via the conduct of  foreign exchange intervention. 
The foreign reserve holdings of  the ESCB will be up to 50 billion euro, which will be 
contributed by the NCBs of Member  States  participating  in  the  euro  area.  The 
amount to be contributed by each Member State will be fixed in proportion to its share 
in the subscribed capital of  the ECB.  Capital subscriptions to the ECB will in tum be 
determined by a key reflecting the weight of  each Member State in the population and 
gross domestic product of the euro area.  9  If necessary, the ECB may make further 
7  Tier-two assets will not normally be used by the ESCB in outright transactions. 
8  These  would  include  initial  margins,  valuation  haircuts,  variation  margins,  exposure  limits, 
additional guarantees and possibly exclusion. 
9  Details of capital subscriptions and transfer of foreign assets are laid down in Article 30 of the 
ESCB Statute. 
7 calls on the foreign reserve assets of  the NCBs beyond the limit of EURO 50 billion. 
Foreign reserves assets other than those held by the ECB will remain with the NCBs. 
However,  all  operations in these  remaining  foreign  reserve  assets  by  the  euro-area 
NCBs and Member States' transactions with their foreign exchange working balances 
shall- above a specified limit- be subject to approval by the ECB.  In this way, the 
foreign exchange activities by parties other than the ECB will not be inconsistent with 
euro-area monetary and exchange rate policies.  It is  likely that the  foreign reserve 
assets with the NCBs will diminish over time but any reduction in reserves will be 
managed within the ESCB to ensure that there are no undesired impacts on financial 
markets. 
The  use  of foreign  exchange  intervention  in  the  ESCB  can  be  foreseen  in  two 
circumstances. 
Eirst,  intervention  may  be  required  in  the  context  of  formal  exchange  rate · 
arrangements  involving  non-EU  currencies.  The  Treaty  provides  for  such  formal 
exchange  rate  arrangements,  which may  be  concluded  by  the  Council  but will  be 
based on a recommendation from  or in consultation with the  ECB.  Similarly, the 
Council may formulate general orientations for the euro exchange rate policy based on 
a recommendation from or in consultation with the ECB.  In either case, any exchange 
rate arrangement or orientations must be consistent with the ECB' s primary objective 
of  price stability. 
Second,  the  ECB  may  have  recourse  to  foreign  exchange  intervention  in  its 
management of  the new exchange rate mechanism (ERM2) which will link currencies 
of other EU currencies to  the euro from  1 January  1999.  The new mechanism will 
derive  from  the  existing  ERM  and  will  therefore  provide  an  important  strand  of 
continuity between stage 2 and stage 3 of EMU.  The euro will be the anchor of the 
ERM  2,  while  the  other  participating  EU  currencies  will  be  linked  directly  and 
bilaterally to  the  anchor  in  a "hub-and-spokes" arrangement.  Accordingly,  central 
parities  will  be  set  for  these  currencies  against  the  euro  with  a  ± 15%  standard 
fluctuation band.  Intervention support will, in principle, be automatic and unlimited 
at  the  margin.  Central  parities  will  be  reviewed  on  a  continuous  basis  and 
realignments  will  take  place  in  a  timely  manner.  The  establishment  of closer 
exchange rate links (contingent on the achievement of convergence) within the ERM 
2  will  be  possible  subject  to  maintenance  of the  price  stability  objective.  The 
operation  of the  ERM  2  - by  setting  appropriate  central  parities  as  a  focus  for 
macroeconomic  management  - should  help  to  ensure  that nominal  exchange  rates 
reflect  underlying  economic  fundamentals.  In  this  way  excessive  fluctuation  of 
exchange rates and/or sharp changes in exchange rate levels may be avoided, thereby 
reducing  the  risk  of disruption  in  the  proper  functioning  of the  single  market. 
Moreover,  the  ERM  2 is  an  important framework  to  support convergence among 
Member States wishing to  adopt the  euro.  The  new mechanism, together with the 
reinforced convergence procedures to  be established under the Stability and Growth 
Pact,  will be  mutually  supportive elements of the  Community policy co-ordination 
framework. 
8 As  with  the  monetary  policy  framework,  the  organisation  of foreign  exchange 
intervention  in  the  ESCB  will  reflect,  as  far  as  practicable,  the  principles  of 
subsidiarity.  The decision to intervene will be taken at the centre by the ECB but may 
be  implemented  either  by  the  ECB  itself or  on a  decentralised  basis.  The  final 
decision on the distribution of responsibility for forex  intervention will be taken by 
the ECB Governing Council.  Counterparties to forex intervention will be chosen on 
the basis of the current best practices of the NCBs and must fulfil  specified criteria, 
which  will  include  credit-worthiness,  supervision,  ethical  standards,  competitive 
pricing and size.  The ESCB will not designate any particular financial centre within 
the euro area as the primary location for  intervention operations but it is likely that 
trading may concentrate in a limited number of centres.  For reasons of effectiveness, 
the ESCB will ensure that it has a capacity to intervene not only within the euro area 
but in any international financial centre. 
11.3  The distribution of monetary income 
Under  Article  23  of the  ESCB  Statute,  the  monetary  income  accruing  to  the 
participating NCBs from assets held against notes in circulation and deposit liabilities 
to credit institutions will be pooled and redistributed to the NCBs according to their 
paid-up shares of  the capital of  the ECB.  The amount of  monetary income involved is 
expected to be substantial - around two-digit billions of  euros.  The weighting of  each 
NCB in the capital key is determined by the sum of 50% of  the Member State's share 
in the EU population and 50% of  the Member State's share in the nominal GDP of  the 
EU over the five-year period prior to the penultimate year before the establishment of 
the ECB. 
Because of  differences among EU countries between the amount of  cash in circulation 
(both within and outside of the country)  relative to  their GDP  and population, the 
allocation of monetary income according the capital key  could result in significant 
changes  in  the  amounts  of monetary  income  received  by  individual  countries. 
Broadly speaking, a country whose share in the banknote circulation of  the whole euro 
area is higher than its share in the capital key would tend to  lose income and vice 
versa.  According to  a recent report10,  countries such as  Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden and Austria would lose out in the re-allocation while the UK, if  it were 
to join EMU, and France would gain  11. 
The calculation of monetary income poses complex problems of measurement.  It is 
certain that without smoothing arrangements, the start of  monetary union would imply 
significant  income  redistribution  among  the  Member  States.  The  ESCB  Statute 
envisages the following definitive method for the calculation of monetary income: (a) 
identify those assets in each central bank's balance sheet that are the counterparts of 
banknote issuance and of the fi:g.ancial  sector's reserves in the central bank; (b) add 
10  in "Central Banking", May 1997 
11  Nevertheless these estimations are highly speculative.  First, a number of important decisions on 
monetary policy instruments, which influence the overall amount of monetary income have not 
yet been taken (imposition  and remuneration of minimum  reserves).  Second,  a  number of 
special factors (circulation of  DM banknotes in Eastern Europe) which generates particular high 
seigniorage income in D might loose importance. 
9 together the income earned on these assets (mainly interest received from  domestic 
banks and income earned on foreign exchange reserves).  The sum in the latter case is 
monetary income. 
Among the issues under discussion have been the appropriate method for calculating 
monetary income at the start of stage three and the smoothing of the allocation of the 
NCB's monetary income.  Towards the end of 1996, the EMI Council decided that an 
indirect method of  calculation of  monetary income would be used.  The direct method 
for  calculating  monetary  income  as  described  in  the  previous  paragraph  was 
considered to  be  unfeasible  given  the  lack  of harmonisation  of the  existing  asset 
portfolio of national central banks. Basically, using an indirect method means that an 
NCB  would  calculate  its  contribution  to  the  monetary  income  of the  ECB  by 
multiplying its liability base (i.e. the liabilities which give rise to seigniorage, such as 
note issues and minimum reserves) for a given period by a common reference rate of 
return.  Before pooling the monetary incomes, each NCB would be allowed to make 
deductions  for  certain  items,  such  as  interest  paid  on  certain  components  of the 
liability  base.  In  principle,  risk  sharing  does  not  enter  into  such  a  calculation, 
although it could be accommodated through adjustment of  the actual rate of  return on 
the NCB's assets. 
Article 51  of  the ESCB Statute allows the Governing Council of  the ECB to derogate 
for  a period of up  to  five  years  from  the rules of Article  32  on the  distribution of 
monetary  income.  If the  application of Article  32  leads  to  significant changes  in 
NCBs relative income positions, the amount of the monetary income which is pooled 
and redistributed according to the capital key may be reduced by up to  60%.  This 
reduction has to decrease every year by at least 12 percentage points. 
11.4  TARGET - a payments and settlement system12 
One key element of the supporting framework for the conduct of the single monetary 
policy involves the development of a cross border payments system in order to help 
achieve identical short  -term interest rates throughout the euro area.  This system is 
known  as  TARGET  - Trans-European  Automated  Real-time  Gross  settlement 
Express Transfer.  The aim is to create a system that will process cross-border euro-
denominated payments in a smooth, efficient, low-cost, secure and rapid manner.  As 
such,  TARGET also  has  an important role  to play in the  development of efficient 
payment mechanisms for the Single Market. 
TARGET is composed of one real time gross settlement (RTGS) transfer system in 
each EU member state and a mechanism (Interlinking) to link these national systems, 
thus allowing euro-denominated payments to move from one system to another.  The 
RTGS systems of countries outside of the EU may also be connected to TARGET if 
they  are  capable of processing  euro.  The  system  will  be  fully  operational  from  1 
January 1999. 
12  In  addition  to  the  TARGET  system,  there  will  also  be  a  securities  settlement  system  for 
settlement  of the  assets  comprising  the  eligible  collateral  for  the  ESCB' s monetary  policy 
operations. 
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To avoid impediments to the efficient conduct of the single monetary policy, some 
harmonisation of the features of national RTGS systems within the euro area will be 
required  in terms  of hours  of operation,  the  provision  of intra-day  liquidity,  and 
pricing policies.  At the end of the day, RTGS participants in the euro area that are 
eligible counterparties for monetary policy operations of the ESCB may draw on the 
marginal lending facility in order to balance their position in TARGET.  NCBs ofEU 
member states which do not participate in the euro area but which may nevertheless 
be connected to TARGET will not have the possibility of extending overnight credit 
in euro to RTGS participants in their countries.  The possibility for NCBs outside the 
euro area to grant. intraday credit in euro is still under discussion and mechanisms are 
being  considered for  preventing  intra-day  credit  from  spilling  over  into  overnight 
credit. 
III.  MONETARY POLICY STRATEGY 
According to the Maastricht Treaty, the primary objective of the European Central 
Bank will be to maintain price stability. This objective is based on the - nowadays 
almost universally shared - view that monetary policy can best support economic 
growth by providing a stable and predictable monetary environment of low inflation. 
Both theoretical and empirical research suggests that monetary policy in the long run 
only  affects  levels  of nominal  variables  like  price  level  and  money  aggregates, 
whereas  the  average  level  of real  variables,  such  as  the  GDP  or  the  level  of 
unemployment, cannot be controlled by monetary policy. 
The Treaty does not specify the precise content of the price stability objective further 
but leaves it to the ECB to operationalise its obligation.  In particular, there are two 
important questions that the ECB will have to resolve, once it is established in 1998: 
•  How to define and measure price stability? 
•  What monetary policy strategy should be used to achieve price stability? 
This  section  centres  mainly  around  these  two  questions.  Since  the  big  decisions 
concerning the operationalisation of the price stability objective have not been made 
(and will not be made until mid-1998), the focus  here is on the presentation of the 
viable alternatives. 
III.l The content of price stability in EMU 
The objective of  price stability could be seen as implying that the central bank should 
keep  the  average  price  level  unchanged  over  time  (while,  of course,  allowing 
individual prices to move). Generally, central banks interpret the concept less literally; 
typically, price stability is  seen as  being fulfilled when inflation is  low and stable. 
There are some good reasons for this less-than-literal interpretation. The first one is 
that it is widely agreed that price indices generally overstate the true inflation rate. 
Existing price indices are  subject to  a number of biases:  they  do  not account to  a 
satisfactory degree for  improvements in the quality and technical  characteristics of 
products or the introduction of new products; they understate the effect of sales and 
11 discount stores on the prices people pay for their purchases, etc. It is estimated that the 
usual  price  indices  overstate  the  annual  inflation  rate  by  as  much  as  1.1-1.5 
percentage points.13  Hence, a steady price level, as measured by the existing indices, 
would actually only be achieved in the state of  actual deflation. 
Furthermore,  it has  been proposed that in an  economy where prices do  not easily 
adjust downwards, zero inflation does not leave sufficient room for changes in relative 
prices. If  no price can adjust downwards, then imposing a  zero inflation target would 
effectively lock in the existing pattern of  relative prices. It is argued that a modest rate 
of inflation  would  enable  relative  prices  to  adjust  even  when  prices  are  sticky 
downwards. 
This argument relies crucially on the assumption of downward stickiness of nominal 
prices.  In  Europe,  there  is  no  convincing  evidence  that  price  stickiness  would 
constitute a significant problem in the product market. In the labour market, on the 
other hand, wage reductions are relatively rare, and that is where the argument would 
appear to have some bite. It can be argued that the target inflation should be set so as 
to  allow sufficiently  quick  changes  in relative  wages,  thereby  providing the  right 
incentives for  cross sectoral labour mobility.  However, this does  not seem to be  a 
particularly restrictive requirement.  Given that because of rising productivity, wage 
increases  can,  on average,  exceed price  inflation,  even a very  low inflation target 
would provide enough room for differences in sectoral wage developments to allow 
sufficient wage differentiation. Currently, those European central banks that have set a 
numerical value for a price stability target aim at an inflation rate of  2% per annum or 
less. 
A related, but separate, issue is whether the central bank should define its target in 
terms of  price level or inflation. The difference between the two has to do with what 
the central bank does when it misses- say, overshoots- its target. A central bank 
which defines price stability in terms of  price level will try to correct the deviation and 
bring prices back to the desired level through a period of  lower-than-average inflation. 
On  the  other  hand,  for  a  central  bank  with  its  focus  on  inflation,  "bygones  are 
bygones"; past deviations of inflation from the target will have no  influence on the 
desired level of  future inflation. 
It is likely that the ECB 's interpretation of price stability will be closer to the latter 
than to the former. The EMI has stated that one of  the guiding principles of  the ECB's 
monetary policy will be medium term orientation; the intention is to provide an anchor 
for  inflation expectations while providing some discretion in response to short-term 
deviations from the target. 
Measurement of  the price level 
Once a satisfactory definition of  price stability has been arrived at, the next question is 
one  of measurement;  i.e.  the choice of a yardstick for  price  developments for the 
13  Recently, a widely publicised report from the "Boskin Committee" put the upward bias in the 
measurement of  the US consumer prices to around 1.1 %. 
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purpose of measuring whether the objective has indeed been achieved.  There is  no 
single obvious measure of price level but, rather,  a broad range of indices, each of 
which is  subject to  its  own particular problems.  The  central  banks,  that  presently 
follow  an  explicitly-stated  price  stability  objective,  have  typically  operationalised 
their target either in terms of the consumer price index, the retail price index, or in 
terms of some measure of underlying inflation, from which specific items have been 
excluded.  The  need  for  a  proper  yardstick  of inflation  is  largely  independent  of 
whether  the  ECB  chooses  formally  to  target  inflation  or  not.  As  the  EMI  has 
announced, whatever the monetary policy strategy,  the  ECB  will need a quantified 
definition for the final objective of price stability. This will enhance the transparency 
of the strategy and will provide the general public with a yardstick against which the 
performance of  the ECB may be assessed. 
In the case of  the European monetary policy, the fact that the single currency covers a 
wide range of countries introduces an additional complication in the measurement of 
prices.  Different  countries  are  likely  to  experience  periods  of diverging  price 
developments,  first  because  the  countries  will  occasionally  find  themselves  in 
different  positions  in  the  economic  cycles,  but  also  because  changes  in  indirect 
taxation, subsidies etc. will not necessarily coincide between countries. To judge price 
developments in the whole euro area, the ECB  will have to construct some kind of 
weighted average of  price developments in the participating Member States. 
The European single currency area will in all probability have to accept occasions of 
significant  inflation  differences  between  participating  Member  States.  There  are 
several reasons to expect that such differences may be larger than those which have 
been experienced,  for  example,  in the  US.  Compared to  the  states  in the  US,  the 
European countries will have much more  segmented national  labour markets,  each 
with its own characteristic wage setting systems. Differences in national tax systems 
and  non-synchronised  tax  reforms  can  also  contribute  to  inflation  differentials. 
Moreover,  some  countries  are  still  involved  in  a  catching-up  process,  with  high 
productivity growth in the exposed sector bringing about relatively high rates of  wage 
increases.  This is  likely to  show up  as  high price  increases  in the  services  sector, 
where  productivity  growth is  slower,  thus  contributing to  a relatively  high rate  of 
overall inflation. Finally, the lack of a sizeable federal budget in Europe reduces the 
ability of  countries to synchronise their business cycles, and can thereby contribute to 
inflation rate differentials. 
111.2  Monetary policy strategy 
The Treaty does not prescribe any particular monetary policy strategy for the ECB in 
its pursuit of  price stability. The final choice of  the strategy will be made by the ECB 
once it is established in  1998.  Meanwhile,  the  EMI  has  narrowed down the viable 
options for the European monetary strategy to two, namely, monetary targeting and 
direct inflation targeting. 
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Monetary targeting 
Monetary targeting is based on the notion that in the long run, inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon; doubling the amount of money in the economy will, other things equal, 
lead to  doubling  of all  prices.  If such a  stable  relationship  exists  between money 
supply and inflation, then by controlling the amount of  money, one also gains control 
over inflation. At the operational level, a central bank with a monetary target monitors 
the growth of a specified monetary aggregate against a regularly preannounced target 
range, and reacts to deviations by adjusting monetary policy. 
With monetary targeting - as with inflation targeting - the ultimate target is price 
stability.  The  monetary  aggregate  serves  both  as  an  intermediate  target and  as  a 
leading indicator of inflation.  A high rate of money expansion can be  indicative of 
future  inflation,  particularly  if accompanied  by  a  high  rate  of domestic  credit 
expansion.  As  an  intermediate  target,  the  money  target  conveys  the  objective  of 
monetary  policy  by  providing  an  anchor  for  inflation  expectations.  Through  the 
monetary target, the central bank can influence inflation expectations and indirectly 
wage and price formation. 
The  main advantage of monetary targeting  (vis-a-vis  inflation targeting)  is  usually 
seen to be controllability: monetary aggregates are more directly controllable by the 
central  bank  than  actual  price  behaviour.  The  success  of this  strategy  depends 
crucially on the  stability (or,  more precisely, on the  predictability) of the  long-run 
relationship between the chosen money aggregate and prices. Experiences as regards 
the stability of  this relationship are varied. In some countries (such as the UK and the 
USA), an apparently stable relationship seemed to vanish once the central bank started 
to  exploit it to  control the  price  level.l4  In  some  other countries,  most notably  in 
Germany, monetary targeting has established an admirable track record over several 
decades. 
No  consensus  exists  whether  the  EMU-wide  money/price  relation  would  be 
sufficiently stable to warrant monetary targeting. At the individual country level, few 
Member States can boast of a convincingly stable demand for any money aggregate 
over  any  long  period  of time,  but  preliminary  evidence  of a  more  predictable 
European aggregate money demand has been encouraging. IS 
14  This is,  in  essence,  a demonstration of the  famous  "Lucas critique".  Empirical relationships 
between macroeconomic variables,  such as money and output, depend on the existing policy 
environment. Giving an historically stable empirical relationship the status of policy instrument 
will effectively constitute a major break in the policy environment governing the behaviour of 
the relationship. As a result, the relationship is likely to disappear, and the attempt to exploit it 
as a policy tool is will fail. 
15  Philippe P. Moutot, Monetary Policy in a European Monetary Union: Instruments, Strategy and 
Transmission Mechanism, in Monetary Policy in Transition in East and West, Osterreichische 
Nationalbank, Vienna 1997. 
14 It is, however, unclear how much weight should be assigned to the relative stability of 
European money demand as  a justification for  using  monetary targeting  approach. 
First, the stable aggregate money  demand conceals  substantial  and  desynchronised 
instability at the  individual country level.  Adding  together a group of independent 
money demands will - by the  law of large  numbers - automatically reduce the 
relative  variability  of the  aggregate  money  demand.  However,  the  law  of large 
numbers  only  works  for  independent  variables.  To  the  extent  that  the  factors 
contributing to money demand instability - financial innovation, changes in taxation, 
monetary policy actions etc.-are synchronised in the monetary union, the aggregate 
money demand may turn out to be  significantly less  stable than the one measured 
before the appearance of  the single currency. 
Second, EMU will introduce a structural break in the interaction between the central 
bank and the private banking sector. The harmonisation of monetary instruments will 
imply changes in virtually every participating  country.  EMU will  also  bring  about 
important behavioural adjustments in the private and public sectors, thus transforming 
the transmission process of  monetary policy. 
Finally, as the Lucas critique and experiences from the UK and the US  have shown, 
exploiting empirical relations for policy purposes is  inherently a risky exercise. No 
amount of  empirical work on existing data is going to reveal much useful information 
about the behaviour of money demand under the  single  currency.  Even if a stable 
relationship  between a  monetary  aggregate  and  inflation  were  to  arise,  the  policy 
makers would not be able to verify it for a long time. Thus, only time will tell whether 
a European monetary aggregate will emerge as a useful tool for monetary control. 
Inflation targeting 
With inflation targeting, the focus is directly on the future expected inflation rate. A 
wide  range  of indicators,  including  monetary  aggregates,  is  used  to  predict  the 
inflation outlook for 1-2 years ahead, and monetary policy is adjusted accordingly. 
The advantage of  inflation targeting is its visibility to the public and its direct focus on 
the  final  target of price  stability.  The  main drawback is  that inflation itself is  not 
directly  or easily controllable by the central bank.  Even in the  best case  scenario, 
monetary policy affects inflation with a lag, so that the success of monetary policy in 
hitting its target cannot be immediately verified. It is also important to note that while 
under monetary targeting, the last measured value of  the target aggregate provides an 
important  indicator and  a  background  for  evaluating  monetary  policy  actions,  the 
relation between inflation targeting and the last measured value of inflation is quite 
different.  Measured inflation rate is unavoidably a backward looking indicator, and 
cannot carry much weight in the central bank's policy formulation. Hence, seemingly 
counterintuitive situations can arise in which, for example, the measured inflation rate 
is undershooting the target while the central bank, responding to forecasted inflation, 
is tightening its monetary stance. 
As with monetary targeting, predictability is a crucial issue; i.e. whether, on the basis 
of  the available information, the central bank can form a reasonably precise picture of 
15 future inflation pressures. At present, several countries (for example, the UK, Spain, 
Finland,  Sweden)  exercise  a  monetary  policy  geared  toward  an  explicit  inflation 
target. So far, the experiences of  inflation targeting have been positive. The problem is 
that inflation target is a fairly recent phenomenon, and a generally non-inflationary 
macroeconomic environment has made the recent success easier to achieve.  Hence, 
the  accumulated  evidence  of the  virtues  of direct  inflation  targeting  is  not  yet 
overwhelming. 
Other options 
The  EMI  has  also  considered a number of additional  candidates  for  the monetary 
strategy  of the  ECB,  including  exchange  rate  targeting,  interest  rate  pegging  and 
nominal  interest  rate  targeting.  These  strategies  were  judged  to  be  non-viable 
alternatives  for  the  future  European  monetary  policy.  In  particular,  exchange  rate 
targeting would not constitute a firm anchor for price expectations, given the probable 
large size of  the future euro area and its low external exposure. 
Consequences of  the choice of monetary policy strategy 
While the details of  the ECB'  s strategy are not yet known, the EMI has identified a set 
of  key elements which it sees as an "indispensable part of  any strategy adopted by the 
ESCB" (EMI report, 1997). These include: 
•  the public announcement of a quantified definition of the final objective of price 
stability  in  order  to  enhance  the  transparency  and  credibility  of the  ESCB'  s 
strategy; 
•  the  public  announcement  of a  specific  target  (or  targets)  against  which  the 
performance of the  ESCB  can be  assessed on an ongoing basis by the  general 
public; 
•  the use of all available information relevant to the final target of monetary policy 
(i.e. the use of  a wide range of  indicators); 
•  within the  set  of indicators,  the  assignment  of a  prominent  role  to  monetary 
aggregates, provided that money demand is sufficiently stable in the long run; 
In addition, according to the EMI, the ESCB should be in the position to make its own 
forecasts for inflation and other economic variables. 
Clearly, the list of  key elements identified by the EMI shows that the ECB'  s monetary 
policy  strategy  will  not dogmatically  follow  either monetary  targeting  or inflation 
targeting, but will instead include features of both.  Whatever the final  strategy, the 
ECB will publish a quantified definition of price stability, which may or may not be 
called  the  inflation  target.  Conversely,  provided  that  a  stable  relation  between  a 
monetary aggregate and the price level arises, the monetary aggregate is going to play 
a key role in policy formulation,  regardless of whether the role is formalised as an 
explicit monetary target. It is also quite possible that the ECB  will choose to target 
simultaneously  both  money  and  inflation;  if the  relation  between  price  level  and 
16 monetary aggregate is predictable, then it is possible to formulate mutually consistent 
targets for both. In any case, the ECB  intends to exercise a pragmatic rather than a 
dogmatic  monetary  policy,  exploiting  all  indicators  which  are  relevant  to  future 
inflation rate - the label assigned to the strategy is of  secondary importance. 
Perhaps  the  most  tangible  difference  between  inflation  targeting  and  monetary 
targeting  is  one  of presentation  - i.e.  the  way  in  which  price  stability  is 
communicated to  the public.  With monetary targeting,  monetary policy  is justified 
mainly  in terms  of the  behaviour of monetary  aggregates,  whereas  with  inflation 
targeting the ECB'  s inflation forecast plays the leading role. An important function of 
the monetary framework is to allow transparent communication of the central bank's 
policy  choices  and  to  enable  the  general  public  to  assess  the  central  bank's 
performance. For that to be possible, the target has to be understood by the public. In 
Germany, monetary targeting has fulfilled this function well, and there, the usefulness 
of the framework in communicating price stability is not contested. In other Member 
States without a long tradition of monetary targeting, money demand has remained a 
much more remote concept to the public. 
More important than the label of the European monetary policy strategy will be its 
actual  implementation and,  in particular, the  ability  of the ECB  to  respond to  the 
changing monetary environment. For example, in a world of liberalised and integrated 
financial markets, asset prices-bond and stock prices- play an increasing role in 
determining  the  behaviour  of economic  agents,  and  financial  innovation  keeps 
transforming the meaning of money. Much of the success of the European monetary 
policy  will  be  determined  by  the  ability  of the  ECB  to  correctly  identify,  and 
appropriately respond to, those changes that are relevant to price stability. 
Transitional issue; monetary policy in the initial years of  the single currency 
In order to exercise successful monetary policy, a central bank has to be able both to 
accurately  monitor  and  forecast  inflation  pressures,  and  to  control  the  inflation 
pressures  through  its  monetary  policy  actions.  To  monitor  and  forecast  inflation 
pressures, the central bank relies on a predictable relation between its monetary policy 
indicators  and  its  policy  target.  To  control  inflation  pressures,  the  central  bank 
depends  on  a  predictable  transmission  of monetary  policy  actions  through  the 
economy. 
The  creation  of the  single  currency  will  introduce  a  fundamental  break  in  the 
monetary environment of  the participating Member States. As a result, during the first 
years of the monetary union, the financial markets are likely to be in a constant state 
of transformation. This will inevitably pose a major challenge to the future European 
monetary policy. 
As an example, a stable money demand is a result of  a stable structure of  the monetary 
system and the  structure of banking  sector.  These  structures  will  almost certainly 
undergo a fundamental change as a result of EMU.  A new monetary policy regime 
changes the expected opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing assets such as 
cash and liquid bank accounts.  The  single currency will transform the competitive 
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euro creates a window of opportunity for innovation in retail payment systems, with 
possibly significant consequences for the demand for monetary assets. Hence, there is 
a  possibility  that  monetary  aggregates  will  experience  a  period  of significant 
instability in the  initial  years  of the  single  currency.  When,  and  whether,  a  stable 
money demand emerges will only be known after several years of  observation. 
The inflation process is likely to experience equally drastic changes as a result of the 
changeover to the single currency, thereby undermining the predictability of inflation 
for some time after the start of  the single currency. At the heart of  the inflation process 
are wage formation mechanisms. In EMU, monetary policy and markets will respond 
to developments in the whole euro area. Wage developments in an individual country 
will  only  affect  the  euro  exchange  rate  and  interest  rate  through  that  country's 
economic weight in the euro area.  Hence,  EMU has the potential to  fundamentally 
transform  wage  formation -no one  knows  quite  what  the  outcome  will  be.  By 
improving the transparency of price comparisons in different participating countries, 
EMU is likely to reduce the ability of firms to pursue price discrimination. The effect 
of  this on the average inflation rate may or may not be significant. 
Finally, the accumulated experience of the national central banks about the way in 
which their respective economies respond to monetary policy actions risks becoming 
rapidly  outdated  after  the  start  of the  single  currency.  The  national  monetary 
transmission mechanisms are a product of financial market structures (for example, 
whether  bank  lending  is  linked  to  short- or long- term  interest  rates  etc.)  and  of 
economic  agents'  perception  about  the  future  consequences  of monetary  policy 
actions.  These,  in turn,  are  a product of the past monetary policy environment.  As 
monetary  authority  is  transferred  from  the  national  central  banks  to  the  ECB, 
economic  agents  will  have  to  alter  their  ideas  of the  monetary  authority's  likely 
behaviour, and financial market structures will be shaped accordingly. 
As a result, regardless of the choice of monetary strategy, it may take several years 
before  the  financial  markets  have  fully  completed  their  adjustment  to  the  new 
environment and the predictability of  indicators can again be assessed with reasonable 
confidence.  During  that  period,  monetary  policy  may  have  to  be  more  backward 
looking,  and to  rely more  on market indicators, than would be the case  in a more 
established operating environment. 
National monetary policies in 1998 
The Maastricht Treaty offers no  special provisions for  the monetary policies of the 
selected countries during the interim period between the decision on the participants 
in the spring of 1998 and the start of  the third stage at the beginning of 1999. As is the 
case  throughout  the  second  stage,  the  member  states  will  continue  to  treat  their 
exchange  rate  policies  as  a  matter  of common  interest  (Article  109m),  but  the 
monetary policies of  the participating countries will formally remain the responsibility 
of  the national authorities. However, it can be argued that in the central banks' policy 
formulation,  the  weight  of "common  interest"  will  have  to  increase,  relative  to 
domestic considerations, during the final run-up to EMU. 
18 The need for closer co-ordination arises for several reasons. First, it is likely that once 
the participants are known, the markets will closely monitor the extent to which the 
central bankers, who will comprise the future Governing Council of  the ECB, are able 
to  cooperate  in  monetary  policy.  Serious  disagreements  about  the  appropriate 
direction of monetary policies could not only destabilise exchange rates during the 
period up to the end of 1998, but would also be likely to raise suspicions about the 
ability of the ECB to exercise an efficient monetary policy. Hence, the central banks 
may wish to co-ordinate their policies in order to enable the ECB to start out with full 
monetary credibility. 
Second, it is important that at the end of 1998 the participating central banks should 
harmonise their policy interest rates at a level which is appropriate from the European 
perspective. This is necessary because monetary policy decisions taken in 1998 will, 
to a large extent, determine whether the  ECB inherits a stable and non-inflationary 
operating environment as it takes over the European monetary policy. Also, from the 
point of view of public acceptability of the single monetary policy, it might not be 
wise to force the ECB to start its monetary policy operations with a sharp change in 
interest rates.  In other words, the emphasis should be on the continuity of monetary 
policy. 
Hence,  although  exchange  rates  between  the  in-currencies  will  in  1998  still  be 
determined in the market, it is likely that as the year approaches its end, the monetary 
co-operation between the participating central banks will begin to look more and more 
like a virtual monetary union. The incentive for deeper monetary co-operation in 1998 
will have been increased by the Ecofin' s decision (Mondorf, 12-14 September 1997) 
to pre-announce the bilateral conversion rates which will underlie the conversion rates 
of national  currencies  into  euro.16  The  pre-announcement  will  coincide  with  the 
selection in Spring 1998 of those Member States qualifying to adopt the euro on 1 
January 1999. The objective of  the pre-announcement of  the bilateral conversion rates 
will be to stabilise market expectations as the EMU launch date approaches. Monetary 
co-operation will be essential to ensure that the relevant market exchange rates are 
consistent with the pre-announced conversion rates on 31  December 1998. 
16  Pre-announcement of the actual euro conversion rates will not be possible because of technical 
difficulties relating to the composition of  the ECU basket. 
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MONETARY POLICY AND LONG-TERM 
INTEREST RATES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  transmission of the  effects  of monetary  policy  actions  through  the  economy 
consists of  several steps. The first step in this process is the transmission of  changes in 
policy interest rates to market interest rates.  Monetary authorities  generally have  a 
fairly tight control over short end of the term structure.  The degree of control over 
long-term interest rates is considerably weaker. The effects of  policy rate changes on 
long rates are  indirect, depend on the particular situation, and are often difficult to 
predict. 
This paper discusses the nature of this part of the monetary transmission process. It 
concentrates on the mechanisms through which policy rates affect long rates, reviews 
some representative empirical work on the area, and tries to assess to what extent this 
empirical  work has  yielded usable  policy  implication.  Finally,  the paper discusses 
some institutional changes, which are likely to affect the nature of  interaction between 
policy rates and market rates. The analysis will not touch upon the effects of  monetary 
policy  on the  real  economy  or on  prices;  those  questions  will  be  discussed  in  a 
separate fiche. 
II.  FROM POLICY RATES TO LONG RATES 
In many continental European countries (particularly in Germany)  bank lending  is 
overwhelmingly linked to long interest rates, and the impact of  monetary policy on the 
real economy depends crucially on how changes in policy rates are transmitted to the 
long end of the yield curve.  Therefore, in order to predict the effects of a monetary 
policy action, one needs to be able to form a picture of the likely responce of long 
rates. 
The link from monetary policy actions to long rates is, however, not a mechanical one. 
In unregulated financial markets, long interest rates are driven by the interaction of 
market expectations concerning future developments in inflation, exchange rate, the 
real economy, monetary policy strategy, and, as a function of these, the future stance 
of monetary policy. Hence, the effect of, say, a central bank rate hike on long rates 
depends  how this  move  is  perceived to  affect  the  economy,  future  inflation,  and 
thereby future monetary policies. Depending on the economic (or political) situation, a 
change  in policy  rates  may  be  seen  as  conveying  different  information,  and  can 
therefore have different effect on long rates. 
One way to classify the channels through which policy rates are transmitted to long 
rates is to divide the effects to portfolio effects and expectation effects. 
20 a)  Portfolio effects. 
This approach stems from the Keynesian economics of  the 60s, as represented in 
the works of James Tobin.  It treats assets of different maturities as  imperfect 
substitutes.  As  the  yield  on  one  asset  (ie  short  money  market  instruments) 
increase, investors redirect their funds  from  other assets (bonds) to that asset. 
Hence, an increase in short rates decrease the demand for bonds, thus forcing 
bond yields to  increase  as  well.  The  direction of this effect on long  rates  is 
unequivocally positive. 
b)  Expectation effects. 
This class of mechanisms rests on two equilibrium conditions (or, in a stronger 
form,  even  arbitrage  conditions),  which  in  turn  rely  on  a  fairly  high 
substitutability between assets  of different maturity  or country of origin:  the 
expectation  theory  of term  structure  and  the  uncovered  interest  rate  parity. 
Expectation theory says that long rates should be a function of expected future 
short  interest rates  (plus  possibly  a reasonably  constant term/risk  premium). 
According to  uncovered interest rate  parity,  long  rate  should be  equal to  the 
corresponding foreign  long rate  plus the expected rate  of depreciation of the 
home currency against the foreign currency. 
A change in policy rate may affect expectations of  future short rates and exchange rate 
changes in different ways. A rate hike can be seen signalling the determination of  the 
central bank in fighting inflation in which case it can give rise to expectations of an 
appreciating trend in exchange rate and downward movements in future  short rates, 
and may thereby even decrease long rates. On the other hand, the rate hike can be seen 
as an indication of  the buildup of inflation pressures. In this case, expectations would 
arise of further increases in short rates and a depreciating exchange rate; hence, the 
effect on long rates would probably be upwards. 
To the extent the response of  long rates depends on the effects of  the policy action on 
expectations, the direction of the response varies from  one situation to the another. 
One immediate implication is that apart from the actual monetary policy action, the 
way  this  action  is  presented to  the  public  and  put  into  the  larger  perspective  of 
monetary policy strategy, also affects the way the action is interpreted by the market 
and how it is transmitted to long interest rates. 
III.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES; CO-MOVEMENTS AND CAUSALITY 
Some  recent  studies  (by  Cohen  and  Wenniger,  1994,  and  Lee  and  Prasad,  1994, 
amongst others) have indicated that in the US, correlation between long interest rates 
and policy rates has increased. They interpret this as an increase in the sensitivity of 
long term interest rates to monetary policy. In a similar study on European data Fell 
(1996)  came  into  a  quite  different  conclusion.  His  study  suggests  that  in  most 
countries  the  dependence  of long  interest  rates  on  foreign  rates  has  increased 
significantly whereas the effect of  changes in short rates has decreased. 
21 In interpreting the empirical results, it is important to  make a distinction between a 
causal  effect  from  policy  rates  to  long  rates,  and  the  degree  of comovement 
(correlation) between the two. Comovements can arise from a causal link, but they do 
not necessarily imply causality. Tendency of short and long rates to move together 
may  as  well  be  a result of monetary  authorities  and markets reacting  in a  similar 
manner to the same information. 
There  has  been  a  fairly  general  tendency  in  the  empirical  work  to  interpret 
comovements  between  short  and  long  interest  rates  as  an  indication  of a  causal 
element  of monetary  policy  transmission,  and  hence  changes  in  the  degree  of 
comovement  as  a  change  in  the  effectiveness  of monetary  policy.  A  perceived 
increase in the correlation between policy rates  and long rates  does not necessarily 
imply an improvement in the control of  monetary authorities over long interest rates.1 
Such an observation can stem from a variety of institutional changes which affect the 
way monetary policy reponds to market conditions, such as financial liberalisation, or 
a change in monetary policy regime  from,  say,  exhange rate  targeting to  inflation 
targeting. For example, an inflation-targeting central bank, viewing long interest rates 
as  an  indicator of inflation  expectations  (and  its  own  anti-inflation  credibility),  is 
probably reluctant to reduce policy rates as long as  long interest rates (and inflation 
expectations) stay at a high level. In such circumstances, short and long rates move 
hand in hand even though no causal effect from policy rates to long rates exists. 
This kind of  situation has recently been evident in several European countries. In Italy 
and  Sweden,  for  example,  both  policy  rates  and  long  rates  have  been  reduced 
considerably over the course of 1996.  It is fairly obvious that the reduction in long 
interest rates has  not been due  to  easening of monetary policy.  Instead,  improving 
government finances  has  resulted  in  a "crowding  in" process  and,  together with a 
significant slowdown of inflation, has brought down long interest rates, thus creating 
room for downward movement in policy rates. However, if  one, ex post, runs a simple 
regression of  long rates on short rates, a strong link between the two will emerge, and 
the risk of  drawing incorrect conclusions is obvious. 
As another example, in the US, bond market weights incoming news in the light how 
they are likely to affect the Fed's decisions about the funds rate and adjust bond prices 
accordingly. It can be  argued that this is  a manifestation of Fed's control over the 
bond rates.  In some cases,  Fed's actions do  convey new information about how it 
perceives the economy is developing and what type of monetary policy strategy it is 
likely  to  pursue  in  the  future.  In  such  cases,  the  effects  on  bond  rates  may 
considerable,  as  developments  in  1994  show.  In  that respect,  the  Fed does  indeed 
affect, if  not control, bond rates. 
On the contrary, it can be argued that a tight monetary control should imply a negative rather 
than positive correlation between policy rates and  long interest rates. If a central bank has a 
good credibility, then monetary tightening should reduce inflation expectations and bring down 
long interest rates. 
22 IV.  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES SHAPE THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
SHORT AND LONG RATES 
At least three trends are likely to have contributed to changes in the comovements of 
short and long rates: financialliberalisation, the shift in the 80s in the monetary policy 
paradigm of  many countries, and the prospect of  European Monetary Union. 
Financialliberalisation affects the link between policy rates and long rates in several 
fashions.  First, abandoning  interest rate ceilings obviously affects the behaviour of 
long  interest  rates.  In  regulated  financial  markets,  long  interest  rates  cannot 
necessarily adjust to its equilibrium value, and domestic arbitrage conditions such as 
the expectation theory are generally violated. Secondly, once both domestic financial 
regulation and exchange controls are  removed,  uncovered  interest rate  parity  links 
domestic  long rates  to  foreign  long  rates  and  exchange  rate  expectations.  Overall, 
financialliberalisation has not removed the effect monetary policy has on long interest 
rates, but it has very likely made these effects less direct and thereby decreased the 
degree of  control monetary authorities have on long interest rates. 
A second major trend that has shaped the relationship between short rates and long 
rates in many countries has been a shift in the monetary policy paradigm: expansive 
Keynesian-style  strategy,  trying  to  utilise  the  Phillips  relation,  has  given  way  to 
policies oriented towards price  stability.  This  regime  shift has,  in many  countries, 
taken place  hand  in  hand  with  financial  liberalisation,  thus  making  it  difficult  to 
separately identify the consequences of the two.  Without attempting to describe the 
effects of  this process on the monetary transmission mechanism in any detail, it is safe 
to say that it has had profound effects on the manner central banks react to economic 
developments  and,  once  the  regime  changes  gained  credibility,  also  on  the  way 
markets interpret central banks' actions. 
Finally, in Europe, an essential ingredient in the causal chain from policy rates to long 
rates  is  the  expectation concerning  a country's EMU  participation.  In EMU,  long 
interest rates will be equalised across countries (up to a default risk factor). Presently, 
long interest rate differentials in Europe seem, to a considerable extent, to reflect the 
views of the financial markets about the prospects of each country joining the single 
currency. The more secure the participation is perceived to be, the closer the country's 
interest rates are to the German rates, and the more closely changes in the country's 
long interest rates mirror those in the German long interest rates. On the other hand, 
countries whose participation is perceived as less likely seem to be more sensitive to 
changes in the US interest rates. In these circumstances, policy actions are viewed in 
the  light of whether they increase  or decrease  the  likelihood of a country's EMU 
participation. 
V.  POLICY RATES AND LONG RATES IN EMU 
EMU will have fundamental  effects on the  institutional  setting in which monetary 
policy is exercised in Europe,  but the mechanisms through which monetary  policy 
affects market interest rates change less.  Once the ECB  and the single currency are 
23 established, then by defmition, speculation on a country's EMU participation ceases 
be a consideration that affects long rates. Otherwise, the mechanisms that govern the 
effects of national monetary policies on long rates  apply to  the ECB  as  well.  The 
effect of ECB'  s monetary policy actions on long rates will depend on things such as 
ECB's  anti-inflation  credibility,  the  extent  to  which  the  action  fits  into  market 
expectations, the transparency of ECB' s actions, and of course the overall economic 
framework in which the ECB excercises its monetary policy. 
One possible change is that the sheer size of  the euro area may provide the ECB with 
a limited degree of "monopoly power" as  a supplier of money;  the  set of feasible 
alternatives to euro as a means of  transaction or investment is more limited than is the 
case with today's national currencies. Still, in today's financial markets, the scope of 
utilising such monopoly power is narrow indeed.  As today with national monetary 
policies, the degree of ECB'  s control  over long  interest rates  will  be  limited,  and 
depend on particular circumstances. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The link from central bank rate to long interest rates is not straightforward. Long rates 
are  driven  by  long-term  expectations  concerning  inflation,  exchange  rate  and  the 
economy, and expectations about how these will feed back to future monetary policy. 
Depending on the particular circumstances (including the perceived credibility of the 
policy action) a central bank rate hike may, in principle, result to either an increase or 
decrease  in long  rates.  Empirical  observations  about  the  strength of the  link from 
policy rates to long rates vary, and are generally wide open to different interpretations. 
Perhaps  the  most  plausible  conclusion  is  that  presented  by  Estrella  and  Mishkin 
(1995, p.2) who  state that "  ... the  central bank can  influence the term structure,  but 
cannot control it in any meaningful sense". 
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THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY 
ON THE REAL ECONOMY 
I.  FACTORS INFLUENCING THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY 
The effectiveness of monetary policy depends on a set of parameters which in most 
cases are not under control of the central banks. The reaction of economic agents to 
policy impulses through the money market is the result of complex behavioural and 
institutional  factors,  which are  often deep-rooted  in the  economic  system and  are, 
therefore,  "structural".  As these factors  can vary  substantially across  countries, the 
impact of monetary policy can also be different, in terms of timing, magnitude and 
distributional effects. 
Without  aiming  to  be  exhaustive,  the  following  are  some  of the  more  important 
factors which have been considered in the literature1: 
a)  Differences  in  the  exchange  rate regime  or in  the  regulation  of capital 
flows. 
In  a  context  of fully  liberalised  capital  movements,  the  effectiveness  of 
monetary  policy  strongly  depends  on  the  exchange  rate  regime.  A  fixed 
exchange  rate  regime  will  substantially  limit  the  effectiveness  of monetary 
policy, as risk-adjusted national interest rates cannot significantly deviate from 
the world level.  In a floating exchange rate regime, changes in interest rates will 
give rise to capital flows and to exchange rate movements; hence the exchange 
rate channel will usually add to the interest rate channel and magnify the impact 
of monetary policy. Regulations or other barriers to capital flows may modify 
the above relationships. They may virtually restore the interest rate channel of 
monetary  policy in fixed  exchange  rate  regime  and,  on the  other hand,  may 
attenuate its effectiveness in a floating exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, such 
barriers  to  capital  flows  would  have  other  negative  repercussions  for  the 
economy. 
b)  Differences in the financial structure 
Financial  systems  can differ  substantially between member states  because of 
differences in levels of development and for historical and institutional reasons. 
Among the most important characteristics which can influence the  impact of 
monetary policy are:  the degree of competition within the banking system and 
between banks and other financial institutions; the share of bank credit in total 
financing  (bank  intermediation);  the  development  of securitization the  credit 
maturity;  the  credit  maturity  (including  the  share  of indexed  loans);  the 
The  following  summary  presentation  of possible  sources  of diversities  in  the  response  to 
monetary  impulses  across  countries  is  mainly  based  on  the  literature  on  the  channels  of 
transmission of monetary policy.  For more detailed references to  this  literature see Mishkin 
(1995), Taylor (1995), Bemanke and Gertler (1995), and Meltzer (1995). 
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relationship between the banking system and the corporate sector; the ownership 
in the banking system; the degree of internationalization of the banking system 
and, in particular,  foreign currency holdings; households' access to  the credit 
market; the existence of  credit access constraints for certain agents; the balance-
sheet configurations of financial and non-financial agents, the financing of the 
public sector, the maturity structure of  public debt. 
c)  Differences in labour market structures 
Differences in labour market structure can imply different degrees of real wage 
"stickiness". The effectiveness of monetary policy is higher the quicker a given 
final target (typically price stability) is achieved and the less it costs in terms of 
output  losses.  In  other  words,  the  effectiveness  of monetary  policy  can  be 
measured in terms of the "sacrifice-ratio" of output to inflation. Given that real 
wage  stickiness  is  likely  to  increase  the  sacrifice-ratio,  different  degrees  of 
flexibility  in labour market  can  account  for  a different  impact of  monetary 
policy across countries. 
d)  Differences in the sectoral composition of output 
The  interest-rate  elasticity  of various  components  of domestic  demand  is 
different.  For example, residential investment typically responds with different 
lags  and different intensity to  monetary tightening.  Investment in inventories 
usually  follow  a  pattern of response  different  from  that of total  investment. 
Hence,  compositional  differences  in  domestic  economy  may  account  for  a 
significant part of the measured differential effects of monetary policy across 
countries. 
II.  RELEVANCE OF THESE FACTORS FOR EMU: A PREMISE 
Many questions can be raised in order to  assess the quantitative relevance of these 
factors for a smooth functioning of EMU. How large are these structural differences 
across Member States? Will the transition to a single currency cause significant losses 
of effectiveness of monetary policy? What kind of costs will this imply? How will 
these costs be distributed across countries? 
The existing literature does not provide sufficient elements for an exhaustive response 
to these questions. A good deal of econometric research has been carried out in order 
to estimate the impact of monetary impulses on nominal and real variables in various 
countries.  Part of this research has focused  on European countries, with the aim of 
assessing differences and similarities. For example, evidence has been found that the 
asymmetric  working  of positive  and  negative  money  supply  shocks  is  a  common 
feature to  all European economies (Karras,  1996).  However, there is no  systematic 
attempt to link differences in the final  impact to  structural features of the economy. 
There are  only partial results  which will  be  summarized below.  Before examining 
these results, however,  some general remarks can be made. 
First, for the countries which have participated in the ERM and have strictly respected 
the  exchange  rate  commitment the  loss of monetary  autonomy  would  not involve 
27 significant additional costs, as the real adjustments implied in the abandoning of the 
exchange rate instrument have largely been accomplished.  Hence, the comparison 
should be made not between a hypothetical situation of  perfect monetary sovereignty 
(as  assumed in many econometric models)  and one of complete loss of monetary 
sovereignty; the comparison should rather be made between a situation in that many 
countries have de facto  subordinated their national monetary policy by linking their 
currencies to  an anchor currency and another  in that a  single  monetary  policy  is 
formulated and made operational for all EMU participants. 
Second, there is some evidence that the fmancial structure is affected by the course of 
monetary policy itself. An important example is that of  the anti-inflationary reputation 
of  a central bank, based on historical experience.  The inflation record of a country is 
likely to influence the maturity structure of the contracts and in particular the mix 
between fixed  and floating rates.  There are, however, many other examples which 
could  illustrate  the  complex  interaction  between  monetary  policy  and  financial 
structure.  Therefore, the transition to a single mone~  policy should eliminate an 
important factor behind differences in the European financial systems. 
More  generally,  EMU  will  represent  a  fundamental  regime  change  which  will 
inevitably modify the structural parameters of  national economic systems and, hence, 
the differences across countries. However, while some of  these differences are bound 
to disappear as soon as a single currency becomes a reality, others will only vanish in 
the long run, while others will be permanent. Some of  the factors underlying observed 
asymmetries in the response to monetary policy impulses are endogenous with respect 
to  the  exchange  rate  regime,  and  should  therefore  disappear.  On the  other hand, 
differences in the output composition are likely to remain and could even become 
more important with monetary unification. Differences in the financial structure will 
probably  persist  for  some  time  before  disappearing  as  a  result  of intensified 
competition within the single currency area. 
While  a  complete  analysis  should  consider all  the  factors  which  can account for 
divergences in the impact of  monetary policy, we will focus here on differences in the 
financial systems of  Member States. 
III.  FROM  POLICY  RATES  TO  LENDING  RATES:  DIFFERENCES  IN 
THE SPEED OF MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION 
In the first instance, the intensity of  transmission is linked to the speed and degree to 
which the "policy rate" affects the cost of borrowing money. Empirical research has 
shown that lending  rates  present different  degrees  of "stickiness"  with respect  to 
changes in money market rates. In other words, there are significant differences in the 
speed with which credit rates adjust to changes in policy rates. Table 1 contains some 
estimates of  the impact and lagged multiplier for most European countries. 
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Impact  3 Months  6 Months  Long run 
(1  Month) 
Germany  0.38  0.67  0.83  1.04 
Belgium  0.21  0.61  0.81  1.03 
Netherlands  0.52  0.97  1.03  1.04 
France(*)  0.43  0.45  0.51  0.74 
Italy  0.11  0.40  0.61  1.22 
Spain  0.35  0.80  0.98  1.12 
Portugal  0.28  0.77  0.97  1.03 
Ireland  0.32  0.80  0.96  1.03 
United Kingdom  0.82  1.02  1.04  1.04 
Denmark  0.07  0.25  0.38  0.71 
Finland  0.13  0.20  0.27  0.60 
Greece  0.00  0.40  0.74  1.05 
(*)The multipliers for France are not comparable with the others' (see data source). 
Data Source:  All the  estimates  are  from  Cottarelli  and  Kourelis  ( 1995)  except for 
France, which is not included in this study. Estimates for France come from Borio and 
Fritz (1995). The multipliers are computed on the basis of long series of monthly data, 
with the sample period varying across countries, but ending in general in 1993. 
According  to  the  above  estimates,  the  adjustment  is  very  rapid  in the  UK,  where 
around 80% of  the adjustment of  lending rate to money market rates occurs within one 
month.  The bulk of the  countries are  situated in a middle  position,  as  the  impact 
effect ranges  from  one  half to  one third of the total  and the  response  is  complete 
within six months.  In the Scandinavian countries the adjustment is slow, and does not 
sum to unity even in the long-run.  Also in Italy and Greece the impact effect is low; 
however, in both cases some 40% of  the adjustment is achieved within a quarter. 
There are many factors which may explain these differences in the responsiveness of 
lending  rates  to  changes  in  policy  rates.  Cottarelli  and  Kourelis  (1995)  have 
documented the role of some structural features of the financial system. Their results 
indicate  that  the  transmission  of monetary  policy  impulses  to  lending  rates  is 
smoother when  there are no constraints on bank competition (in particular, barriers to 
entry), when the banking system is privately owned, when capital flows are perfectly 
liberalized, when  there is an efficient market for negotiable short-term instruments, 
and  when  random  fluctuations  in the  money  market  rates  are  contained.  The  UK 
financial  system,  which is  characterized by  all  of these  features  and  hence,  is  the 
system  in which  the  adjustment  of banking  rates,  and  hence  the  transmission  of 
monetary impulses, seems to be more rapid.  On the other hand, in countries where 
competition  in  the  banking  system  is  less  developed  or  public  ownership  of 
commercial banks is still prevailing, lending rates show a  higher degree of  stickiness. 
The most important implication of different lag structures in the transmission from 
policy rates to  lending rates  is  that the  response  of the  real  economy  to  monetary 
impulses will also  have different timing and intensity.  This means that in EMU, as 
long  as  differences  in the  financial  structures  persist,  monetary  impulses  from  the 
29 ECB  could impact asynchronously on the economies of the participating countries, 
thus increasing the risk of  policy-induced economic divergence. 
IV.  DIFFERENCES IN THE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY ON THE 
REAL ECONOMY: PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
A first line of quantitative research aiming at identifying cross-country differences in 
the  real  impact of monetary  policy has  developed  using  the  vector  autoregressive 
systems (V  AR) methodology.2  However, contrary to expectation, a common finding 
of recent studies using V  AR systems seems to be that the real impact of a monetary 
policy change is fairly similar in scale and in time across western countries. 
Barran Codert and Mojon (1996) have analysed the response to a monetary shock in 
nine EU countries (Austria, Germany, France, the UK,  Denmark, Finland, Italy and 
Spain)  using  a  V  AR model  including  real  GDP,  the  consumer price  index,  the 
exchange rate and the money market interest rate.  The main result is that a monetary 
(restrictive) shock induces an output decline in all  countries, ranging from  0.2% to 
0.7%3.  The  magnitude  is  highest  in  Germany  and  lowest  in  the  Scandinavian 
countries, while the other countries are somewhere in between. Delays are longer in 
the countries where the effect is more pronounced.  Overall, however, the effects on 
the output level are transitory and the trough is reached between four and ten quarters. 
Gerlach  and  Smets  (1995)  compare  the  effects  of monetary  policy on output and 
prices  in the  G-7  countries  using  a  parsimonious  V  AR model  comprising  output, 
prices and the short-term interest rate. They present a set of simulations of the effect 
of a "standardised" monetary  shock4•  The results of this exercise for  the  European 
countries participating in the G-7 (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) show that there 
are  no  large  differences  in  the  transmission  mechanism  between  countries.  In  all 
cases, the effect of a monetary tightening on output is  quite rapid,  while consumer 
prices start to react with a delay of around one year. However, the point estimates of 
the effect of  a monetary shock on output and prices are larger in Germany than in Italy 
and France. The estimates for the United Kingdom fall  somewhere in between. The 
authors  explain these  differences  by  a  stronger  impact  through  the  exchange  rate 
channel in Germany. 
2 
3 
4 
The  appeal of the  econometrics  of V  ARs  is  that the  number of restrictions  required in  the 
modeling strategy is  very limited.  This is  a big advantage when many countries are involved 
and the introduction of  important common restrictions could considerably distort the results. 
A direct comparison of  the impulse responses across countries is made difficult by the fact that a 
typical monetary policy shock varies  in  size  and  duration across  countries  (for example,  in 
Germany the typical shock is small in terms of basis points but quite persistent, in Italy is larger 
but transitory). The authors  have analysed the response to a "typical" shock, which has been 
identified within the V  AR framework.  This means that the absolute magnitude of  the shock can 
differ across countries. This is the approach most used to identify monetary shocks.  However, it 
becomes problematic if  the focus is on differences in the response to a same shock,  as it would 
be in case of  a single monetary policy. 
A standardised shock is here defmed as a rise in short-term rates by I 00 basis points mantained 
for eight quarters, after which the interest rate is returned to the baseline. 
30 The results  from  the  V  AR modeling,  although pointing  to  some  minor differences 
across  countries,  seem to  be  in contrast to  what we  would  expect on  the  basis  of 
common  knowledge  about  the  structure  of money  and  financial  markets  of the 
European countries.  For example, we would expect the impact of monetary policy to 
be stronger and more rapid in the UK, where the financial structure seems to be more 
responsive to  policy signals,  and  slower and weaker in many continental countries. 
The problem with V  AR econometrics is that the results are very sensitive to the ways 
in which the models are identified.  Therefore, the finding that differences in monetary 
policy effectiveness between countries are limited could simply reflect the inadequacy 
of  the V  AR techniques in documenting such differences.  Actually, simulations with 
structural models lead to quite different results, apparently more plausible. 
Iabk....l:  Simulation with  central  bank  models:  impact of a  temporary  1 percentage  point increase in  short-term 
interest rates on prices,  output, investment, and consumption in 8 EU countries(*) 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Consumer prices 
Germany  -0.03  -0.14  -0.31  -0.45  -0.55 
France  -0.05  -0.15  -0.25  -0.32  -0.32 
Italy  -0.48  -0.64  -0.53  -0.17  0.10 
United Kingdom  0.89  1.89  -0.46  -2.36  -3.48 
Netherlands  -0.13  -0.35  -0.35  -0.23  -0.27 
Belgium  -0.14  -0.48  -0.79  -0.81  -0.55 
Spain  -0.26  -0.54  -0.66  -0.95  -1.28 
Austria  -0.02  0.18  0.05  -0.25  -0.31 
ReaiGDP 
Germany  -0.15  -0.37  -0.30  -0.07  0.09 
France  -0.18  -0.36  -0.20  0.01  0.07 
Italy  -0.32  -0.53  -0.22  -0.08  -0.13 
United Kingdom  -0.35  -0.89  -0.59  0.01  0.24 
Netherlands  -0.10  -0.18  -0.15  -0.09  -0.01 
Belgium  -0.03  -0.12  -0.23  -0.15  0.02 
Spain  -0.05  -0.02  0.03  -0.17  -0.17 
Austria  -0.08  -0.14  -0.02  0.04  0.01 
Private investment 
Germany  -0.43  -1.21  -0.80  0.30  0.63 
France  - - - - -
Italy (excl. inventories)  -1.10  -2.29  -1.95  -1.72  -2.28 
United Kingdom  -1.54  -4.20  -3.30  -1.80  -2.70 
Netherlands  - - - - -
Belgium  -0.34  -1.67  -2.72  1.68  -0.25 
Spain  -0.43  -0.88  -1.01  -0.92  -0.49 
Austria  - - - - -
Private consumption 
Germany  -0.14  -0.26  -0.13  0.02  0.13 
France  0.07  0.01  -0.05  0.04  0.08 
Italy  -0.13  -0.30  0.00  0.38  0.44 
United Kingdom  -0.36  -0.88  -0.67  -0.22  0.05 
Netherlands  -0.05  -0.16  -0.22  -0.18  -0.04 
Belgium  0.01  0.02  -0.07  -0.10  0.00 
Spain  -0.04  0.19  0.16  -0.14  0.05 
Austria  -0.12  -0.15  -0.08  -0.12  -0.12 
(*) In this simulation, short-term rates increase by  100 basis points at the beginning of 1994 and remain at that level for eight 
quarters, after which they return to the baseline. 
Source:  Smets, 1995,  pp. 244-247. 
The  most comprehensive  attempt to  shed  light on  differences  in the  transmission 
mechanism  and  the  impact  of monetary  policy  using  structural  models  has  been 
conducted at the BIS (Smets,  1995), as  a part of a wider project not yet concluded. 
The exercise has compared the responses of real and nominal variables to a 100-basis-
31 point increase in policy rates maintained for  two  years.  The simulations have been 
made using national central bank models for their own economies, which have quite 
different structures.  The exercise has 
2concerned twelve countries, including eight EU 
countries:  Germany,  France,  Italy,  the  UK,  Belgium,  Spain,  Austria,  and  the 
Netherlands.  The results  show the  impact of an interest rate hike on a large  set of 
nominal  and  real  variables.  Table  2,  above,  reports  some  results  relative  to  the 
European countries. 
Unlike  the  V  AR results,  the  estimates  from  the  central  bank  models  show  quite 
important  differences  in  the  real  impact  of monetary  policy  across  countries. 
Moreover, these results are  broadly consistent with common a priori beliefs.  The 
impact  of a  monetary  tightening  is  stronger  in  the  UK  than  in some  continental 
European countries.  Germany and France show a very similar pattern of response. 
Italy is in a middle position, probably because  the share of the variable rate credit is 
close to 75%, as it is in the UK. 
A  likely  explanation  for  these  results  is  that  central  bank  models  tend  to  reflect 
differences in financial structures across countries. For example, while V  AR models 
only include short-term interest rates,  central bank models  generally  include  short-
term and long term interest rates  (the only  exception being the  Bank of England 
model), and often identify the spending components which depend on long-term rates. 
Hence, they not only account for differences in the response of long-term rates to a 
change in policy rates but also reflect the fact that the importance of short-term and 
long-term rates varies across countries and spending components.  This specification 
is sufficient to capture at least part of  the effects of  different financial structures. 
However,  the  use  of different  central  bank  models  to  compare  simulation  results 
across countries is subject to the risk that differences in modelling methodologies may 
influence the simulation results.  On the other hand,  even comprehensive structural 
models such those of the central banks are far from accounting for the complexity of 
the financial  systemss.  For these reasons the  above  point estimates  should not be 
given excessive confidence. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical research on cross-country differences in the impact of monetary policy on 
the  real  economy  has  not  yet  achieved  conclusive  results.  Nonetheless,  there  are 
indications that differences exist at various levels of the transmission mechanism and 
are  potentially  important.  Differences  seem  to  emerge  already  in  the  transmission 
from policy rate to lending rates, as well as in the reaction of long-term interest rates 
to  monetary impulses.  Simulations with central  bank models also  point to  a broad 
pattern of response  of aggregate  demand  and  its  components.  In this  context,  the 
impact on inflation varies in time and magnitude depending on national features of  the 
transmission mechanism. 
5  On these points, see the caveats expressed by the co-ordinator of  the exercise (Smets, 1995). 
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While  part  of these  differences  are  likely  to  depend  on  the  characteristic  of the 
financial  structure of individual countries, the current state of research only permits 
the  formulation  of few  hypotheses  consistent  with  the  empirical  research.  For 
example,  it  seems  that  the  efficiency  and  the  deepness  of the  money  market  are 
important for the smooth transmission of monetary policy impulses to lending rates. 
The degree of  competitiveness in the banking system also seems to be relevant for the 
efficient  operation  of monetary  policy.  Economic  systems  where  the  share  of 
adjustable debt is higher tend to show a more rapid and intense response to monetary 
policy changes. 
It is difficult, on this basis, to draw sensible policy conclusions. Clearly, any reform 
aiming  at  increasing  the  efficiency  of money  and  credit  market  goes  in  the  right 
direction,  but further  research  is  needed to  single  out more  specific  interventions. 
Nonetheless, also the simple mapping of  the way the transmission mechanism works 
in different Member States could become an important instrument for the design and 
the implementation of  a single monetary policy in EMU . 
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THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While EMU implies an economic policy regime change primarily for the participating 
countries,  it  will  also  have  important  external  implications.  Given  the  economic 
importance of the euro area, the introduction of the euro will have significant effects 
on Member States outside of the area as well as on countries outside of  the European 
Union. These so-called external aspects will be investigated in this chapter. 
However,  exact quantification of the external effects of EMU  will not be  possible. 
Firstly, many of  these effects will be felt only gradually and will depend upon private 
sector  expectations,  while  other  effects  will  already  be  felt  before  the  euro  is 
introduced.  Secondly,  some  of the  effects  will  work  in  opposite  directions,  for 
example, there might be  an increased demand for  euro assets but also an increased 
supply of such assets so that the effects of portfolio movements on the exchange rate 
of  the euro are difficult to appreciate.  Thirdly, by definition, the external effects of  the 
euro will depend not only upon the economic policies and performance in the euro 
area but also on those of  partner countries. 
This paper is organised as follows.  Section II describes the structural changes to the 
international economy likely to result from EMU. For simplicity, we will assume in 
the remainder of the analysis that the euro area comprises the entire European Union 
so as to avoid any presumptions concerning the size of initial participation. Section III 
discusses the implications of the changed policy framework of the euro area. Section 
IV attempts to draw some conclusions on the likely behaviour of the euro given the 
structural changes due to EMU and the different environment in which monetary and 
fiscal policy will be operating. Sections III  and IV examine only long-term aspects, 
without discussing transitional issues1• Section V analyses the consequences of EMU 
for international economic co-ordination and section VI concludes. 
II.  THE STRUCTURAL CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY EMU 
EMU will have the effect of creating a very large currency area with an economic 
weight similar to that of the United States and with a single, deep and large financial 
market.  These  characteristics  will  promote  the  development  of the  euro  as  an 
international currency.  These  structural changes are  likely to  have an  effect on the 
exchange rate of  the euro. 
On issues of the transition period (such as dollar overhang, portfolio adjustments or monetary 
stance in the early stages of  the ECB), see Benassy-Quere et al. (1997a), European Commission 
(1997) and Masson and Turtelboom (1997). 
35 Principal characteristics of  the euro area 
An EMU of 15 Member States will have the following main characteristics 
(see table 1): 
•  Its  economic  and  commercial  weight  will  be  comparable  to  that  of the 
United States and larger than that of  Japan.  In 1996 the European Union's share 
of the GDP in the OECD amounted to 38.3%, as against 32.5% for the United 
States and 20.5o/o for Japan.  If  intra-Community trade is excluded, the European 
Union accounts  for  20.9% of world  trade,  as  compared with  19.6% for  the 
United States and 10.5% for Japan. 
•  The average degree of openness of the Member States of the European Union 
(as measured by the share of  exports in GDP) is currently 29.8%, compared with 
8.2% for the United States and 9% for Japan.  The degree of openness of some 
Member States is higher, rising to more than 60% in the case of Belgium and 
Ireland.  If intra-Community trade is excluded, the  degree of openness of the 
euro area is 10.2%, similar to that of  the United States and Japan. 
•  Due  largely  to  a  convergence  of economic  policy  objectives,  the  economic 
cycles in the different Member States have over the last ten years become more 
synchronised.  This  trend  will  be  reinforced  in  EMU  owing  to  the 
implementation of a single monetary and exchange rate policy, the increase in 
economic interdependence and the likely intensification of economic policy co-
ordination.  This  greater  cyclical  synchronisation,  combined  with  the  size  of 
EMU, will make economic developments in the euro area more important to the 
world. 
•  The economic performance of euro area will be less sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations.  This reduced vulnerability will  result from  the disappearance of 
strains  between  European  currencies  that  can  stem  from  fluctuations  in  the 
currencies of  third countries or shocks outside the European Union. The implied 
exchange rate variability within the single market which reduced consumer and 
investor  confidence,  will  disappear  with  the  euro' s  arrival.  But  this  lower 
sensitivity of  the euro area to exchange rate fluctuations does not imply that the 
euro area will adopt an attitude of "benign neglect "towards the euro exchange 
rate (see section IV). 
TABLE 1 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS:  US - JAPAN- EUROPEAN UNION 
USA 
Japan 
EU15 
• 
•• 
Population 
(Mio) 
1995 
263 
12S 
370 
Excludmg mtra-EU trade 
Source: IMF 
Sbareof  Sbare of 
OECDGDP(%)  world trade 
(o/o) 
1996 
1996 
32.5  19.6 
20.5  10.5 
38.3  20.9* 
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Export  Foreign exc:bange 
GDP ratio ("/•)  reserve~ 
inBNS 
1996 
end 1995*-
8.2  49.1 
9  172.4 
10.2  349.8 Euro financial market 
The major structural changes resulting from EMU will occur in financial markets. The 
present segmentation will be overcome in many respects and the European financial 
market will become truly integrated, providing opportunities in the form of broader 
funding and investment possibilities.  EMU will create one of the largest government 
bond markets in the world.  This market can be expected to develop rapidly.  From the 
beginning of EMU, all new issues of government bonds will be in euro.  However, 
European financial markets and therefore government bond markets can be expected 
to retain a number of country-specific characteristics (due to different tax treatments 
and a  wide range of financial  and monetary rules  and instruments)  for  an interim 
period at least. EMU will diminish a number of  these elements 
There will also be no single sovereign borrower on the euro markets as in the case of 
the Treasury in the United States. The yield on corresponding government bonds in 
Member States participating in the euro area may not converge completely. But yield 
differences which will reflect the market's assessment of default risk, are likely to be 
small  given nominal  convergence required on entry  and the  commitment to  avoid 
excessive public sector deficits thereafter. 
Internationalisation of  the euro 
Various factors,  such as the size of EMU, the stability oriented policy-mix and the 
wide  financial  market  underpinning  it,  should  facilitate  the  development  of the 
international use of  the  euro2.  The behaviour of private operators, however, will be 
the most important factor.  The development of the euro's international role should 
first show itself in the countries which have close economic, trade and financial links 
with the European Union, such as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
some Mediterranean and African countries.  At the world level, these developments 
will be more gradual given the inertia effects that have prolonged the international 
role of  the dollar since the end of  the Bretton Woods system (see Benassy-Quere et al. 
(1997a) and Ilzkovitz (1996)). 
The  use  of the  euro  in an area  whose  economic  and  commercial  weight  will  be 
equivalent to that of the United States should reduce the information and transaction 
costs  associated  with  its  use.  Companies  which  trade  principally  with  the 
European Union will be prompted to invoice and pay in euros.  With the euro being 
widely used in international trade transactions, European exporters and importers will 
no longer have to carry exchange rate risks or cover themselves against such risks. 
The euro could also be used as a vehicular currency in commercial transactions not 
involving member countries of EMU. For example, if use of  the euro were equivalent 
2  A currency develops  at international level  when  its  use  extends beyond the frontiers  of the 
issuing country and when it is used by private and official operators as a means of payment, a 
unit of  account and a store of  value (see Icard (1996)). 
37 simply to that of the German mark today3  (see box, Table 2), 30% of world exports 
would be invoiced in euros following the changeover to EMU. 
The impact of  the euro' s introduction on the allocation of  private portfolios is difficult 
to assess since it is hard to forecast the reaction of  economic agents to a new currency. 
Furthermore, there are transitional and steady state effects. However, in the long term, 
the factors already identified will tend to increase the attractiveness of the euro.  The 
simple  conversion of assets  currently  held  in European  currencies  into  euros  will 
mean that more than a third of the world portfolio will be  denominated in euros, a 
percentage equivalent to that of the dollar.  Exchange rate effects of such portfolios 
movements should remain limited because movements will occur gradually, they are 
part of a diversification trend which has been in progress since the  1980s (see box, 
Table  4(a)and  (b))  and  the  increased  demand  for  euro  assets  is  likely  to  be 
accompanied by an increased supply of  such assets. 
The use of the euro as a reserve currency should also develop. The diversification of 
foreign-exchange reserves in favour of the euro will be linked to its increased use as 
an  instrument  of intervention  on  foreign-exchange  markets  and  as  an  invoicing 
currency in world trade. It will mainly depend on the euro intrinsic qualities and its 
use in the denomination of international financial transactions. This diversification of 
reserves in favour of  the euro would continue a trend that is already evident (see box, 
Table 1(a)). 
III.  THE POLICY-MIX IN THE EURO AREA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
EURO'S EXCHANGE RATE 
The long-term trend of the euro will depend on both domestic and foreign economic 
developments and policies. These policies will take place within the framework set 
out by the  Maastricht Treaty that is designed to ensure that the Community is an area 
of  economic growth and stability. 
The institutional framework 
As from 1 January 1999, a single monetary policy will be formulated by the European 
Central Bank.  The Bank will  be independent and its priority objective will  be  to 
safeguard price stability in the euro area.  Fiscal policies will be the responsibility of 
Member States but budgetary discipline will be  guaranteed by Treaty obligations to 
avoid excessive deficits and to submit stability and growth programmes designed to 
maintain a budgetary situation close to balance or in surplus in the medium term. 
The Treaty (article 109) organises the exchange rate policy in three levels: 
3  It is  assumed here  that the  euro's intemationalisation ratio  will  be  equivalent to that of the 
German mark, that ratio being defmed as the ratio of world exports denominated in marks to 
Germany's  world  exports.  This  intemationalisation  ratio  is  1.4  in  the  case  of the  mark, 
compared with 3.6 for the dollar. 
38 •  The conclusion of  formal agreements on an exchange rate system which will be 
the  responsibility  of the  Council.  However,  this  requires  a  recommendation 
from either the ECB or the Commission,  the ECB having to be consulted in an 
endeavour to reach a consensus consistent with the objective of  price stability. 
•  General orientations for exchange rate policy which may,  in the absence of an 
exchange  rate  system,  be  formulated  by  the  Council  but have  to  be  without 
prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB to maintain price stability. The 
ECB  would  have  to  organise  its  operations  in  a  way  consistent  with  these 
orientations, which however must not contravene the primary objective of price 
stability, the ECB  being entrusted with the task of conducting  monetary  and 
exchange rate policies with the view to respecting this objective. 
•  Conduct  of foreign  exchange  operations  for  which  the  ECB  will  have  sole 
responsibility. 
The impact of  the policy-mix on the euro exchange rate 
In  the  longer  term,  exchange  rates  are  determined  principally  by  fundamental 
economic  factors  such  as  growth,  inflationary  strains,  productivity,  budget 
balances, .... These fundamental factors in turn depend on the economic policy pursued, 
the  policy  mix.  Structural  policies,  such  as  those  designed  to  improve  the 
competitiveness of European firms or to increase the flexibility of product and labour 
markets, may also influence the euro' s exchange rate. 
The economic policy factors which will influence the euro' s exchange rate fall  into 
two  categories:  internal  and  external.  At the  European  level,  the  conditions  for  a 
stability-oriented monetary policy are set out in the Treaty. The independence of the 
ECB and a fiscal policy avoiding excessive deficits are the basis upon which monetary 
policy will maintain stability and hence  sustainable growth.  A balanced policy mix 
should  lead  to  sustainable  low  long-term  interest  rates  enabling  easy  monetary 
conditions at an exchange rate which is appropriate in view of  economic conditions. 
Considering the economic prospects for the European economy compared to that of 
the  United States,  different cyclical positions will  impact on the  stance  of relative 
economic policies  and thus on the exchange rate.  Given the  Union's objectives to 
achieve both fiscal  consolidation and full  employment, this creates conditions for  a 
relatively easy monetary stance in the euro area.  Given that fiscal policy is committed 
to reducing the deficit towards close to balance or surplus, monetary policy would be 
able  to  conduct  a  fairly  accommodative  policy  without  jeopardising  its  primary 
objective of  price stability. 
In summary, the euro could evolve into an international currency in an environment of · 
internal  stability.  In  addition  to  these  factors,  which  are  influenced  primarily  by 
domestic  economic  policies,  the  euro  exchange  rate  would  also  be  influenced  by 
external economic developments. 
39 IV.  EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN THE EURO AREA 
This section discusses two issues that are closely interrelated. First, the issue of the 
euro variability and second, the issue of  the exchange rate regime. 
The euro variability 
It is  difficult to determine whether the exchange rate variability of the euro against 
other major currencies such as the dollar and the yen will be greater than that of the 
mark, as arguments working in opposite directions can be given. 
Martin (1994 and 1997) argues that the euro-dollar exchange rate could be more stable 
than the DM-dollar exchange rate. His argument is that the euro area will have a lower 
incentive to use strategically the exchange rate to stabilise the economy because of  the 
large size of  the euro area and because output depends less on the exchange rate in a 
large country than in  a small one. 
However,  other  authors  (Artus  (1996  and  1997),  Benassy-Quere  et  al.  (1997b), 
Bergsten (  1997) and Cohen ( 1997)) argue that EMU should lead to higher exchange 
rate variability. They consider that EMU, being a n1ore closed economy, will be less 
concerned with trade  imbalances  and  the  inflation  consequences  of exchange  rate 
changes.  Furthermore, one motivation of the European Union to  take an interest in 
external monetary developments has  been the EMS  strains caused by  a weakening 
dollar. Hence, according to these authors, the creation of  the euro will eliminate one of 
the EU'  s main interest in managing exchange rates.  This suggests that the euro area 
could adopt an attitude of  "benign neglect" towards the euro' s exchange rate. 
But such an attitude would be at odds with Europe's experience of co-ordination. It 
would  expose  it  to  the  danger  of  excessive  fluctuations  or  even  prolonged 
misalignments, in the euro' s exchange rate which could undermine the viability of  the 
global  trading  system.  Periods  of misalignments  are  frequently  accompanied  by 
protectionist  temptations.  Furthermore,  it  is  likely  that  there  will  be  pressure  to 
include exchange rate considerations in the conduct of  economic policy. This pressure 
could  stem  from  sectors  or  regions  which  are  more  dependent  on  the 
extra-Community  market  for  their  sales.  The  ECB,  national  governments  and 
Community  bodies  will  continue  to  take  account of the  euro' s  exchange  rate,  the 
former  primarily  because  it  may  affect  the  price-stability  objective  and  the  latter 
because  it  will  influence  cost-competitiveness  and  the  growth  outlook  for  the 
European economy. 
The EU's increased influence on the international monetary scene will also provide an 
opportunity for  increased economic dialogue with its partners.  The  adoption of the 
euro should therefore be seen as an opportunity to put an end to the erratic fluctuations 
and prolonged misalignments of  the type that occurred between 1980 and 1985 and to 
contribute  to  achieving  more  stable  international  monetary  relations.  This  could 
contribute  to  creating  greater  exchange  rate  stability  in the  international  monetary 
system  .. 
40 The future exchange regime of the euro area 
A more difficult question is whether a more structured exchange rate regime should be 
envisaged to manage the steady-state relationship that will eventually emerge between 
the euro and the dollar and the yen. A priori, there is no reason to expect that the euro 
area would require any change from the current system which seeks to correct marked 
misalignments  and  excessive  exchange  rate  fluctuations  through  a  combination  of 
economic policy dialogue, the occasional use  of interventions and verbal exchange 
rate management. 
However,  some authors consider that the risk of increased volatility and prolonged 
misalignments  are  good  arguments  in  favour  of  new  currency  management 
arrangements.  An option which  is  discussed  is  that  of target  zones  (see  Bergsten 
(1997)  and  Artis  and  Salmon  (1997)).  This  system  implies  the  adoption  of an 
exchange rate objective but with relatively large fluctuation margins. However, there 
are a number of technical difficulties associated with the implementation of such a 
system4 and its advantages over a softer system of managed floating are not clearly 
demonstrated.  This  option  is  also  unrealistic  before  the  euro  reaches  its  eventual 
steady  state  as  there would be  no  sound  basis  on which to  base  the  target.  Other 
options  to  improve  the  current  system  exist.  For  example,  the  surveillance  of 
economic policies and the transparency of  the co-ordination may be increased. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF EMU FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
SYSTEM 
The completion of EMU has  the potential to  lead to  an  important evolution in the 
international monetary system. But the establishment of European Monetary Union is 
a natural continuation of the on-going process of European integration and the single 
currency  is  being  introduced  at  a time  when  the  international  monetary  system  is 
already in a period of transition, with the dominant position of the dollar giving way 
to  a  more  multi-polar  system.  Such  a  system  is  not  inherently  less  stable  than  a 
unipolar system but, by definition, appropriate arrangements for co-operation between 
poles will be crucial to the stability of  the system. 
The implementation of  EMU will also tend to make the international monetary system 
more symmetrical with the potential gains to be obtained from co-ordination tending 
to  be  more  uniformly  distributed  among  the  various  partners.  European economic 
policies  are  likely  to  have  bigger  spill-over effects  on the  economies  of Europe's 
partners.  Monetary  policy  in  EMU,  particularly  under  the  assumption  of  a 
synchronised  European  business  cycle,  would  certainly  have  an  impact  on  global 
interest rate constellations. European monetary unification and financial integration, 
which will increase the attractiveness of euro-denominated assets, will also give the 
ECB 's actions an international dimension beyond that of the national central banks 
4  Such as the choice of  the central rate to be targeted, the width of  the bands,  the instruments to 
keep the exchange rate commitment...(see European Commission (I  994)). 
41 today.  On the other hand, the removal of  the possibility ofintra-EU tensions triggered 
by international exchange rate movements removes  one  source of EU  vulnerability 
towards  the  outside  world  (see  Bergsten  (1997),  Henning  (1996a  and  b)).  The 
development of  a more balanced international monetary system might result in greater 
difficulty  in managing  exchange  rate  internationally  (see  Alogoskoufis  and  Portes 
(1997))  but  it  could  also  create  an  opportunity  to  strengthen  the  effectiveness  of 
economic policy co-ordination 
The direct implication of EMU is that the EU will have a single exchange rate and a 
single monetary policy, and that it will be  the policy mix at European level that is 
relevant for the rest of  the world and for any international macro-economic policy co-
ordination. Although part of  this policy mix is the result of policies set at the national 
level,  the  obligation  of the  member  States  to  closely  co-ordinate  their  economic 
policies (Article 3a) and the different procedures set out in the Treaty to accomplish 
this  should enable  the  euro  area to  pursue  consistent policies  and  provide  a valid 
reference point for international economic affairs, both bilaterally and in international 
bodies. 
This reality is reflected in the Maastricht Treaty, and in particular in Article 109( §3, 4 
and 5) of the EC  Treaty.  This Article not only sets out internal procedures for the 
Community to establish an exchange rate policy, as discussed earlier, but also offers a 
framework which will allow the EU to be an effective actor on the international stage 
on macro-economic and monetary issues.  Although the Article is complex, there are 
several principal points: 
•  it  is  clear  that  the  EU,  or  the  euro  area,  must  establish,  where  relevant,  a 
common  position  for  international  discussion  of  "agreements  concerning 
monetary  or  foreign-exchange  regime  matters"  and  on  "issues  of particular 
relevance to economic and monetary union"; 
•  responsibility for  these matters  lies with the  Council, although both the ECB 
and  the  Commission  have  roles  to  play.  The  underlying  intention  of these 
provisions is to make clear that the Council and the ECB co-operate in this area 
in a way that recognises ECB responsibility for monetary policy and the primary 
objective of  price stability; 
•  the representation of the  Community at  international  level  is  for  decision by 
unanimity,  although  it  must  respect  the  allocation  of competences  in  the 
economic and monetary union. 
These issues will need serious discussion both within the Community, and with the 
Community's partners in the relevant international organisations, since the advent of 
EMU  will  also  have  implications  for  how  some  of these  institutions  operate.  A 
straightforward  case  concerns  the  IMF  whose  balance  of payment  assistance  and 
economic surveillance will be affected by EMU. 
42 (4) 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The main messages of this analysis are,  firstly,  that the establishment of EMU will 
have important implications not only for Member states but also for countries outside 
the European Union.  Secondly, that these changes will only take place gradually and 
that there is no reason to expect more instability in the long term in the international 
monetary system  .. 
The major changes induced by EMU are  that much of the  present segmentation of 
European financial markets will be overcome, that the euro will play a progressively 
more  important role  as  an international currency  and  consequently that the  ECB's 
actions will have  an international dimension beyond that of national  central banks 
today.  More generally , by creating a currency area whose economic and commercial 
weight will be comparable to that of the United States, EMU will increase the spill-
over effects of  European economic policies on the economies of  its partners. 
A priori, the policy-mix prevailing in the euro area is likely to be of the right kind, 
with the monetary policy aimed at price stability and budgetary discipline guaranteed 
by the Stability and Growth Pact. The euro should therefore be a stable currency.  The 
future exchange rate policy of  the euro area is likely to be similar to the current one, in 
which  a  floating  system  is  complemented  by  international  co-ordination.  By 
increasing symmetry in the international monetary system, EMU should ensure that 
the benefits to be gained from international co-ordination are more equally distributed. 
The establishment of EMU is thus an opportunity to strengthen the effectiveness of 
international economic co-ordination, contributing to greater stability of international 
economic relations. 
There is therefore no reason to expect that the euro-dollar exchange rate will be less 
stable  than the  DM-dollar  exchange  rate.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  and  in particular 
Article  109  offers  a  framework  which  will  allow  the  European  Union  to  be  an 
effective actor in international discussions of macro-economic and monetary issues. 
But EMU will also have implications for the operation of international institutions, 
such as the economic surveillance carried out by the IMF.  These issues need to be 
clarified to permit effective co-ordination at the world level. 
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45 l.Official role 
A.  Share of  total official currency holdings (%) 
end 1973 
US dollar  76.1 
Euro_pean currencies1  14.3 
ofwhich: German mark  7.1 
Yen  0.1 
Pound sterhng, German mark, French franc, Dutch gmlder 
~: IMF annual reports. 
B.  Number of  currencies linked to:  1983 
the dollar  34 
European currencies (including the ecu)  18 
~: IMF annual reports. 
2 Correne~  use in international trade 
Share of  the main currencies as regards use in international trade 
1980 
end 1983  end 1995 
71.1  61.5 
15.8  20.1 
11.7  14.2 
4.9  7.4 
1994  1994 (% ofworld GNP) 
25  1.53 
19  0.25 
1992 
% of world exports in  Internationalisation ra  % of  world exports in  lnternationalisation ra 
US dollar  56.4 
German mark  13.6 
Yen  2.1 
1 
~: 
..  For the defimt10n, see footnote 1 of  text. 
European Commission 
3 Transactions on foreign-exchan2e markets 
Breakdown of transactions by currency1 
US dollar 
German mark 
Yen 
Other 
Total as %2 
1  Gross turnover.  Dally averages. 
4.5  47.6  3.6 
1.4  15.5  1.4 
0.3  4.8  0.6 
Aprill989  Aprill992  Aprill995 
90  82  83 
27  40  37 
27  23  24 
56  55  56 
200  200  200 
2  Since any transaction on the foreign-exchange market involves two currencies, the total of the proportions of transactions 
involving a given currency is 200%. 
~: BIS, surveys of  activities on foreign-exchange markets 
4 Correne~  in which financial assets and liabilities are denominated 
A.  Share of  outstanding international bonds 
end 1981  end 1992  end 1995 
Dollar  52.6  40.3  34.2 
European currencies  20.2  33.0  37.1 
ofwhich: German mark  n.a.  10.0  12.3 
Yen  6.9  12.4  15.7 
.. 
~:  BIS, mtemat10nal bankmg and financ1al actiVIty 
B.  Share of  world private portfolio 
end 1981  end 1992  end 1995 
Dollar  67.3  46.0  39.8 
European currencies  13.2  35.2  36.9 
ofwhich: German mark  n.a.  14.7  15.6 
Yen  2.2  6.9  11.5 
. . 
~:  BIS, mtematiOnal bankmg and financ1al act1v1ty, and own calculatiOns . (11.5) 
ACHIEVING BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE 
The Maastricht Consolidation Process 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is currently a growing awareness in the literature and among governments that 
strong political biases lie at the root of the tendency of governments to run excessive 
deficits and accumulate debt. There is compelling evidence that governments do not 
smooth taxes, as deficits during periods of  economic hardship are not counterbalanced 
by  budgetary  improvements  on  a  sufficient  scale  in  periods  of strong  economic 
growth. 
To restrain their bias towards spending and deficit, governments in most industrialised 
countries  are  at  present  considering,  or  have  already  adopted,  measures  to  force 
themselves into  a straitjacket of budgetary discipline.  They are  attempting to  limit 
their fiscal misbehaviour by "tying their own hands". 
There  is  increasing  support  for  the  view that budgetary  institutions  are  important 
determinants of fiscal performance. Even though inadequate institutions per se may 
not create deficits, they tend to delay the necessary budgetary adjustments following 
adverse shocks. Measures that change institutional budgetary processes have a direct 
impact on the rules and practices according to which budgets are drawn up,  adopted 
and implemented. 
The Maastricht budgetary rules - comprising of reference values for deficits and debt 
to  be  achieved  within  a  given  time-span,  a  common  accounting  framework  for 
computing public  finance  variables  and  a  call  to  adapt  national  procedures  to  the 
requirements of budgetary discipline - are probably the strongest example so far of a 
"commitment technology" adopted by governments in the attempt to  establish fiscal 
discipline credibility. 
This chapter reviews the Maastricht experience with budgetary consolidation in the 
light of the  current theories  and  empirical  analyses  of the  behaviour of budgetary 
authorities. 
Section two presents a brief discussion of  the tax-smoothing theory of budget deficits 
as well as of the main theories of politically-induced deficit biases. Current evidence 
clearly shows that the budgetary behaviour of EU countries over past decades has not 
conformed  with  tax-smoothing.  The  third  section  reviews  the  main  features  and 
impact  of rules  imposing  fiscal  discipline  and  analyses  the  Maastricht  budgetary 
framework from a political economy viewpoint. Section four examines the scale and 
composition of the  budgetary adjustments  which  have  taken place  in  EU  member 
states  over  recent  years  and  assesses  ~hether this  Maastricht-induced  shift  is 
47 consistent with the overall budgetary framework of  EMU. The final section draws the 
main policy conclusions from the analysis. 
II.  POLITICAL DEFICIT BIAS 
What drives budgetary behaviour? 
Under the  inter-temporal  budget  constraint,  the  present  value  of an  exogeneously 
given path of  government spending has to be equal to the present value of  government 
revenue. The neo-classical theory of optimal tax-smoothing suggests that, in order to 
minimise the distortionary cost of taxation, tax rates should be kept constant over the 
business cycle. Thus, instead of increasing taxation when spending is exceptionally 
and temporarily high during periods of economic slowdown, tax rates should remain 
unchanged. Therefore, under tax-smoothing, deficits will occur during recessions but 
should be reversed during phases of  expansionary growth. 
Deteriorations  and  improvements  in  budget  balances  are  thus  used  as  a  buffer to 
accommodate  the  effects  on  the  government  budget  of cyclical  fluctuations  in 
economic activity (Alesina and Perotti, 1995a and 1996a). These cyclical fluctuations 
in the budget balance should therefore cancel out over the cycle. A Keynesian view of 
the world would reach similar qualitative conclusions1• If governments pursue active 
stabilisation policies to supplement the working of  budgetary stabilisers, the swings in 
the budget balance will be even more pronounced but, again, they should cancel out 
over the cycle2. 
Even though tax  -smoothing does not strictly require that a balanced budget should be 
maintained over the cycle, it does not provide a justification for running deficits over 
longer time horizons. Under this theory, there is thus no reason why government debt, 
as a share ofGDP, should show a pronounced upward trend in the long run. However, 
it is precisely the observation of  upwardly-trending debt ratios in most, though not all, 
industrialised  countries  since  the  beginning  of  the  seventies  that  led  to  the 
development in the literature of other interpretations of the behaviour of budgetary 
authorities besides the tax-smoothing theory.  Common to  these alternative views is 
the emphasis on the strong political bias of  governments to run excessive deficits and 
accumulate debt. 
According to the "fiscal illusion" theory, voters typically overestimate the benefits of 
current government spending  and  underestimate  the  costs  of future  taxation.  As  a 
result, budgetary policies become asymmetric over the cycle:  deficits are  increased 
during recessions but are never reversed to a position of  surplus during expansions. In 
addition,  as  pointed  out  by  political  business  cycle  theory,  government  deficits 
2 
In the tax-smoothing model, as  output is supply-determined, stabilisation policies do not play 
any role. Therefore, in a Keynesian perspective, budgetary swings would be even larger. 
In addition, budget deficits to fmance government investment allow to spread out the burden of 
the investment on an inter-generational basis and can be expected to be counterbalanced by 
future revenue generated by the investment. 
48 fluctuate  with the electoral cycle:  governments tend to adopt expansionary policies 
and increase deficits during election years.  These theories, however,  fail  to  explain 
why voters do not learn from past experience to see through government behaviour. 
Another explanation of  why governments have a tendency to accumulate debt is that a 
government in office, especially when it has only a small chance of being re-elected, 
might choose to limit the budgetary options available to its successor by imposing on 
it the burden of high debt.  The strategic purpose of such a debt build-up is that it 
imposes  severe  constraints  on  the  composition  of budget  spending  for  future 
governments. However, such a strategy appears to be mainly of  theoretical interest in 
· that it would apply only if  a government knows that it will not be re-elected and so far 
it does not seem to have been common in Europe. 
Budgetary behaviour also depends on the underlying features of political institutions. 
Weak coalition governments and frequent changes in government are often associated 
with  a  tendency  to  debt  accumulation.  The  literature  has  shown  that  coalition 
governments, which are often the outcome of elections under a proportional electoral 
system,  are  generally  too  weak  to  implement  swiftly  the  necessary  budgetary 
adjustments following a negative shock and therefore tend to have larger deficits over 
longer periods than strong single-party governments. However, the recent examples of 
some  EU  countries  (for  example,  Belgium  and  Italy)  show  that  a  widely-shared 
commitment  to  achieve  a  strategic  objective  (i.e.  joining  EMU)  could  twist  the 
balance  in favour  of fiscal  discipline,  even  in the  case  of traditionally  profligate 
coalition governments. 
Budgetary  misbehaviour  tends  to  occur  under  budgetary  institutions  which  are 
inadequate  to  enforce  fiscal  discipline.  Budget  procedures  which  allow  large 
negotiating margins for spending ministers during the preparation of the draft budget 
or which leave ample room for parliamentary amendments weaken attempts to redress 
the budgetary situation in periods in which fiscal adjustments are needed (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1995a). 
Absence of  tax-smoothing in EU member states 
There is ample evidence that over the past decades EU countries have not behaved in 
accordance with the policy prescriptions of the tax-smoothing theory.  In particular, 
under tax-smoothing, two interrelated phenomena should be observable: 
a)  accumulation of government debt during periods of  economic slowdown, offset by 
movements in the opposite direction in periods of  cyclical upturn; 
b) a broadly linear negative relationship between the budget deficit and the output 
gap, with the structural balance either constant over the cycle or moving together 
with the cyclical component if  the government pursues a discretionary policy3. 
3  The overall budget equation can be written as follows:  dt =d -(a.  +~)Gt, where J  captures 
the fiXed  long-run structural component of the budget balance, a the sensitivity of the budget 
49 This behaviour could not be observed in the  European Union during the past two 
decades. 
First of  all, the build-up in debt that has occurred in many EU member states did not 
take place exclusively during  periods of economic slowdown.  This can be  seen in 
Graph 1. The graph shows the evolution of  the deficit and debt ratios for the European 
Union as a whole over the past two and a half decades. As shown in the marked parts 
of the graph,  the  average  deficit  and  debt ratios  continued to  increase,  albeit at  a 
decelerating rate, during periods of positive output gaps, i.e. when the economy was 
operating above its trend reference path. 
Secondly, there occurred a differentiated behaviour of budget balances over different 
phases of the cycle. EU member states have, in the past, reacted rather prudently to 
"harsh" recessions - resulting in large negative output gaps - and on average there has 
been no  systematic tendency to  loosen discretionary budgetary policy during these 
periods (Buti  et a/.,  1997).  However,  EU  member  states  loosened  fiscal  policy  in 
"good" periods, thereby reversing the budgetary improvements brought about by the 
working of  the automatic stabilisers. 
Graph 1: 
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~ The data are weighted averages for the European Union as whole. 
~: European Commission, DG II database. 
balance to the output gap,  J3  the discretionary reaction of the budgetary authorities to the cycle 
(assumed to be  linear  for  simplicity),  and  Gt  the  output  gap  in  year t.  Under "pure" tax-
smoothing, J3  is equal to zero. 
50 This can be seen in Graph 2, which shows output gaps for EU countries against their 
actual  and cyclically adjusted balances4  over the  period  1970-90.  The  output  gaps 
were  divided  into  ranges  spanning  1%  point  of trend  GDP.  For  each  range,  the 
corresponding  average  actual  budget balance  as  well  as  its  cyclical  and  structural 
components were calculated. The data show that when the economy was situated at its 
trend level, i.e. when there was a zero output gap, EU member states have on average 
run deficits of  around 3% of  GDPS. 
When there  is  a moderately negative  output gap from  0%  to  around  -2%  of trend 
GDP, the actual deficit gradually increases as the negative output gap becomes larger: 
the actual deficit goes from around 3% ofGDP with a zero output gap to almost 6% of 
GDP  with an output gap  of slightly  less  than  -2.5%.  This  widening  of the  actual 
deficit can be  partially explained by  the  operation of the  automatic  stabilisers:  the 
cyclical component of the deficit increases in line with the output gap from zero to 
1.3% ofGDP. 
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Thus, over the period 1970-90, the government budget balance of EU member states was far 
away from close-to-balance or in surplus during normal economic conditions, as required by the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
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the  structural  component of the deficit  also  increases  from  around  3% of GDP to 
slightly more than 4% ofGDP. 
When there is a strongly negative output gap of more than -2% of trend GDP, the 
working of the automatic stabilisers is increasingly counterbalanced by pro-cyclical 
fiscal  retrenchment.  Presumably  to  avoid  budget  deficits  getting  out of hand,  the 
continuing increase in the cyclical component is compensated for by a decrease in the 
structural deficit. Thus, when the output gap increases from -2% to -4%, the cyclical 
component of  the deficit increases from around 1% of GDP to 2% of GDP, while the 
structural component decreases from above 4% of GDP to around 2% of GDP. As a 
result, the actual deficit falls from around 6% to 4% ofGDP. 
When there is a moderately positive output gap between 0% and 2% of trend GDP, 
the actual deficit remains stable in the initial phase. When the positive output gap rises 
from 0% to  1.5% of GDP, the structural deficit increases from 3% to slightly below 
4% of GDP. Thus, the positive contribution of higher growth to the improvement in 
the budget balance is fully offset by a pro-cyclical relaxation of  fiscal policy. 
When there is a strongly positive output gap of  more than 2% of  trend GDP, the actual 
budget deficit improves gradually and moves towards a balanced budget position. The 
structural deficit slowly decreases, returns to  its initial level, and even falls  slightly 
below it. The positive contribution of strong economic growth to the improvement in 
the overall budget balance is thus reinforced by a fiscal tightening, which may have 
been implemented in order to avoid overheating. 
To summarise, EU member states' discretionary fiscal policy during the seventies and 
eighties  was  counter-cyclical  in  the  case  of moderately  negative  output  gaps  and 
strongly positive output gaps. But it was forced to "limit the damage" in the case of 
strongly  negative  output  gaps,  as  member  states  prevented  budget  deficits  from 
getting out of hand by capping the deficit at a given maximum value. This seems to 
indicate that member states already implicitly followed  deficit ceilings in their past 
budgetary behaviour (though at a much higher level than that set by the Maastricht 
Treaty). By contrast, they behaved in a perverse manner when growth was just above 
potential as they did not seize the opportunity of positive cyclical developments to 
reduce the deficit. 
III.  RULES FOR ACHIEVING FISCAL DISCIPLINE 
Even coming out of a period of high  growth  at  the  end  of the  eighties,  most EU 
member states were still confronted with serious and persistent fiscal  imbalances at 
the beginning of  this decade. Thus, it is often claimed that EU governments opted to 
"tie their own hands" within a European Union framework to overcome their deeply-
rooted bias towards running excessive deficits and so to justify to their public opinion 
the need to implement unpopular measures. 
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served as an external device to trigger budgetary retrenchment, which in any case had 
become indispensable (McKinnon, 1997). The "virtuous" countries, such as Germany 
and France, which at that time had their public finances well under control, saw these 
targets as a "screening device" to ensure that only countries with a sufficiently good 
track record of fiscal discipline could enter EMU. The Maastricht targets thus aimed 
to ensure a preference towards fiscal discipline at the start of  EMU. 
Numerical targets and procedural reforms: substitutes or complements? 
Numerical  targets  and  procedural  reforms  are  often  referred  to  as  typical 
"commitment devices" to achieve and sustain fiscal discipline6. 
Numerical targets, such as the bipartisan agreement in the United States to balance the 
budget by 2002 or the Maastricht budgetary convergence criteria, impose a permanent 
constraint on budgetary policy by requiring it to meet a specific target or by imposing 
an upper ceiling. Their degree of severity depends on which part of the government 
sector  is  covered,  on the  budgetary  indicator  chosen,  and  on the  threshold  being 
targeted. Rigid balanced-budget rules covering both the current and capital balances of 
the  general  government  sector  are  an  example  of highly  binding  rules,  while 
contingent rules allowing for tax-smoothing or with escape clauses are less stringent. 
Procedural rules, on the other hand, do not set specific numerical targets but directly 
impose  changes  on  the  procedures  according  to  which  government  budgets  are 
presented, adopted and carried out. "Hierarchical" procedures, which attribute strong 
power to the treasury or finance minister to  overrule spending ministers during the 
intra-governmental  preparation  of the  budget  and  which  limit  the  ability  of the 
parliament to amend the government's budget proposals, are more conducive to fiscal 
discipline than collegial procedures, which give spending ministries more room for 
manoeuvre to increase their budgets or for the parliament to introduce modifications. 
In practice, both types of  measure have proven to be effective tools to contain political 
biases in fiscal policy-making and to achieve and sustain fiscal discipline. Rather than 
being mutually exclusive, they are often implemented in parallel. 
As  shown  in the  next  section,  the  highly  visible  reference  values  adopted  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty have provided a useful device to jump-start budgetary consolidation 
and to  redress the public finance  imbalances which existed at the beginning of this 
decade  in most EU  member  states.  Besides  setting  specific  numerical  ceilings  for 
government deficit and debt levels and a time-table for achieving them, the Maastricht 
Treaty  also  instructed  member  states  to  make  their  budgetary  procedures  more 
conducive to fiscal discipline, while avoiding the setting up of a uniform model for 
national procedures. 
6  For a detailed discussion of  the main characteristics as well as the advantages and disadvantages 
of numerical targets and procedural rules,  see,  for example, Ales  ina and Perotti ( 1996a and 
1996b), Corsetti and Roubini (1992) and Roubini (1992). 
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extensively. The literature provides evidence on the effectiveness of  numerical targets 
and  procedural  rules  for  both  the  US  states  as  well  as  for  EU  member  states. 
Eichengreen ( 1993)  finds,  for  example,  that the  statutory and constitutional deficit 
restrictions  in US  states  exert  a  significant restraining  influence  on the  budgetary 
behaviour of state governments and that the more stringent the restrictions the more 
conducive they are towards the targeted position of a balanced budget.  Von Hagen 
(1992)  and  von  Hagen  and  Harden  (1994)  also  provide  empirical  evidence  which 
suggests  that  procedural  rules  leading  towards  a  more  hierarchical  design  of the 
budget process help to avoid excessive government spending and deficits in some EU 
member states. 
The lower government deficits which follow from the imposition of  numerical budget 
targets  in  US  states  are  mainly  obtained  in  the  short  run  via  lower  levels  of 
government  spending,  and  not  via  increased  taxation  (Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen, 
1995; Poterba,  1996). Over longer time horizons, however, both taxes and spending 
tend to adjust. There is evidence that strict numerical rules reduce the responsiveness 
of government budgets to the cycle and therefore limit the extent to which budgetary 
policies  may  contribute  to  the  stabilisation  of cyclical  fluctuations  in  economic 
activity.  Under stringent balanced-budget restrictions,  budgetary policies may even 
become  pro-cyclical  and  thus  increase  the  cyclical  volatility  of the  economy.  In 
addition,  governments may reduce the  cyclical  sensitivity of the  budget.  As  to  the 
latter,  most of the  reduction in the  automatic  stabilisers  associated with numerical 
balanced-budget  targets  was  found  to  take  place  on  the  expenditure  side,  i.e. 
budgetary behaviour following the imposition of  strict numerical rules mostly reduces 
the cyclical sensitivity of government spending and less that of government revenue 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1995). 
A  drawback  of numerical  targets  is  the  incentives  they  introduce  for  one-off or 
accounting measures in an attempt to satisfy the criteria at any cost. This entails a loss 
of information  about  the  government's  true  budgetary  situation  and  as  a  result 
negatively affects the credibility of  the government's commitment to fiscal discipline. 
Empirical  evidence  for  US  states  shows,  however,  that  even  though  accounting 
devices make up a non-negligible part of  the fiscal adjustment to numerical targets in 
the short run, they do not appear to be the primary source of deficit reduction in the 
longer run (Poterba,  1996).  To  prevent their circumvention and  in  order to  reduce 
monitoring  problems,  these  targets  and,  more  broadly,  the  overall  accounting 
framework need to be simple and transparent. 
Procedural rules imposing hierarchical, closed and transparent budgetary procedures 
are equally effective in ensuring fiscal discipline as numerical rules, while at the same 
time maintaining flexibility.  Von Hagen and Harden (1994) find  a clear correlation 
between the size of  a country and the nature of  its commitment to fiscal discipline: the 
larger  EU  member  states,  such  as  Germany  and  France,  which  were  relatively 
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rules, while the smaller countries opted for numerical targets  7. 
The Maastricht provisions 
The Maastricht Treaty sets specific reference values for government deficit and debt 
levels - 3% of  GDP for the deficit and 60% of  GDP for the debt ratio -, on the basis of 
which the budgetary positions of  EU member states are assessed. In addition to setting 
specific numerical ceilings, the Maastricht Treaty also instructs EU member states to 
adopt budgetary procedures conducive to fiscal disciplines. While their importance is 
thus recognised in the Treaty, applying effective budgetary procedures is left at the 
discretion  of EU  member  states.  In  practice,  most  member  states  have  tightened 
budgetary procedures on their own initiative in order to meet the budgetary targets set 
by the Maastricht Treaty. 
As the Maastricht budgetary targets impose a common accounting framework,  they 
increase  the transparency and comparability of budget figures  among  EU member 
states. As such, they restrain the tendency of  policy makers to try to obtain a strategic 
advantage by creating confusion concerning the government's underlying budgetary 
situation  (Alesina  and  Perotti,  1996a  and  1996b  ).  By  imposing  increased 
transparency, the Maastricht targets also increase the feasibility of  expenditure control 
(Tanzi, 1995). 
In monitoring member states' compliance with the budgetary targets set in the Treaty, 
the Commission acts as an external agent and thus adds to the surveillance already 
exercised via peer pressure (Corsetti and Roubini, 1992). In addition, to comply with 
the reporting requirements of  the Treaty, EU member states have started to harmonise 
their budgetary accounting practices and are adopting the deficit and debt definitions 
used in the Treaty as  the main indicators for  budgetary discussions at the national 
level. 
Can a parallel be drawn between the rules on monetary and fiscal arrangements in the 
Treaty?  In  the  monetary  domain,  the  mandate,  institutional  organisation  and 
procedures of  the European and national central banks are spelled out in detail. It thus 
appears as if  the authors of  the Maastricht Treaty opted to set numerical targets in the 
fiscal  domain,  while  in  the  monetary  domain  they  imposed  procedural  rules 
(Eichengreen, 1996). 
This opposition, however, is unwarranted. During the third phase of EMU, monetary 
policy will be centralised at the European level and competence transferred from the 
national  central  banks  to  the  European central  bank.  The  procedural  requirements 
7  According to these authors, in view of  their more complex administration and the heterogeneity 
of interests, the larger countries apparently needed more flexible and discretionary rules, while 
the smaller countries found it easier to unite behind a single budgetary target. Thus, the main 
determining factor appears to be more the state organisation and institutional complexity of a 
country rather than simply its size. 
8  Article 3 of Protocol n° 5 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure specifies that "Member States 
shall ensure that national procedures in the budgetary area enable them to meet their obligations 
in this area deriving from this Treaty". 
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inserted  in the  Treaty  in  order to  allow the  banks  to  prepare  for  the  institutional 
transformation  to  the  European  System  of Central  Banks  during  stage  three. 
Therefore, these procedural conditions cannot be seen solely as an entry criterion for 
participation  in  EMU,  but  have  to  be  regarded  essentially  as  facilitating  the 
institutional  set-up  during  stage three.  As  budgetary  policy  will  remain  a national 
policy tool,  the  drafters  of the  Treaty  saw  no  need  to  impose  uniform procedural 
arrangements in this area. 
It can be argued that the imposition of  just procedural rules as a screening device for 
entry  into  EMU  would  not  have  been  sufficient  to  kick-start  a  process  of fiscal 
retrenchment and overcome the political deficit bias in EU member states. Indeed, for 
such  procedural  rules  to  be  effective,  a "regime-shift" needs  to  take  place  during 
which  fiscal  discipline  becomes  a  major  element  in  the  objective  function  of 
governments and during which ministries, and especially the treasury,  change their 
incentive structure. 
The  aim  of EU  governments  to  achieve  the  numerical  budget  targets  set  by  the 
Maastricht Treaty and to  participate in EMU has triggered precisely such a shift in 
priorities, which would have been more difficult to realise through the imposition of 
procedural rules.  However,  to  reinforce  fiscal  discipline  as  a permanent feature  of 
stage  three of EMU,  procedural  reforms  could  be  useful.  Indeed,  in  a number of 
countries, the combination of the imposition of a harmonised accounting framework 
with the urge to meet the numerical targets has led to significant procedural reforms 
conducive to budgetary discipline9. 
In order to  impose fiscal  discipline as  an entry criterion for  participation in EMU, 
numerical targets are in addition more operational and easy to monitor than procedural 
rules and better show the "distance" - to policy-makers, citizens and markets - which 
still has to be overcome before a sound public finance equilibrium is reached. 
IV. THE MAASTRICHT CONSOLIDATION PROCESS 
The  previous  section  illustrated  that  international  experience  shows  that  both 
numerical  and procedural rules can be effective in curbing governments' politically-
induced bias towards deficits.  Furthermore, it was  argued that the  sharp dichotomy 
between the two types of  rules often found in the literature is somewhat misleading in 
the case of  the Maastricht Treaty. 
The bottom line of  this debate, however, is the effectiveness of the Maastricht process 
in  achieving  and  sustaining  fiscal  rectitude.  Has  the  consolidation path  set  off by 
9  Generally, EU member states are putting more emphasis on a medium-term approach to setting 
their  budgetary  strategy.  The  convergence  programmes  have,  in  this  respect,  acquired 
considerable  importance  in  domestic  budgetary  planning.  Many  member  states  have  also 
introduced expenditure  control  mechanisms  in  their medium-term  planning,  in  the  form  of 
limits  on  annual  expenditure  growth,  and  have  improved  their  monitoring  and  control 
mechanisms on budgetary execution. 
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and growing debt in which they seemed to be stuck in the past two decades? Does the 
current  budgetary  consolidation  represent  a  genuine  "regime-shift"  in  running 
budgetary policy? What is the likelihood of a reversal in the recent improvements in 
budget  balances,  thereby  endangering  past  budgetary  retrenchments  and  having 
negative effects on the functioning of  EMU? These questions are addressed below. 
What determines the success of budgetary retrenchments? 
Putting public finances in order is difficult. The threat of  economic hardship following 
deficit cuts militates against "head on" radical approaches to budgetary retrenchments. 
Moreover, even governments that try in earnest to tackle budgetary imbalances often 
fail10• 
A  growing  body  of literature  has  recently  examined  the  features  of budgetary 
retrenchments over the past two to three decades and the possible factors which affect 
the likelihood of success  - "success" being broadly defined as  stabilisation of the 
government debt ratio and then its shift onto a declining path. 
As  shown  by  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1995b),  budgetary  consolidations  since  the 
beginning of the seventies have been achieved mainly through tax increases.  These 
results are confirmed by McDermott and Wescott (1996), who analysed episodes of 
significant fiscal  consolidation over the  period  1970-95  in industrialised countries. 
Out of  a total of  62 episodes, in 37 the deficit was cut mainly (by at least 60 percent) 
through  revenue  increases,  in  17  it  was  reduced  mainly  through  non-investment 
expenditure cuts,  while  in  8 cases  there  was  a  broadly  equal  mix of revenue  and 
expenditure measures. 
Two features of  budgetary retrenchment seem to be particularly important in ensuring 
a successful outcome: scale and composition. 
The  larger  the  magnitude  of the  budgetary  cuts,  the  more  likely  their  impact  on 
government debt.  As argued first by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), there could be a 
non-linearity between budgetary adjustment and economic activity: while in the event 
of small  cuts  traditional  Keynesian  effects  dominate,  confidence  and  crowding-in 
effects in response to  larger adjustment packages may  help  in offsetting the direct 
reduction in demand, thereby sustaining the consolidation efforts.  The chances of a 
positive outcome may be enhanced when bold consolidation efforts, often undertaken 
as  part  of a  broader  reform  package,  boost  the  credibility  of the  government's 
commitment to fiscal discipline. 
The composition of budgetary consolidation also appears to play an important role in 
determining  its  success.  There  is  increasing  evidence  in  the  literature  that  deficit 
reductions that take place through expenditure cuts, rather than tax increases, have a 
much higher probability of reducing the stock of debt (Alesina and Perotti, 1996a and 
10  Amongst the 62 episodes of significant budgetary consolidation in industrialised countries over 
the  last 25  years,  examined by McDermott and Wescott (1996),  only  13  were successful in 
shifting the debt ratio onto a declining path. 
57 1996b  ). If  taxes are distortionary, focusing on expenditure can have virtuous effects to 
the extent that it limits disincentives and signals a reduction in expected future taxes. 
Moreover, the composition of expenditure cuts also has an important impact on the 
persistence of  the budgetary adjustment: more persistent improvements are those that 
reduce the deficit mainly by cutting social expenditure and the wage component of 
government  consumption,  while  non-lasting  adjustments  primarily  rely  on  tax 
increases and cuts in capital spending. This is explained by Perotti (1996a, p.  1  06) as 
follows: "Because cuts in public employment and in transfer programs are politically 
much more costly than, say, capital-spending cuts, perhaps only governments that are 
determined to carry out a lasting consolidation undertake them. .  ..  At the same time, 
as  these  adjustment  are  conducive  to  a  better growth  performance,  they  are  also 
associated with a better future fiscal performance". 
When do  governments  implement the  "right" adjustment  measures?  An important 
determinant seems to be the initial public finance conditions. There appears to be a 
clear interaction between the  scale and composition of the adjustment,  on the one 
hand, and the initial budgetary situation, on the other hand: when the adjustment takes 
place  in a  situation of high public finance  imbalances,  it is  more  likely to  be  of 
sufficient scale to stabilise the debt, to have the right composition and thus to be less 
likely to be reversed in the future (Perotti, 1996b  ). 
The Maastricht experience: a virtuous adjustment path? 
How does the Maastricht consolidation process fare  in relation to the message that 
emerges from the empirical literature on budgetary consolidations? 
The analysis  in this  section focuses  on episodes of fiscal  consolidation  since  the 
beginning of the decade when the Maastricht budgetary rules and deadlines were set 
and  started  to  "bite".  Country-specific  consolidation  periods  were  determined  by 
selecting years of consistent, virtually uninterrupted improvement in the cyclically-
adjusted primary balance. While for the majority of EU countries the chosen periods 
correspond to  the  "kick  -off' of large-scale  budgetary  consolidation,  a  number  of 
countries  (for  example,  Denmark  and  Ireland)  had  carried  out  the  bulk  of the 
budgetary  retrenchment  during  previous  years,  thereby  enjoying  the  fruit  of their 
efforts - in terms of  a declining debt ratio - during the subsequent period. Therefore, in 
these countries, only relatively minor adjustments were required in the nineties. 
Undeniably, the imposition of the Maastricht budgetary targets has set off a genuine 
consolidation process in all EU member states. The sheer magnitude and speed with 
which this fiscal retrenchment has taken place is quite exceptional. Furthermore, the 
scale and composition of  the adjustment which has been achieved so far indicate that a 
major part of it appears to be soundly based and therefore unlikely to be reversed in 
the future. 
Scale of  the budgetary adjustment 
As can be seen in Table 1, in practically all member states the budget deficit declined 
substantially since the beginning of this decade. For the European Union as a whole 
on average, this marked improvement in government deficits has been of a structural 
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nature.  The pattern at the level of individual member states  is  more  varied.  In the 
Nordic countries as well as in the UK, the improvement has been somewhat more of  a 
cyclical nature. However, in other countries and especially those which started from a 
high deficit position, the budgetary consolidation has been genuinely structural. 
Table 1: Budgetary consolidation in EU member states 
Change in actual  Change in cyclically  Change in cyclically  Average  Difference between actual 
Consolidation  budget balance  adjusted budget  adjusted primary  consolidation per  and debt-stabilising 
Member States  period  (in % points of  balance  balance  year  structural primary balance in 
GDP)  (in % points of  (in % points of  (in % points of  final year• 
GDP)  GDP)  GDP)  (as •10 of  GDP) 
B  1992-96  -3.1  -5.6  -4.0  -0.8  +2.5 
DK  1996-97  -3.7  -3.1  -2.2  -l.l  +4.9 
D  1992-97  -0.3  -2.9  -4.4  -0.7  -0.3 
EL  1990-97  -11.9  -11.3  -13.7  -1.7  +5.9 
E  1992-97  -1.3  -4.6  -5.8  -1.0  +0.9 
F  1995-97  -2.6  -2.7  -2.8  -0.9  -0.7 
IRL  1991-93  +0.1  -3.6  -2.3  -0.8  +9.2 
I  1991-97  -8.1  -9.8  -10.0  -1.4  +2.8 
NL  1991-96  -2.8  -4.8  -4.4  -0.7  +1.3 
A  1995-97  -2.0  -2.7  -2.6  -0.9  +0.3 
p  1994-96  -2.9  -3.9  -2.5  -0.8  +1.1 
FIN  1993-97  -4.5  -0.6  -3.5  -0.7  +0.7 
s  1994-97  -10.4  -7.5  -7.9  -2.0  +2.2 
UK  1994-97  -5.9  -3.9  -4.3  -1.1  +0.3 
EU average  -4.2  -4.8  -5.0  -1.0  +2.2 
~:Data  for Luxembourg are not available. A negative sign denotes an improvement in the budget balance (reduction of  the deficit), a positive sign 
a deterioration. The data for 1997 are based on the Commission's Autumn 1997 Economic Forecasts. The figures for the EU average are the 
unweighted average of  the pooled data for the Member States. 
•  The data for the actual and debt-stabilising primary balance have been corrected for the influence of the cycle. The structural debt-stabilising 
primary balance was calculated using the nominal trend growth rate. 
~:  European Commission, DG II database. 
The improvement is particularly striking when analysing the change in the structural 
primary balance,  a variable that,  compared to  the overall budget balance,  is  under 
closer  control  of the  budgetary  authorities.  As  shown  in  Table  1,  a  majority  of 
member states  achieved during their consolidation period an improvement in their 
structural primary balance by at least 4 percentage points of GDP.  The scale of the 
adjustment appears to be positively correlated with the "seriousness" of imbalances at 
the  beginning  of the  consolidation  period:  Greece  and  Italy,  which  registered  a 
double-digit  deficit in the  year  before  the  retrenchment  started  achieved  the  most 
impressive performance, with an improvement in the  structural primary balance by 
13.7 and 10.0 percentage points of GDP  respectively.  Together with Sweden, these 
two countries also have the highest average consolidation effort per year. 
The government deficit levels achieved so  far  allow government debt levels to start 
falling. As can be seen in Table 1, all Member States, except for Germany and France, 
realised structural primary surpluses at the end of the consolidation period above the 
structural primary balance needed to stabilise their debt ratio. 
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As recalled above, the literature has shown that, in the past, industrialised countries 
have  pursued  deficit  reductions  mainly  through  tax  increases.  However,  such  tax 
increases,  as  opposed  to  expenditure-based  cuts,  have  delivered  less  satisfactory 
results in terms of  both effectiveness and durability of  consolidation. 
The  picture  that  emerges  from  the  analysis  of the  composition  of budgetary 
adjustments in the  EU  during this decade  is  complex and  cannot be  forced  into  a 
simple  revenue-based  versus  expenditure-based  framework.  Table  2  shows  the 
composition of discretionary  budgetary adjustment in the  EU  countries  during  the 
nineties.  A finer decomposition of spending reductions is  also provided.  Figures in 
bold indicate the  dominant strategy.  Table 2 shows that only half of EU  countries 
have implemented a "composition-consistent" retrenchment strategy throughout the 
whole consolidation period. 
Four countries (Belgium, Ireland, Austria and Portugal) have relied essentially on tax 
increases. However, as  stated above, Ireland had implemented the bulk of its effort 
during the eighties and had already its government debt firmly on a downward path at 
the  beginning  of this  decade.  As  to  Austria  and  Portugal,  since  the  selected 
consolidation period is recent and relatively short, it is not to be excluded that, as in 
other countries, a phase of  expenditure cuts would follow the initial tax rises. 
The  Nordic  countries  and  the  UK  carried  out  their  fiscal  consolidation  through 
sizeable  cuts  in  government  spending,  with  either  very  limited  increases  in  tax 
revenue or even with reductions in taxation. In Finland and Sweden, the pronounced 
cut in spending  followed  an expansionary policy during the period  1991-93, when 
these  countries  were  hit by  a very  severe  and  protracted recession.  Therefore,  the 
spending  cuts  helped  to  restore  "normal"  spending  levels.  In  all  four  countries, 
reductions  in  current  primary  expenditure  largely  outweighed  the  cuts  in  capital 
spending.  Furthermore, a large part of these spending cuts came from reductions in 
transfers  to  households  and  in  wages  of government  employees,  measures  which, 
according to  the literature reviewed above,  contribute to  the durability of the fiscal 
consolidation. 
In  the  rest  of the  countries,  a  kind  of "switching"  strategy  prevailed.  Their 
consolidation period can be split in two phases. In the frrst phase, they all increased 
taxes substantially, while expenditure was only reduced insignificantly or was even 
increased.  However,  in the second phase of the  adjustment, substantial expenditure 
cuts  were  implemented,  while  tax  revenue  grew  much  less  or  even  declined. 
Noticeably,  in  all  these  countries,  by  far  the  largest  share  of the  expenditure 
adjustment did not come from "politically-easy" cuts in investment expenditure, but 
from  "politically-costly"  reductions  in  current  expenditure  and,  more  specifically, 
from  cuts  in  transfers  to  households  and  wages  of government  employees.  The 
switching point in all but one country is the year 1994, i.e. the beginning of  the second 
stage of EMU.  Increasing awareness of the unsustainability of further tax increases 
and  the  need  to  put public  spending  firmly  under control  to  meet the  Maastricht 
budgetary criteria seem to have played an important role in the switch of government 
behaviour. 
60 Table 2: Composition of budgetary consolidation in EU member states 
Of  which:  Of  which: 
Member states  Consolidation  Change in  Change in structural  Change in capital  Change in current  Transfers to households 
period  structural revenue  primary expenditure  spending  primary expenditure  and wages government 
employees 
Revenue-based retrenchment: 
B  1992-96  +3.7  -0.2  -0.3  +0.1  +0.7 
IRL  1991-93  +3.2  +1.0  +0.1  +0.9  -0.1 
A  1995-97  +3.5  +0.8  -0.5  +1.3  -1.0 
p  1994-96  +1.9  -0.6  -0.1  -0.5  +0.9 
Expenditure-based retrenchment: 
DK  1996-97  +0.1  -2.1  -0.1  -2.0  -1.7 
FIN  1993-97  -3.4  -6.8  -0.7  -6.1  -3.9 
s  1994-97  -0.4  -8.2  -0.2  -8.0  -3.8 
UK  1994-97  +0.7  -3.7  -1.0  -2.7  -3.5 
"Switching" strategy: 
D:  -1st phase  1992-93  +3.1  +0.8  +0.2  +0.6  +1.8  1----------1----------------------------t-------------1-------------~------------ -2d phase  1994-97  -0.6  -2.1  -0.8  -1.3  -0.7 
EL: -1st phase  1990-93  +6.8  -0.7  +0.3  -1.0  -1.6  1----------1------------------------------------------------------------------- -2d phase  1994-97  +2.5  -3.4  0.0  -3.4  +0.6 
E:  -1st phase  1992-93  +4.6  +2.4  -2.9  +5.3  +1.7  1----------1------------------------------------------------------1------------- -2d phase  1994-97  -2.0  -5.6  +1.1  -6.7  -2.6 
F:  -1st phase  1995-96  +2.1  +0.2  -0.1  +0.3  +0.3  1----------1-------------------------------------------------------------------
-2d phase  1997  +0.2  -1.2  -0.1  -1.1  -0.2 
1:  -1st phase  1991-93  +6.4  +0.7  -0.6  +1.3  +0.6  1----------1------------------------------------------------------'------------- -2d phase  1994-97  -0.5  -4.7  -0.5  -4.2  -0.5 
NL: -1st phase  1991-93  +4.9  +0.6  -0.2  +0.8  +0.5  1----------1------------------------------------------------------------------- -2d phase  1994-96  -4.6  -4.8  +0.1  -4.9  -3.3 
~:  Data for Luxembourg are not available. ~:  European Commission, 00  II database. Composition of  the adjustment: a clean break with the past 
The  overall  expenditure  reduction  which  has  taken  place  during  the  recent 
consolidation  period  presents  a  genuine  break  with  past  patterns.  During  past 
recessionary periods there has been a substantial increase in expenditure, which has 
been partially financed by discretionary rises in tax revenue. On the contrary, over the 
recent consolidation period - a period characterised by negative output gaps in most 
EU member states  - a marked  reduction in  government spending  has  taken place, 
while current revenue increased only slightly. 
Table 3 analyses the  average change in budgetary behaviour of EU member states 
during periods of negative output gaps over the past two and a half decades. During 
the seventies, the government deficit increased by 3.1  percentage points on average, 
due to a sharp increase in overall expenditure which was only partially offset by an 
increase in revenue.  During both the eighties and the nineties, budget deficits were 
reduced during recessionary periods. 
While in the eighties the 0.6 percentage point of GDP deficit reduction was brought 
about by tax increases which outweighed the rise in expenditure, during the nineties 
the  sharp  fall  in  expenditure  in combination with  a moderate  increase  in revenue 
brought about a reduction of 0.9  percentage points in the deficit,  even larger than 
during  the  eighties.  This  pattern  becomes  even  more  clear-cut  when  Finland  and 
Sweden  are  excluded  -both  underwent  a  severe  and  protracted recession  over the 
period 1991-93 to which they initially reacted by engaging in expansionary budgetary 
policy. 
Table 3:  Budgetary behaviour during periods with  negative output gaps (changes in  indicated ratios are 
given in percentage points of GDP) 
Average  Budget deficit  Current revenue  Total expenditure 
output 
Member States  gap 
Unadjusted  CydicaJiy  Unadjusted  Cydically  Unadjusted  Cyclically 
adjusted  adjusted  adjusted 
1970s  -1.3  3.1  1.0  4.3  5.7  7.5  6.8 
1980s  -1.9  -0.6  -2.1  2.9  4.0  2.2  1.8 
1990s: -all EU countries  -1.5  -1.0  -2.8  0.8  2.2  -0.2  -0.6 
-excluding FIN and S  -1.3  -2.0  -3.4  0.6  1.7  -1.3  -1.6 
~:  Change in the budget balance and its components between the year before the period of  negative output gaps and the last year of  the 
negative gap period. The data presented are unweighted averages of  pooled EU member states data. 
~:  European Commission, DG II database. 
62 V.  CONCLUSIONS 
EMU will be built on a  strong foundation of budgetary discipline.  The Maastricht 
criteria  for  joining  EMU  imply  that,  from  the  outset,  EMU  members  will  have 
achieved a high degree of  public finance discipline. The Stability and Growth Pact, by 
setting  ambitious  medium-term  targets  and  providing  a  strong  deterrence  against 
budgetary misbehaviour, ensures that fiscal prudence will be a permanent feature of 
EMU. This paper has reviewed the budgetary retrenchment process triggered by the 
Maastricht rules in the light of  the recent literature on the determinants and effects of 
the behaviour of budgetary authorities. The most important policy conclusion is that 
the on-going budgetary consolidation appears to be consistent, both in terms of scale 
and composition, with the  overall EMU budgetary framework.  In other words,  the 
present consolidation strategy provides a good basis to  attain a close-to-balance or 
surplus position, as required by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
More specifically, the main results of  the analysis can be summarised as follows: 
a)  EU countries' fiscal policy in the seventies and eighties did not conform to the 
prescriptions of the tax-smoothing theory:  in periods of favourable  economic 
growth, many countries instead of seizing the opportunity to re-absorb debt and 
deficits  accumulated  during  recession,  have  added  further  to  budgetary 
imbalances. In particular, the accumulation of government debt has been fuelled 
by a persistent structural deficit of around 3% of GDP  on average during the 
seventies  and  eighties,  and  through  budgetary  loosening  in  the  event  of 
moderately  positive  output  gaps.  Conversely,  budgetary  behaviour  has  been 
relatively prudent in the event of  both large negative and positive output gaps. 
b)  The concrete experience of EU countries shows that the sharp opposition, often 
found  in  the  literature,  between  numerical  targets  and  procedural  rules  is 
unwarranted.  The  Maastricht  targets  have  set  off a  process  of budgetary 
consolidation  in  the  course  of which  EU  member  states  have  started  to 
streamline their institutional and accounting procedures in order to comply with 
the  budgetary  criteria as  well  as  with the  reporting  requirements  set by  the 
Treaty.  Therefore,  the  Maastricht  budgetary  rules,  coupled  with  the 
"transparency shock" of a common accounting framework and accompanied by 
bottom-up changes in national budgetary procedures, have been highly effective 
in triggering a "regime-shift" in budgetary behaviour. 
c)  The scale of the adjustment carried out in the past few years will allow a large 
majority of  EU countries to set government debt on a downward path. The scale 
of the retrenchment was particularly important in those countries which at the 
beginning of  the nineties experienced the most serious public finance pressures. 
d)  The budgetary adjustments which have recently taken place in all EU member 
states have involved large reductions in primary government expenditure (either 
outright over the whole consolidation period or in a second phase, after initial 
tax  increases).  Only  in  a  few  member  states  did  the  consolidation  occur 
essentially via tax increases. This budgetary adjustment represents a clear break 
63 with past behaviour, as during analogous periods of low growth in the previous 
decades, EU countries had tended to increase both expenditure and taxation. As 
the literature on budgetary behaviour has shown,  a composition of budgetary 
retrenchment strongly axed on expenditure tends to lead to a lower likelihood 
that governments would revert to reckless budgetary behaviour. 
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BUDGETARY ADJUSTMENT 
The role of  the Stability and Growth Pact 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND MAIN RESULTS 
Over recent years, the budgetary policies carried out by Western countries during the 
Post-War period have been analysed extensively in the literature. Several studies have 
pointed  to  the  interaction  of economic  and  political  factors  and  underlined  the 
importance  of  institutions  and  procedures  in  shaping  policies  and  outcomes1• 
Considerable attention has been devoted to  budgetary consolidation processes, with 
some  studies  emphasising  the  role  of the  composition  of budgetary  measures  tn 
determining the success of  these policies2• 
The purpose of this chapter, which draws on a larger study3,  is to analyse budgetary 
policies  carried out during  and  after  severe  recessions,  an  issue  which the  above-
mentioned literature has not yet focused upon. 
Since the adoption of the "Stability and Growth Pact" by the  European Council of 
Amsterdam in June 1997, interest in this issue and its policy relevance have increased 
significantly.  The  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  which  sets  the  rules  for  budgetary 
behaviour  in  stage  three  of EMU,  singles  out  severe  recessions  as  specifically 
problematical periods during which a certain budgetary flexibility could be allowed. 
This study provides elements to examine the following issues: what type of  budgetary 
policies have been adopted during severe recessions in the past? Were the automatic 
stabilisers  allowed  to  fully  operate?  Did  governments  adopt  an  expansionary 
budgetary policy stance and which factors influenced the policies undertaken? 
With  specific reference to  the  Stability and  Growth  Pact,  the  following  issues  are 
addressed: which changes should be envisaged in national budgetary policies during 
recessions?  More  specifically,  what  is  the  scope  for  discretionary  counter-cyclical 
policies? Which situations might be particularly problematic? What risks are involved 
in the transition towards the medium-term targets of close-to-balance or in surplus set 
by the Pact, and which types of recession can lead Member States into a position of 
excessive deficit, even when they start from a sound pre-recession budgetary position? 
Section  2  of this  study  describes  the  basic  principles  of the  Excessive  Deficit 
Procedure  and  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  and  examines  the  main  features  of 
severe economic downturns in the past.  Section 3 examines the budgetary policies 
2 
3 
See  Alesina and  Perotti  (1995a),  (1995b),  (1996a)  and  (1996b),  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen 
(1995), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), Grilli et al. (1991), Hahm et al. (1995), von Hagen (1992) 
and von Hagen and 
Harden (1994). 
> See Per()tti (1996a) and (1996b). 
See Buti et al. ( 1997). 
67 carried  out  during  recessions  in  the  1961-96  period.  Section  4  examines  past 
budgetary behaviour in the light of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability 
and  Growth  Pact  and  analyses  under  what  circumstances  deficits  would  have 
breached the  3%  reference  value  in  severe  recessions.  Section  5 assesses  whether 
government  budgets  behave  differently  in  "mild"  recessions  and  during  abrupt 
slowdowns  in growth.  Section  6 concludes  and  points  to  some  limitations  of the 
analysis undertaken in this chapter. 
The main results of  this study can be summarised as follows: 
Budgetary policies in recessions during the period 1961-96: 
- There  has  been  no  systematic  tendency  to  loosen  budgetary  policy  during 
recessions in the past three and a half decades. EU Member States have reacted in 
general  rather  prudently  to  negative  economic  shocks,  regardless  of  their 
underlying  nature.  While  the  Nordic  countries  pursued  active  counter-cyclical 
budgetary  policies  during  their  multi-year  recession  episodes,  most  other  EU 
Member States  often carried out  a fiscal  retrenchment policy during  periods  of 
economic slowdown. 
- The initial public finance conditions influence the way budgetary policies react to 
cyclical downturns: countries with low deficit and debt levels were able to exploit 
the  available  room  for  manoeuvre  by  carrying  out  counter-cyclical  budgetary 
policies; on the contrary, Member States with higher budgetary imbalances were 
less able to smooth out the cycle through fiscal policies and even had to implement 
pro-cyclical  retrenchment  policies  during  recessions  in  order  to  prevent  their 
budget deficits from getting out of  hand. 
Breaching of the 3% reference value during recessions: 
- Over the  past  36  years,  an  initially  balanced  budget,  and  a fortiori  a  country-
specific surplus, would have prevented all  one-year recessions from  leading to  a 
budget position  which  remains  into  excessive  deficit  in  the  year  following  the 
recession  (hence  the  excessive  deficit  would  have  been,  at  most,  "transient"). 
However, the early years of EMU, when some countries might still have a deficit 
of  about 2% of GDP, are likely to prove highly problematic in the event of  a severe 
recession. 
- The risk of incurring an excessive deficit is high in case of protracted recessions, 
even if the starting point is a sound budgetary position. The same conclusions can 
be drawn for exceptionally severe recessions with negative growth of 2% or more. 
However,  there  are  no  economic  downturns  other than  severe  recessions  which 
would produce serious budgetary effects if the budget is initially in balance. Mild 
recessions  and  abrupt  slowdowns  in  growth  are  not  likely  to  create  excessive 
deficits once the medium-term target of close-to-balance or in surplus is met.  As 
such,  the  0.75%  recession  threshold  therefore  appears  appropriate  once  the 
medium-term target is reached. 
- The  simultaneous  application  of  the  "exceptionality",  "temporariness"  and 
"closeness"  conditions  in  the  case  of severe  recessions  "over-determines"  the 
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decision on whether or not an excessive deficit exists: the relaxation of  one of  these 
conditions does not produce significantly different results as long as the other two 
conditions are sufficiently strict. 
Major policy implications: 
The  results  of this  study  suggest that there  is  no  need  for  EU  Member  States  to 
substantially change budgetary policies carried out during recessions. Indeed, over the 
past decades, these policies were generally rather prudent. 
More specifically, the analysis allows the following policy conclusions to be drawn: 
1) A medium-term balanced budget is highly recommendable for most Member States 
in order to meet the Stability and Growth Pact requirements. It would allow them 
to overcome single-year severe recessions without incurring excessive deficits. 
2) In  case  of recessions,  the  margins  for  implementing  large-scale  discretionary 
counter-cyclical policies are rather limited, unless budgets move into surplus. 
Two major risks can be identified: 
a)  In the event of a severe recession during the early years of EMU,  since  several 
countries will still have deficits in the 2% to 3% of GDP range, they risk moving 
into excessive deficit, unless they take a pro-cyclical budgetary stance. 
b) Long  recessions  may  pose  serious  threats  even  to  countries  with  sound  pre-
recession budgetary positions. 
II.  INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Solid budgetary discipline is considered to be an essential condition for the success of 
EMU. The requirement of achieving a sound budgetary position in order to join the 
single currency and maintaining budgetary prudence once in EMU are at the core of 
the Maastricht Treaty. The general principles and procedures of the Treaty have been 
spelled out in detail in secondary legislation, which forms the so-called "Stability and 
Growth Pact". 
The Treaty 
Article 1  04c of  the Treaty on European Union states at the outset that, in the third and 
fmal stage of  EMU, "Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits"4. The 
compliance  of a  Member  State  with the  budgetary  discipline  requirement  will  be 
4  As  to  the second stage, the Treaty stipulates that "Member States  shall  endeavour to avoid 
excessive  government  deficits".  Currently,  five  Member  States  (namely  Denmark,  Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland) are not in excessive deficit. Germany, which in the 
1995 exercise was also among the "virtuous countries", dropped out in 1996 because its budget 
deficit attained 3.5% of GDP in 1995 and was forecast to remain above the reference value in 
1996. 
69 assessed inter alia on the basis of the behaviour of the government deficit as a share 
of GDP in relation to a reference value set by the "Protocol on the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure" (Protocol 5 of  the Treaty) at 3% of  GDP. 
When  an  excessive  deficit  occurs,  a  procedure  aimed  at  reducing  the  deficit  is 
initiated.  This  includes  several  steps  involving  an  increasing  "pressure"  on  the 
Member  State  through  recommendations  and  notice  to  take  effective  measures  to 
correct the excessive deficit position.  If such a correction does  not take  place, the 
Treaty foresees that sanctions may be applied to the Member States participating in 
EMU. 
The  3% threshold can be  exceeded without causing  an excessive deficit,  but only 
under a restrictive set of  conditions. In particular, three conditions must be met: 
(a)  exceptionality: the origin of  the excess has to be outside of  the normal range of 
situations; 
(b)  temporariness:  the deficit is  allowed to remain above  3% of GDP  only for  a 
limited period of  time; 
(c)  closeness: the deficit must remain close to the reference value. 
In practice, the Treaty prescribes that the original cause of  the rise of  the deficit above 
the 3% ceiling must be exceptional, that the deficit must not, in any case, exceed this 
threshold by too  much,  and must return promptly below it once the initial driving 
force is over. These three conditions need to apply simultaneously. The extent of the 
common subset of  events not giving rise to an excessive deficit depends on the degree 
of restriction with which these conditions are interpreted. The Treaty, however, does 
not specify the exact content of the three constraints. The  Stability and Growth Pact 
gives a more precise interpretation of  conditions (a) and (b). 
The Stability and Growth Pact 
The European Council adopted the Stability and Growth Pact in Amsterdam in June 
19975. The core elements of  the Pact include: 
•  setting time limits to the various steps of the Excessive Deficit Procedure so as to 
speed it up  and, where appropriate, impose sanctions within the calendar year in 
which the decision on the existence of  the excessive deficit is taken; 
•  defining the meaning of  the exceptionality and temporariness conditions; 
•  specifying the conditions in which sanctions will be applied and their scale. 
5  A first proposal for a Pact to ensure fiscal discipline in stage three of EMU was put forward by 
the German Finance Minister Theo Waigel in November 1995. The European Council reached 
an agreement on the principles and the main features of the Pact in Dublin in December 1996. 
The Pact was adopted in Amsterdam in June 1997. 
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• The  starting point of the  Pact is  that the  EMU  Members  should  set medium-term 
budgetary targets which are "close-to-balance or in surplus", thus allowing them to 
respect the 3% ceiling even during economic downturns. 
The exceptionality clause (condition (a)) can be called upon when the excess of the 
deficit over the reference value results from an unusual event outside the control of  the 
Member State in question and which has a major impact on the financial position of 
the general government. Alternatively, it can apply if the deficit overshooting takes 
place  in  the  presence  of a  severe  economic  downturn.  The  latter  is  considered 
"exceptional" if  there is an annual fall of  real GDP of  at least 2%. 
An annual fall of GDP of less than 2% could nevertheless be considered exceptional 
in the light of further supporting evidence, such as the abruptness of the downturn or 
the accumulated loss  of output relative  to  past trends.  In any event,  in evaluating 
whether the economic downturn is severe, the Member States will, as a rule, take an 
annual  fall  in  real  GDP  of at  least  0.75%  as  a  reference  point.  This  condition 
recognises that, in the event of a harsh and persistent recession, the budgetary room 
for  manoeuvre  between close to  balance  and a deficit of 3% of GDP  may  not be 
sufficient to cushion the negative effects of  the shock on economic activity. 
As to the temporary nature of the excess of the deficit over 3% of GDP  (condition 
(b)1 the Pact allows it only insofar as the "exceptional" conditions mentioned above 
persist. If  the Commission's budgetary forecasts indicate that the deficit would not fall 
below the reference value in the year following the recession, the country would also 
be put into a position of excessive deficit in the year of the recession because it had 
violated the "temporariness" clause. 
The Pact does not deal with the closeness condition (condition (c)). 
Graph  1  illustrates  the  five  relevant  paths  for  the  deficit  during  and  after  an 
exceptionally severe recession, by indicating for each of  them the occurrence or not of 
an excessive deficit position. 
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a)  the no-problem case, in which, in spite of the recession, the deficit remains below 
the 3% threshold; 
b) the  limited-problem  case,  in which the  deficit  exceeds  3%  of GDP  during  the 
recession,  but  remains  close  to  it  and  returns  below  it  immediately  after  the 
recession: the three conditions mentioned above apply, hence no excessive deficit 
occurs; 
c)  the  violation of the closeness condition,  in which the deficit is pushed up well 
above the reference value, but moves promptly below it as soon as the recession is 
over:  the country is in excessive deficit during the year of the recession, but no 
sanctions are imposed on it and thus its excessive deficit is only "transient"; 
d) the violation of the temporariness clause, in which the deficit remains fairly close 
to the 3% ceiling during the recession year, but as it does not move below it in the 
year after the recession, the country is in excessive deficit during the year of the 
recession and there is a presumption that sanctions might be applied; 
e)  the  double-violation  case,  in  which  both  the  temporariness  and  closeness 
conditions are not respected: there is an excessive deficit which, as in the previous 
case, could eventually lead to sanctions. 
The decision on whether or not an excessive deficit existed during the year of the 
recession is taken on the basis of  figures for the recession year which are reported one 
year later. In order to avoid the imposition of sanctions, the Member State which has 
been put into excessive deficit needs to take immediate action in the year in which the 
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is taken. The correction of  the deficit 
should be completed in the year following the identification of the excessive deficit, 
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i.e.  in order to avoid sanctions, the Member State concerned should bring back its 
deficit below the reference value two years after the occurrence of  an excessive deficit 
and one year after its identification, unless special circumstances are given. 
Severe economic downturns 
This study considers two concepts of "economic downturn":  a decline in real GDP 
and a worsening of the output gap.  As already pointed out above, the Pact refers to 
negative real GDP growth rates. This is the main yardstick used here. This measure is 
supplemented with the output gap concept, which, though not uncontroversial, allows 
a  broader  assessment  of the  budgetary  impact  of economic  downturns.  More 
specifically, the output gap allows to analyse the budgetary implications of  protracted 
periods of low positive growth, as well as those in which the rate of growth declines 
abruptly but still remains positive. The output gap is also implicitly referred to in the 
Pact when the exceptionality of cases with negative growth of less than 2% but of at 
least 0.75% is qualified6. 
For  this  analysis,  an  "exceptionally  severe  recession"  is  defined  as  involving  a 
negative annual real GDP growth rate of  2% or more. A "severe recession" involves a 
fall  in GDP of 0.75% or more. Negative growth of less than 0.75% is defined as a 
"mild downturn.  7 This classification allows examination of a substantial number of 
recession cases, which ensures the robustness of  the results. 
Ta.b.k..l:  Number of recession years per European Union Member State over the period 1961-96 
Negative growth:  Severe recessions:  Ex~~ptionally  s~v~re  r~~~sshms: 
Negative annual real GDP growth  Negative growth of  0. 75% or more  Negative growth of2% or more 
Member States  Number of  years  I 
Member States  I 
Number of years  I 
Member States  Number of  years 
UK  6  S,UK  4  FIN  2 
DK, D, P, FIN, S  4  B, D, P, FIN  3  EL, I, L, P, S  I 
B,EL  3  DK, EL, I,  2 
E, F, I, L, NL, A  2  E,F,L,NL  1 
IRL  I 
Total EU  45  Total EU  30  Total EU  7 
~:  European Commission, DG II database. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the total number of  cases with a negative annual real GDP 
growth rate is 45 for the fifteen EU Member States together over the period 1961-96, 
which corresponds to an average of three cases per country or a frequency of 8.3%. 
6 
7 
The Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, which was adopted 
in Amsterdam in  June  1997, states that "...  in  evaluating whether the economic downturn is 
severe, the Member States will, as a rule, take as a reference point an annual fall in real GDP of 
at least 0.75%"  . 
It goes without saying that the analysis hereafter does not prejudge in any way the application of 
the "exceptionality clause" of  art.  I 04c of  the Treaty, as spelled out in the Amsterdam decision. 
73 Most of  these negative growth years are concentrated around the three major recession 
periods of 1974-75, 1980-82 and 1991-93. 
For  all  fifteen  Member  States  over  the  last  36  years,  there  were  30  cases  when 
negative growth was 0.75% or worse, i.e.  an average of two cases per country or a 
frequency  of 5.6%.  The  number of years of negative  growth of 0.75%  or more is 
distributed unevenly among Member States. The Nordic countries as well as Belgium, 
Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom have registered a larger number of  severe 
recession  years  compared  to  the  average  of two  cases  per  country,  while  Spain, 
France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands recorded a smaller number of cases. Ireland 
and Austria did not have a severe recession over the past 36 years. There were only 7 
cases where real GDP fell by 2% or more in one year. 
The periods of two  or more  consecutive  years  of negative  growth,  in which GDP 
declines by 0.75% or more in at least one year, are treated as single severe "recession 
episodes" in this study. Over the period 1961-96, there have been 9 cases where real 
GDP declined during two or three consecutive years and for which in at least one of 
these recession years there was negative growth of0.75% or more8• As a result of  this 
approach, the 30 years where there was negative growth of 0.75% or more collapse 
into 25  severe recession episodes.  As  no  budgetary data are  availabde  for the  197  4 
recession in Greece, only 24 cases have been taken into account for the calculations in 
this study.  Amongst them,  5 episodes involve a negative growth of GDP of 2% or 
more. 
It is clear that the appropriate policy response to recessions differs depending on the 
nature of the underlying economic disturbance. In particular, the needed stabilisation 
policy-mix will differ depending on whether the shock originates from the  demand 
side and thereby is usually temporary, or from the supply side and therefore has long-
lasting consequences. 
It also depends on whether the shock is symmetric or country-specific. If  the shock is 
temporary,  macro-economic  policy  may  be  used  to  stabilise  the  level  of activity, 
whereas  if the  shock  is  permanent  structural  adjustment  would  be  imperative. 
Symmetric  shocks  may  call  for  a  co-ordinated  policy  response,  while  asymmetric 
shocks are to be dealt with via decentralised policy instruments. Policies during past 
recessions have obviously been affected by these differing needs and by the existing 
institutional set-up. 
Governments  attempting  to  engage  in  stabilisation  policy  face  the  problem  of 
identifying  the  nature  of the  underlying  economic  disturbances.  It is  obvious  that 
"shocks do  not come  labelled as  temporary  or permanent" 9,  and  neither are  they 
designated as  symmetric or asymmetric.  During past recessions,  governments have 
been confronted more than once with this "identification" problem. 
8 
9 
7 cases occurred in the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom, the other 2 in the Netherlands 
and Portugal. 
See Melitz (1996). 
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Political  pressures  to  intervene  may  push  governments  to  resort  to  inappropriate 
policy responses as  a "quick fix",  even when the nature of the initial shock clearly 
called for  politically difficult measures,  the  effects  of which only  show up  in the 
medium term. This may have been the case in the past in the event of supply shocks 
calling,  in  principle,  for  major  structural  reforms.  Inappropriate  policies  could 
therefore have exacerbated further the effect of  existing shocks or even be at the origin 
of  these. 
The procedures and sanctions to be applied under the Stability and Growth Pact do not 
distinguish between different types of recessions.  The  Pact does  not provide  more 
leeway  for  recessions  which  would  require  the  predominant  use  of budgetary 
stabilisation policies. If governments want to pursue active budgetary policies during 
recessions once in EMU, they will have to create the necessary room for manoeuvre 
by setting their medium-term budgetary targets accordingly. 
III.  SEVERE RECESSIONS AND BUDGETARY OUTCOMES 
Budgetary reactions during severe recessions 
The effect of severe recession episodes on the budgetary situation can be analysed by 
setting out the  changes in the  actual  budget balances  and  the  cyclically  adjusted10 
primary  balances  between the  year  preceding  the  recession  and  that  in which the 
recession takes place or reaches its final year against the variation in the output gap 
over the same period. 
The difference between the actual and the trend growth rate determines the variation 
of the  output gap.  When the  actual  growth  rate  falls  below the  trend growth rate 
during a recession, there is a worsening of the output gap, i.e.  positive output gaps 
turn negative and existing negative output gaps widen further. 
In Graph 2, the change in the actual budget deficit between the year preceding the 
recession (t-1) and that in which the recession takes place or reaches its final year (t) is 
set out against the change in the output gap over the same period. 
Graph 2 shows that the 24 severe recession episodes with negative growth of0.75% or 
more over the period 1961-96 produced extremely different changes in the output gap: 
the output gap deteriorated by between 2.5 to around 15% points of trend GDP.  On 
average, output gaps deteriorated by 5.5% points. 
10  The decomposition of the actual budget balance into a cyclical and a structural or cyclically 
adjusted  component  is  based  on  the  European  Commission  services'  cyclical  adjustment 
method. In this method, the influence of  cyclical fluctuations on government budget balances is 
calculated by multiplying the output gap by the cyclical sensitivity of budgetary receipts and 
expenditure. The output gap is defmed as the difference between the actual level of GDP and 
that of trend GDP,  expressed as  a percentage of trend GDP.  The trend output benchmark is 
estimated via the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter.  The  structural  primary  balance,  i.e.  the  cyclically 
adjusted balance minus interest payments, is often used as a rough indicator of the underlying 
budgetary policy stance. See Commission of  the European Communities (1995). 
75 The cumulative widening of  the output gap between the year before the recession and 
the  last year of the recession is obviously much larger during multi-year recession 
episodes (shown by the dark markers) than for single-year recessions. While in most 
one-year recession episodes (12 out of 15) the gap increased by around 2.5 to 4.5% 
points, in most multi-year episodes (8  out of 9)  it increased by around 4.5  to  7.5% 
points. 
The  actual  budget balance will tend to worsen during a recession if the automatic 
stabilisers are not offset completely. As can be seen in Graph 2, most Member States' 
actual budget deficits increased by between zero and 7% points of GDP during the 
severe recession episodes which occurred over the period 1961-96. On average, actual 
budget  deficits  increased  by  around  3.5%  points.  Graph  2  also  shows  that  the 
cumulative  increase  of the  actual  deficit  is  not  necessarily  larger  for  multi-year 
recessions than for single-year recessions. 
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Graph 3 provides some indications about the discretionary budgetary policy stance -
defined as  the change in the structural primary balance -adopted during the  severe 
recession episodes of  the period 1961-96. 
76 There is  an almost even distribution of changes in the  structural  primary balances 
above  and  below the  zero-line,  i.e.  in  about  half of the  cases  a  counter-cyclical 
budgetary stance which increased the structural primary deficit was adopted, while in 
the  other half,  a  pro-cyclical  policy  was  undertaken  which  reduced  the  structural 
primary deficit. Taking the average of all recessions episodes, the structural primary 
balance remained virtually  unchanged.  There  was  thus  no  systematic  tendency  on 
average to loosen budgetary policy during severe recessions over the past decades. 
Graph 3: Change in cyclically adjusted primary balance 
during severe recession episodes (1961-96) 
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There was no systematic tendency either to adopt more frequently a looser budgetary 
policy during multi-year recession episodes than during one-year recessions. Portugal 
and the United Kingdom carried out a budgetary retrenchment policy at the beginning 
of the 1980s in order to avoid that their budget deficits got out of hand, in spite of a 
severe and persistent recession with a strong widening of  the output gap by between 6 
to 7% points of  trend GDP. When its output gap worsened by 7.5% points during the 
recession of 1991-93, Sweden, however, judged the recession to be severe enough and 
its  budgetary  room  for  manoeuvre  to  be  large  enough  to  undertake  a  substantial 
budgetary  relaxation.  Finland,  which registered  a worsening  by  15%  points of its 
output gap during the 1991-93 recession, loosened its budgetary policy during the first 
two recession years but significantly tightened its budgetary stance during the third 
year,  so  that over the full  recession episode  its structural primary deficit remained 
unchanged. 
The average budgetary stance over all recession episodes hides substantial differences 
in  budgetary  behaviour  over  different  recession  periods  and  depends  on the  pre-
recession budgetary position of  Member States. 
77 Major recession periods 
Did  the  budgetary  reaction  of Member  States,  when  confronted  with  a  severe 
recession, change over time? 
Over the years 1961-96 taken into consideration, most recessions were concentrated in 
three periods:  1974-75, 1980-82 and 1991-93. The first and second recession periods 
were triggered by the two  oil price shocks;  the third by the effects of the banking 
crisis and the collapse of  the Soviet-Union in the Nordic countries as well as the tight 
monetary policy in the aftermath of  the German unification  11. With hindsight, the first 
two  recessions  could  be  characterised  as  supply  shocks  of a  permanent  nature, 
whereas the third recession could be classified as a demand shock. It could be argued 
that while there should have been less need for an active budgetary stabilisation policy 
during the first two recessions, such a policy could have been undertaken during the 
third recession. 
As can be seen in Table 2, real GDP on average declined by 2.8% during both the first 
and third recession periods. The recession of 1980-82 was less severe, with an average 
drop  in  real  GDP  of 1.7%.  The  output  gap  worsened  more  during  the  1974-75 
recession than during the  1991-93 recession, even though the negative growth rates 
were the same. This can be explained by the fact that trend growth was significantly 
higher in the mid-1970s than at the beginning of  the 1990s. 
During the 1974-75 period, five Member States registered a recession with a negative 
growth of 0. 75% or more in 1975, while Denmark and the United Kingdom recorded 
negative growth in both 1974 and 1975. 
As can be seen in Table 2, these countries increased their structural primary deficit by 
0.5%  points  of  GDP  on  average.  Four  Member  States  (Denmark,  Germany, 
Luxembourg and Italy)  carried out an expansionary budgetary policy to offset the 
shock, with the structural primary deficit increasing by between 0.3  to 2. 7% points. 
Belgium and Portugal adopted a weak pro-cyclical budgetary stance, which reduced 
their structural primary deficit by 0.4 to 0.8% points, while the UK took an even more 
restrictive stance. 
During  the  1980-82  period,  there  was  a  predominance  of multi-year  recession 
episodes. Belgium and Germany registered a negative annual real GDP growth rate of 
more  than  0.75%  in  1981  and  1982  respectively,  while  Denmark  and  the  United 
Kingdom recorded negative growth in both  1980  and  1981  and the Netherlands in 
both 1981 and 1982. 
Most of the Member States hit by this recession undertook a budgetary consolidation 
policy,  with  the  extent  of the  fiscal  retrenchment  undertaken  being  relatively 
important.  Structural  primary  deficits  were  reduced  by  1. 7%  points  of GDP  on 
11  Budgetary policies in Western countries over the period 1970-94 are examined in de Haan et al. 
(1992), Leibfritz et al. (1994) and Tanzi and Fanizza (1995). 
78 average. As budget deficits had remained high after the first oil shock, less room for 
manoeuvre  was  available  to  combat  the  second  oil  shock  via  budgetary  policy. 
Moreover, the need for  counter-cyclical policies was more limited as  this recession 
was less severe. 
During the last major recession, seven Member States (Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, France, Italy and Portugal) registered negative growth of more than 0.75% in 
1993, while Finland and Sweden recorded negative growth in the three consecutive 
years of  the period 1991-93 and the United Kingdom in both 1991 and 1992. 
Over the 1991-93 recession episode, structural primary deficits increased by 0.8% of 
GDP on average. This increase can be entirely attributed to the worsening that took 
place in the Nordic countries: 4.3% points of GDP  on average.  The other countries 
adopted  a  slightly  tighter  fiscal  stance  and  on  average  decreased  their  structural 
primary deficit by 0.7% ofGDP. 
Highly-indebted Member States, such as Belgium and Italy, implemented a significant 
budgetary  tightening  during  this  recession  and  decreased  their  structural  primary 
deficit  by  more  than  1.5%  point  of GDP,  while  Germany  also  undertook  some 
budgetary consolidation. Most other Member States adopted a slightly expansionary 
stance and let their structural primary deficits increase by between 0.2 to 1.2% points 
of  GDP. Sweden conducted a substantial fiscal relaxation policy in order to combat its 
major  multi-year  recession  and  increased  its  structural  primary  deficit  over  this 
recession  episode  by  8.2%  points  of GDP.  Finland's  structural  primary  deficit 
increased by 0.2% ofGDP. 
On the whole, budgetary reactions to recessions seem to  have become more prudent 
since the early 1980s. This may be related to the worsening of  the pre-recession deficit 
and debt levels. In most countries, the debt to GDP ratio was higher at the beginning 
Comparjson of budgetary reactions during major recession periods (1961-96) 
Cumulative change between year before recession and last year of the recession 
(average over episodes) 
I 
~= 
I  Uhidl: 
reaiGDP  output gap  actual deficit  I  structural  I  primary  structural primary  Major recession periods  I  deficit  I 
I  deficit  I  deficit 
1974-75 recession  -2.8  -6.7  3.5 
I  3.3  0.6 
I  0.5  I  I 
1980-82 recession  -1.7  -4.3  2.4 
I  1.2  -0.4 
I  -1.7  I  I 
1991-93 recession:  -2.7  -5.1  4.8 
I  4.0  1.4 
I  0.8  I  I 
-Finland and Sweden  -8.1  -11.0  15.7  I  12.8  6.7  I  4.3 
-Other countries  -1.5  -4.0  1.8  I  1.3  -0.4  I  -0.7 
I  I 
Average over all episodes  -2.5  -5.5  3.6  :  2.8  0.5  :  -0.1 
~: European Commission, DG II database. 
of the second and third recession periods than in the early 1970s. Moreover, the debt 
ratio was set on an upward trend in several countries.  These changes increased the 
risks involved in supplementing the automatic stabilisers with active counter-cyclical 
79 policies. The constraint to the implementation of these policies is also evident in the 
fact that in the two most recent recession periods the share of interest payments to 
GDP increased much more than in the first. 
Budgetary margin of manoeuvre 
Were budgetary reactions influenced by pre-recession budgetary positions? 
Countries with high debt ratios and with a high deficit in the year before the recession 
can be  expected to judge their budgetary room for  manoeuvre to be insufficient to 
conduct a significant fiscal relaxation and therefore to adopt a cautious policy stance, 
while countries with low pre-recession deficit and debt ratios may be more likely to 
undertake fiscal relaxation. 
It should  be  stressed  that  pre-recession  budgetary  positions  may  be  affected  by 
expectations  about  the  need  for  active  counter-cyclical  policies:  countries 
experiencing relatively big output swings may aim at maintaining low deficit and debt 
levels in order to have more room for manoeuvre in the event of  a recession. The same 
argument applies to countries where the effects of  automatic stabilisers are reduced by 
greater  exposure  to  international  trade  and  may  therefore  require  supplementary 
discretionary action to cushion negative shocks. 
:I:ahk.J:  Comparison of budgetary reactions to seyere recessions starting from 
different pre-recession budgetary situations (1961-96) 
Cumulative change between year before recession and last year of  the recession 
(average over episodes) 
Pre-recession budgetary  I 
~= 
I 
~=  reaiGDP  output gap  actual deficit  I  primary  structural  :  structural primary  situation*  I  deficit 
_l_  deficit  I  deficit 
-Member States with  deficit  and debt  -1.7  -4.4  1.9 
I 
-0.4  1.1 
I 
-1.2  ratios above the EU average  I  I 
-Member States with deficit and debt  -3.1  -6.1  5.1 
I 
1.4  4.4 
I 
0.8  ratios below the EU average  I  I 
Average over all episodes  -2.5  -5.5  3.6  l  2.8  0.5 
I  -0.1  I 
•  Not including the 1983-84 and 1993 recession episodes for Portugal because the deficit and debt criteria led to a different classification. 
~: European Commission, DG II database. 
Table 3 provides some preliminary indications on the possible relation between initial 
public  finance  imbalances  and  budgetary  behaviour  during  severe  recessions.  A 
Member State is classified as  being in a relatively difficult pre-recession budgetary 
situation if both its deficit and debt ratio in the year before the recession are higher 
than the EU average, while Member States with pre-recession deficit and debt ratios 
below the EU average are considered to be in a relatively easier budgetary position. 
Table  3  confirms  that  Member  States  with  deficit  and  debt  ratios  above  the  EU 
average in the year before the recession conducted a less accommodating budgetary 
policy: these Member States tightened their fiscal stance and reduced their structural 
80 " 
primary deficit by 1.2% points ofGDP on average during severe recession episodesi2. 
Fiscal  retrenchment  policies  aimed  at  preventing  a  worsening  of the  budgetary 
situation were adopted especially during protracted recession periods. 
On the contrary, Member States with low deficit and debt ratios compared to the EU 
average  undertook budgetary  relaxation  policies  during  recessions:  these  Member 
States increased their structural primary deficits with 0.8% pointsi3. Member States 
undergoing a protracted recession also substantially loosened their budgetary policy. 
An analysis14 of  the composition of budgetary measures during recessions shows that 
the main discretionary instrument to smooth out the effects of cyclical downturns is 
government  expenditure.  This  analysis  also  found  that,  contrary  to  widespread 
perception, discretionary tax revenue has risen during recessions, thereby partly or 
totally offsetting the rise in expenditure. 
IV.  EXCESSIVE DEFICITS DURING SEVERE RECESSIONS 
In  this  section,  the  budgetary  behaviour  of EU  Member  States  during  severe 
recessions over the period 1961-96 is examined in the light of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. This exercise aims at providing answers 
to the following questions: how many recessions would have led to excessive deficits, 
and, more specifically, to breaches of  the 3% reference value and to violations of  the 
"temporary nature of the deficit" clause? Which were the features of these specific 
recessions? Which level of  pre-recession budget balance could have avoided situations 
that would now be considered as excessive deficits? 
Methodology and assumptions 
The Excessive Deficit Procedure did not exist for  most of the period considered; 
therefore, the 3% reference value for the government deficit did not have any policy 
relevance. 
Table 4 shows that in about three quarters of  the years in the period 1961-96, deficits 
in the fifteen EU Member States have actually been above the 3% level. This means 
that the difference between actual  deficit levels  and the  3% threshold during past 
recessions does not provide any indication which could be relevant for understanding 
the  potential  working of this  procedure  in the  past.  For this  purpose,  it is  more 
appropriate to focus on the changes in deficit during and after recessions. 
12 
13 
14 
These results are consistent with the comments on this issue by Leibfritz et al.  (1994). 
These results still hold when Finland and Sweden, which had a severe multi-year recession at 
the beginning of  the 1990s during which they undertook a fiscal relaxation, are taken out. 
See Buti et al. ( 1997). 
81 Ia.llk..4:  Budget deficit indicators for 
the European Union Member States Cl961-96) 
Am:w  Standard d~viati!!n  Fr~gu~n~I  Qf bude~t  ddi~its 
government  government  above 
Member  budget deficit  budget deficits  3% ofGDP 
States  (% ofGDP)  (% points of GDP)  number of years* 
B  5.5  3.1  26 
DK  0.5  3.3  7 
D  1.5  1.8  8 
EL  9.7  3.8  16 
E  3.1  2.5  15 
F  1.4  1.9  6 
IRL  5.9  3.8  27 
I  7.3  3.7  29 
L  -2.0  2.0  I 
NL  2.7  2.0  15 
A  1.6  2.2  9 
p  3.2  3.3  20 
FIN  -2.1  3.6  5 
s  I.  I  5.3  10 
UK  2.6  2.3  16 
EU  3.6  1.6  20 
*on a total of36 years (1961-96), except for the following cases:  18 years 
(1979-96) for Greece, 27 years for Spain, Sweden and EU (1970-96), 34 
years for Luxembourg (excl.  1988 and  1989) and 35 years for Portugal 
(excl.  1980). 
~:  European Commission, DG II database. 
% 
72% 
19% 
22% 
89% 
56% 
16% 
75% 
81% 
3% 
42% 
25% 
57% 
14% 
37% 
44% 
74% 
More  precisely,  the  actual  deficit changes  are  superimposed  on an  arbitrary  "pre-
recession  deficit".  Starting  from  any  value  of the  deficit,  the  deterioration  of the 
deficit during the recession (in terms of percentage points of GDP) and its bouncing 
back once the recession is over are examined. 
Two common starting points are considered: a balanced budget (0% deficit), which is 
obviously  consistent  with  the  close-to-balance  requirement  and  may  represent  a 
benchmark for long-term budgetary targets within EMU and a 2% deficit, the likely 
deficit level in several Member States during the early years of EMU. Furthermore, a 
country-specific pre-recession budget surplus corresponding to the size of  the cyclical 
budget component is also considered as an additional exercise15. 
The analysis has been carried out as follows: 
15  The rationale  for the  latter exercise  is  that the  available  budgetary room  for  manoeuvre to 
confront a recession depends on the cyclical position of the country in the period before the 
recession. In this exercise, it is  assumed that the country choses a structural balanced budget 
position and that the actual budget position corresponds to the cyclical component in the pre-
recession year.  Therefore,  if the  output gap  is  zero  in the  pre-recession period,  this  case  is 
equivalent to the balanced budget exercise, while if the output gap is positive, as it turns out to 
have been the case for past recessions, the starting point will be an actual budget surplus. 
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1)  Recession periods involving a decline in GDP in real terms of 0.75% or more 
have been selected. The results with negative GDP growth rates of 2% or more 
have also been identified separately in the analysis. As pointed out in Section 2, 
when GDP declines for more than one year, the different years are grouped in a 
single recession episode  . 
2)  The analysis examines whether, during the recession period, the deficit exceeds 
the 3% reference value and whether the deficit returns below 3% in the first year 
following the recession. 
For instance, if  a Member State is assumed to have a deficit of  2% of GDP in the year 
before a severe recession, it will be put into a position of excessive deficit during the 
recession if its deficit increases by more than 1% points of GDP  in the year of the 
recession but returns below the 3% threshold as soon as the recession is over. In this 
case, the excessive deficit will only be "transient". If, however, its deficit increases by 
more than 1% points of GDP in the year of the recession and does not return below 
the  3%  threshold  as  soon  as  the  recession  is  over,  there  will  be  a  "persistent" 
excessive  deficit  and  there  is  a  presumption  that  sanctions  might  be  applied  if 
sufficient action to correct this excessive deficit is not taken. 
Main results 
Tables 5,  6 and 7 report the results of the exercise for the three starting points taken 
into consideration for the pre-recession deficit. On the vertical dimension, each table 
shows the change in deficit in the recession period with respect to the year before the 
recession; on the horizontal dimension, it considers the change in deficit in the first 
year after the recession period with respect to  the year before the recession.  Three 
areas can be identified: 
a)  the no-problem area (white area- no excessive deficit); 
b)  the  area showing a violation of the  3%  reference  value  during  the  recession 
(light grey area- "transient" excessive deficit); 
c)  the  area  showing  a  violation  of the  3%  threshold  both  in  the  year  of the 
recession and in the year following the recession (dark grey area -."persistent" 
excessive deficit). 
As can be seen in Table 5, starting from a pre-recession balanced bud~et, the deficit 
exceeds the 3% level in 11  recession episodes. In 6 cases (B  1981, D 1975, E 1993, 
I 1975, L 1975, P 1993), the deficit exceeds the 3% level in the year of the recession 
but returns below it in the following year. In 5 events (DK 1974-75 and 1980-81, FIN 
1991-93, S 1991-93, UK 1991-92), the deficit exceeds the 3% level in the year of the 
recession and remains above it also in the year following the recession. 
In two  cases  (P  1975  and  S  1977), the  deficit stays below the  3%  reference value 
during the recession but moves above it in the year following  the recession.  These 
countries  would  not be  put  into  an  excessive  deficit  position  for  the  year  of the 
83 recession, which is the angle taken for the analysis in Table 5,  but would be put in 
excessive deficit in the year after the recession. 
Table 6 shows that a pre-recession 2% deficit leads to  18  cases in which the deficit 
exceeds the 3% level. In one case, the deficit returns below the 3% threshold in the 
year following the recession (EL  1993). In 17 recessions involving  12 countries, the 
deficit breaches the  3%  level in the year of the recession and stays above it in the 
following year (B  1975 and 1981, D 1975, DK 1974-75 and 1980-81, E 1993, F 1993, 
FIN 1991-93, I 1975, L 1975, NL  1981-82, P 1975  and  1993, S 1977 and  1991-93, 
UK 1974-75 and 1991-92) . 
.I.a.b.k...S:  Excessive  deficits  during  severe  recessions  (GDP  decrease  of at  least  0. 75%):  deficit  before 
recession dt_1=0% 
Deterioration in  number 
recession period (t)  of cases  less equal 1% 
2  D, P 
total  24  7 
* ·  DP decrease of at least 2.0% (of at 
EXPlanation of shaded areas : 
more than 1% 
less equal 2% 
4 
light grey(===:=J"transient" excessive deficit (E, L,P,I, B,  D). 
dark grey-"persistent"  excessive deficit (OK,  FIN, S, UK). 
Source : European Commission, DG II database 
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more than 2% 
less equal 3% 
6 
more than 3% 
7 ~:  Excessive  deficits  during  severe  recessions  (GDP  decrease  of at least  0.75%):  deficit  before 
recession dt_1=2% 
Deterioration in  number  more than 1%  more than 2% 
recession period  of cases  less equal 1%  less equal 2%  less equal 3%  more than 3% 
total  6  7 
Explanation of shaded areas : 
light greyE==:J"transienf'  excessive deficit (EL). 
dark grey-"persistenf'  excessive deficit (17 cases). 
Source : European Commission, DG II database 
Table 7 shows that a pre-recession country-specific budget surplus, which corresponds 
to the cyclical budget component, would lead to 6 cases of excessive deficit. There is 
a breach of  the 3% threshold in only the recession year in 2 cases (D 1975 and I 1975) 
and in both the recession year and the following  one in 4 cases  (DK  1974-75  and 
1980-81 as well as both FIN and Sin 1991-93). Therefore, even when starting from a 
structural balanced budget and with an actual country-specific pre-recession surplus, 
the conclusions of  the balanced budget exercise remain valid  . 
.I.ahkl:  Excessive deficits during severe recessions (GDP decrease of at least 0. 75%): country-specific 
surplus before recession dt-t  corresponding to cyclical budget component 
Budget  in recession 
period (t) 
tcXal 
ni.Jliler ci 
cases 
24 
Surplus 
9 
a least 2.0'.4 (d a least o. 
85 
fran balaJlCE to  more than 1%  more than 2lk 
1%  less equal2'lk  less equal 3%  more than 3% 
5  3  6 The exercises presented above are summarised in Table 8. The following conclusions 
can be drawn: 
a)  As  expected,  the  lower  the  pre-recession  deficit,  the  lower  the  probability  of 
breaching the 3% threshold both in the recession year and in the year following the 
recession. For instance, moving from the 2% pre-recession deficit exercise to the 
balanced budget exercise makes the breaches of the 3% threshold decline from  18 
to 11; a similar pattern is found for the violations of  the temporariness clause (these 
decline from  17 to 5).  Moving from a balanced budget to a country-specific pre-
recession surplus as  a starting position further reduces the  violations of the  3% 
reference value and the temporariness condition: the breaches of the 3% threshold 
are reduced from 11 to 6 and the violations of  the temporariness clause from 5 to 4. 
b) The early years of EMU, where several countries are likely to record deficits close 
to 2%, are likely to  be  problematic in the event of a severe recession.  Over the 
period  1961-96,  with  this  pre-recession  deficit,  more  than  two  thirds  of the 
recessions  would  have  resulted  in a  breach of the  3%  level  in the  year of the 
recession as well as in the year following the recession. 
c)  A pre-recession balanced budget, and a fortiori a country-specific surplus, would 
have  prevented  all  one-year  recessions  from  leading  to  a  deficit  which  is 
"excessive" in the year of  the recession and which remains so in the year following 
the recession. 
d) The risk of  incurring an excessive deficit is relatively high for countries involved in 
lengthy recessions which result in significant negative  output gaps  and  make  it 
extremely difficult to  re-absorb  the  deficit within the  first  year of recovery.  As 
already pointed out, in 9 out of  the 24 recession episodes considered, GDP declines 
for two or three years. In 5 of  these 9 events, even starting with a balanced budget, 
and in 4 cases when starting from a pre-recession surplus, the deficit exceeds the 
3% reference value in the recession period and remains above the  3% threshold 
during the following year. 
Table 8:  Excessive deficjts during seyere recessions (GDP decrease of at least 0.75°/o): Summing-up 
Number of recessions with deficit 
above 3% threshold 
of which: 
Assumed deficit before  Number of  Excessive  "Transient"  "Persistent" 
recession  recession  Deficits  excessive deficit  excessive deficit 
(% ofGDP)  episodes  (a)=(b)+(c)  (b)  (c) 
0%  24  11  6  5 
2%  24  18  1  17 
Country-specific surplus  24  6  2  4 
~:European  Commission, DG II database. 
86 e) The risk of incurring an excessive deficit is very high in cases where the fall  in 
GDP exceeds 2%. Even in the 0% exercise, there is a breach of the 3% reference 
value in 4 out of  the 5 cases, in 2 of  which the deficit stays above the 3% threshold 
in  the  year  following  the  recession.  In  the  2%  deficit  exercise,  there  is  a 
"persistent" deficit in all the 5 recession episodes involving a fall of  2% or more in 
real GDP. In the exercise with a country-specific surplus, there is a "persistent" 
excessive deficit in 2 out of the 5 cases of negative growth of 2% or more and in 
one case there is a "transient" excessive deficit. 
f)  For the calculations carried out in this section, the closeness condition has not been 
applied.  However,  had this condition been taken into  account,  this  would have 
introduced a number of limited-problem cases as defined in Graph 1 in Section 2 
and it would have decreased the number of "transient" excessive  deficit cases. 
However, for the purpose of imposing sanctions on persistent offenders, nothing 
would have changed. 
All in all, the analysis in this section calls for a fast move to a balanced budget and for 
some attention for the problems that will be encountered during the early years of 
EMU in the event of a severe downturn. An analysis of the length of the adjustment 
period  needed  to  redress  budgetary  imbalances  after  recessionst6  shows  that,  if 
Member States start off with a balanced budget, then even in the event of breaching 
the 3% ceiling during the recession year, a fast budgetary adjustment to fend off the 
thread of sanctions is feasible. However, the situation becomes more problematic the 
further away government budgets move from a balanced position. 
V.  "MILD"  RECESSIONS  AND  ABRUPT  SLOWDOWNS:  ARE  THERE 
HIDDEN PROBLEMS? 
This section examines budgetary outcomes during two additional types of economic 
slowdown: mild recessions, in which GDP declines by less than 0. 75%, and periods of 
economic slowdown, in which the rate of growth declines abruptly but still remains 
positive. The analysis provides indications about the risk that these events, which do 
not qualify as severe economic slowdowns, produce excessive deficits. 
Over the period 1961-96 there were 9 cases of  negative GDP growth in the 0 to 0.75% 
range. The output gap widened by around 3% points of  trend GDP on average in these 
episodes, as against over 5% points in the 24 episodes considered in Section 4.  The 
increase in the deficit was relatively limited, 0.7% points, as against 3.6% points in 
the 24 episodes. This is due to the different stance of discretionary policies, which 
reduced the structural primary deficit by 1.1% points of  GDP, while in the 24 episodes 
it decreased by 0.1% points. 
An abrupt decline in economic growth is defined as corresponding to a fall in the GDP 
growth rate which still remains positive but produces a worsening of  the output gap by 
16  See Buti et al. (1997). 
87 at  least 2.5% points17•  Over the period  1961-96 there were  17  such episodes (7  of 
which in Ireland and Portugal). Most took place during the  1960s and  1970s, when 
growth rates were relatively high. The increase in the deficit was very limited during 
periods of abrupt slowdown in growth: 0.3% points, as against 3.6% points in the 24 
severe recession episodes and 0.7% points during mild recessions. This is due to the 
discretionary policy undertaken, which reduced the structural primary deficit by 0.9% 
points ofGDP. 
As can be seen in Table 9,  assuming a pre-recession balanced budget, there is only 
one case of excessive deficit.  More specifically, this is  a case in which the  deficit 
breaches the 3% threshold in the recession period and does not return below it in the 
following year (A 1975). This was due to a substantial expansionary budgetary policy 
in the year of  the recession (an increase in the structural primary deficit by about 1. 7% 
points of GDP), followed by a failure to exploit the high growth rate recorded in the 
following year 18• 
Excessive deficits during mild recessions and abrupt slowdowns in growth: 
deficit before recession dt_1=0% 
Deterioration in  number 
recession period (t)  of cases  less equal 1% 
more than 1% 
less equal 2% 
more than 2% 
less equal 3%  more than 3% 
total 
growth going along with a worsening of the output gap by at least 2.5% 
Explanation of shaded areas · 
light grey C=:J  "transienf' excessive deficit. 
dark grey-"persistenf'  excessive deficit {A). 
Source : European Commission, DG II database 
As  shown in Table  1  0,  a pre-recession deficit of 2% of GDP  leads to  11  cases in 
which the deficit exceeds the 3% threshold. More specifically, there are 3 cases where 
the deficit breaches the 3% reference value during the recession year only (D 1967, F 
17 
18 
The  2.5%  threshold  has  been  selected  taking  into  consideration  that  2.5%  is  the  minimum 
output gap deterioration in  the  single-year recessions  involving a decline of GDP by at least 
0.75%. This means that the 2.5% threshold allows to select downturns which produced effects 
potentially as  large  as  those  produced in  the  recessions  labelled as  severe under the  0.75  % 
condition. 
See OECD (1977) and (1978). 
88 1975 and L 1981), and 8 cases of a "persistent" excessive deficit (D  1974, E 1981, I 
1971, L 1967, NL  1975, A 1975, P 1974 and FIN  1977).  Most of these cases were 
characterised by expansionary policies. 
Table 10:  Excessive deficits during mild recessions and abrupt slowdowns in growth: 
deficit before recession dt_1=2% 
Deterioration in  number 
recession period 
total 
Note: 
more than 1% 
less equal 2% 
more than 2% 
less equal 3% 
growth going along with a worsening of the output gap by at least 2.5% 
EXPlanation of shaded areas : 
light greyC==:J"transient" excessive deficit (D, F. L). 
dark grey-"persistent"  excessive deficit (D,  E,  I,  L,  NL, A,  P, FIN). 
Source : European Commission, DG II database 
more than 3% 
6 
These results seem to  imply that, if budgets are balanced before recession episodes, 
mild recessions and abrupt slowdowns in growth will not lead to  excessive deficits 
unless  strong  expansionary  policies  are  implemented  and  not  reversed  after  the 
recession. In other words, experience from the 1961-96 period points to the fact that 
there  are  no  downturns  other  than  "severe  recessions"  which  produce  serious 
Table 11:  Excessive  deficits  during mild  recessions  and  abrupt slowdowns  in  growth:  country-specific 
surplus before recession d  •. 1  corresponding to cyclical budget component 
Budget  In recession  number 
period (t)  cases 
Surplus 
14 
total 
Emla"tation of shaded areas : 
Surplus 
IRL(4x),L, A, 
P, FIN 
from balance to  more than 1% 
1%  less equal 2% 
A,P 
light greyc:==:J"transient"  excessive deficit. 
dark grey-"persistent"  excessive deficit. 
Source: European Commission, DG II database 
89 
more than 2% 
less equal 3%  more than 3% budgetary effects. 
If budgets are  balanced,  mild recessions or major drops  in the  growth rate  do  not 
produce excessive deficits. On the other hand, if  deficits are in the 2% range, as might 
occur in the early years of EMU,  abrupt declines  in growth might also  lead  some 
countries into excessive deficits. 
Table 11  shows that a pre-recession country-specific budget surplus would not lead to 
a case in which the deficit would exceed the 3% reference value during the recession 
year. When starting from a structural balanced budget and with an actual pre-recession 
surplus corresponding to the size of the cyclical budget component in each country, 
the conclusions of  the balanced budget exercise therefore remain valid also for periods 
of  mild recessions and slowdowns in growth. 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The aim of  this study was to examine whether EU Member States will have to change 
their  budgetary  policy  behaviour  once  the  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure  and  the 
Stability and Growth Pact become fully  operational during the third stage of EMU. 
Indeed, these procedures will introduce a major "regime-shift" as Member States will 
be bound to apply prudent budgetary policies in order to  avoid an excessive deficit 
position. 
Member States' budgetary performances during phases of economic slowdown were 
examined over the period 1961-96. These performances were analysed in the light of 
the provisions of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
More specifically, this study analysed whether, during and  immediately after these 
recession periods, Member States would have moved in a situation of  excessive deficit 
had past budgetary policies been pursued. 
The use of the provisions of the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and 
Growth Pact to examine the past is obviously a highly speculative exercise. Its results 
do not address the following questions: to what extent is past budgetary behaviour a 
reliable guide to  assess the likely behaviour of national budgetary policies in EMU 
during recessions? More  specifically,  would  Member States need larger or smaller 
changes  in  their  budgetary  positions  to  provide  the  degree  of stabilisation  which 
occurred in the past? 
A number of  factors will play an important role: 
New policy regime under EMU 
During the third phase of EMU, the conduct of  monetary policy will be centralised at 
the European level and will therefore no longer be available as a policy tool at the 
national  level.  Budgetary  policy  will  thus  be  the  main  macro-economic  policy 
instrument  still  available  for  individual  Member  States  to  combat  recessions, 
90 (7) 
especially when shocks are  country-specific.  The  impossibility of lowering  interest 
rates and resorting to currency devaluations might require larger deficit changes. 
On the other hand, according to the Mundell-Fleming framework,  budgetary policy 
will  in  principle  become  more  effective  in  dampening  the  amplitude  of cyclical 
fluctuations in the new policy environment of EMU with centralised monetary policy 
and irrevocably fixed exchange rates between Member States. 
If,  however,  EMU enhances the process of economic integration,  trade  leakages of 
budgetary  policies  will  gradually  increase,  thereby  reducing  the  "domestic" 
effectiveness  of budgetary  policies.  Unless  national  policies  are  co-ordinated,  this 
factor  raises the  changes in the  budget deficit required in order to  attain the  same 
degree of  stabilisation as that achieved in the past. 
"Pre-recession" deficit level 
Actual deficit changes observed during past recessions were applied in this chapter 
"pre-recession" deficit levels chosen specifically for the exercise. However, the deficit 
changes which took place during past severe recessions usually started from markedly 
higher pre-recession deficit levels.  The impact on the economy of budgetary policy 
changes during recessions also varies depending on the deficit and debt levels.  For 
instance, the markets' perception of  an increase in the deficit from a low level during a 
severe recession will be different from that of a rise in the deficit from a much higher 
level, the latter more likely being interpreted as shifting the deficit to an unsustainable 
path. This may lead to an increase in the risk premium on interest rates which reduces 
the effectiveness of  the fiscal expansion. 
High  budgetary  imbalances  may  inhibit  policy  makers  from  using  the  budgetary 
instrument  for  stabilisation purposes.  Indeed,  the  higher  risk  premia which  would 
raise the interest burden may represent a powerful disincentive to  expanding fiscal 
policy in spite of the recession. As was pointed out in Section 3, budgetary reactions 
to  economic  downturns  differ  depending  on  the  initial  public  finance  conditions 
before the recession: countries with high deficit and debt levels tend to conduct tighter 
fiscal policies during recessions than those with lower deficit and debt levels. In the 
future,  when medium-term targets have been achieved,  Member States would have 
more room for manoeuvre to undertake accommodating policies. 
These factors point in different directions.  As  a consequence, the net effect on the 
requirement  for  budgetary  stabilisation  is  ambiguous.  If it  proved  necessary  to 
reinforce the working of the automatic stabilisers during recessions in EMU,  larger 
swings in budget deficits compared to the past would have to be allowed for.  Under 
the  provisions  of the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  this  would  imply,  however,  that 
during  the  third  phase  of EMU,  Member  States,  and  especially  those  with  large 
automatic stabilisers, would have to run budgetary surpluses when in medium-term 
equilibrium. 
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AUTOMATIC BUDGETARY STABILISERS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the recession of 1993, the average general government budget deficit for the 
European Union as a whole has been reduced from its record level of  6.1% of  GDP in 
1993 to 4.2% ofGDP in 1996, and the Commission's Autumn 1997 Forecasts indicate 
that the average EU deficit might decrease further to 2.6% ofGDP in 1997. 
This marked reduction in government deficits in EU Member States can be attributed 
both  to  the  budgetary  consolidation  policies  pursued  by  the  Member  State 
governments over recent years and to the favourable effects of  the economic recovery 
on government budgets. 
Indeed,  cyclical  fluctuations  in  economic  activity  exert  a  significant  influence  on 
government budget balances: tax receipts weaken and social transfers increase during 
recessions and show reversed movements during expansions. 
Such changes in the budget balance which are induced by cyclical fluctuations, in turn 
have a stabilising influence on economic activity, i.e. they fulfil the role of budgetary 
automatic stabilisers. These budgetary automatic stabilisers contribute to a stimulation 
of the economy in a period of recession and exert a dampening effect in periods of 
overheating, and should therefore be automatically self-correcting. 
Governments  have  the  option to  either  let  these  automatic  stabilisers  work  or to 
reinforce  or  restrain  their  effect  via  discretionary  budgetary  policy.  During  a 
recession,  for  example,  governments  might  prefer  not  to  let  the  budget  deficit 
deteriorate due to the operation of the automatic stabilisers and will therefore decide 
to conduct a pro-cyclical budgetary policy, or they might choose to actively undertake 
a counter-cyclical budgetary policy which will further increase the deficit. 
To examine the operation of  the budgetary automatic stabilisers, a cyclical adjustment 
method to identify the cyclical component of government budget balances is needed. 
Such a method allows to examine the effects of  variations in economic growth on the 
government's budgetary position and to decompose the actual budget balance into a 
cyclical  and a  structural  or cyclically  adjusted  component.  The  former  shows  the 
effect on the government budget of cyclical fluctuations around the trend level, while 
the latter reflects what the budget balance would be if economic activity was at its 
trend level. 
An example of such a method is the simple cyclical adjustment method used by the 
Commission  services  (European  Commission,  1995).  The  influence  of cyclical 
fluctuations on government budget balances is calculated by multiplying the output 
gap  by  the  cyclical  sensitivity  of budgetary  receipts  and  expenditures.  The  trend 
output  benchmark  is  estimated  via  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter.  The  output  gap  is 
94 • 
defmed as  the difference between the  actual  level  of GDP  and that of trend GDP, 
expressed as a percentage of  trend GDP. 
II.  SIZE AND VARIABILITY 
Calculations based on the method used by the  Commission services  show that the 
magnitude  of the  budgetary  automatic  stabilisers,  as  measured  by  the  cyclical 
component of budget balances, is quite important for most of the EU Member States 
and varies substantially across Member States and over time. 
As can be seen in Table  1,  the cyclical impact on government budgets is relatively 
higher and  shows  a relatively  higher degree  of variability  in the  smaller Member 
States and in the Nordic countries than in the  larger Member States.  The  size  and 
volatility of the cyclical component for the European Union as a whole is dampened 
because the different positions with respect to the cycle of the Member States at a 
given moment are averaged out. 
Table 1 shows that, in most Member States, the cyclical component on average varies 
with around 1 percentage point of  GDP in either direction around its mean. 
As can be seen from the lowest negative and highest positive values of the cyclical 
components over the period 1960-1996 presented in Table 1, the cyclical component 
for the EU Member States rarely surpassed the 3% of GDP value on either side and 
even remained below the 2% value in five  Member States.  Cyclical components of 
above 4% were only registered in Finland and Sweden during the exceptionally severe 
recession at the beginning of  the 1990s as well as in the UK. 
The magnitude of the cyclical fluctuations of the government's budget is influenced 
by the extent and volatility of  the economic cycles, the importance of  the government 
sector  in the  economy,  the  progressivity  of the  tax  system,  the  generosity  of the 
unemployment  compensation  schemes  and  the  sensitivity  of unemployment  to 
fluctuations in output. These factors vary considerably from one country to another 
and also change significantly over time. 
In the  Commission services'  cyclical adjustment method,  the  influence of cyclical 
fluctuations on the government budget balance is captured by taking the product of 
two  parameters:  the marginal  sensitivity of budgetary  receipts  and  expenditures to 
GDP and the size of  the output gap19. 
19  The  Hodrick-Prescott  trend  estimation  method  used  in  the  Commission  services'  cyclical 
adjustment method produces output gaps which are symmetric over the  series, and therefore 
sum to zero on average over the period 1960-1996. The negative output gaps produced by this 
method  are  relatively  small  compared  to  those  produced  by  other  methods,  such  as,  for 
example, the production function  approach.  In  addition, the method smoothes over structural 
breaks,  such as  those which occurred in  Finland and  Sweden  at the  beginning of the  1990s 
(European Commission, 1995) 
95 Table 1: 
Size and volatility ofthe cyclical component of bud2et balances for the 
European Union Member States (1960-1996) 
Member  Volatility  Lowest negative component  Highest positive component 
Table 2: 
States  Standard deviation  Value  Year  Value 
(% points of GDP)  (as% ofGDP)  (as% ofGDP) 
B  1.0  -1.7  1986  2.0 
DK  1.3  -2.4  1981  2.6 
D  1.0  -1.8  1967  2.4 
EL  0.7  -1.0  1987  1.6 
E  1.5  -2.1  1984,1985  2.7 
F  0.8  -1.1  1985  1.6 
IRL  1.2  -2.6  1993  2.0 
I  0.7  -1.2  1975  1.1 
L  2.0  -3.3  1983  4.2 
NL  1.3  -2.9  1983  1.8 
A  0.7  -1.2  1987  1.4 
p  1.1  -2.4  1984,1985  2.4 
FIN  2.2  -5.6  1993  5.3 
s  1.8  -4.1  1993  3.2 
UK  1.4  -2.7  1982  3.1 
EU  0.8  -1.3  1983  1.6 
~:  Own calculattons based on the Commtsston's Autumn 1997 Forecasts 
(European Commission, 1997). 
Year 
1974 
1986 
1991 
1973 
1990 
1990 
1978 
1980 
1974 
1974 
1991 
1973 
1989 
1990 
1989 
1990 
Size and variability of the output gaps for the European Union Member States (1960-1996) 
Member  Volatility  Lowest negative output gap  Highest positive output gap 
States  Standard deviation  Value  Year  Value  Year  (% points of  GDP)  (as% ofGDP)  (as% ofGDP) 
B  1.7  -2.7  1968  3.8  1974 
DK  1.8  -3.6  1981  3.8  1986 
D  2.0  -3.8  1967  4.3  1991 
EL  2.1  -3.4  1962  5.8  1973 
E  2.5  -4.5  1960  5.3  1974 
F  1.4  -2.1  1985  3.2  1990 
IRL  2.1  -4.5  1993  4.2  1978 
I  1.8  -3.4  1975  3.1  1980 
L  3.1  -4.8  1983  8.9  1974 
NL  1.6  -3.4  1983  2.4  1974 
A  1.6  -2.8  1968  3.2  1973,1974 
p  2.8  -5.4  1984,1985  8.2  1973 
FIN  3.6  -8.0  1993  9.2  1989 
s  1.9  -4.6  1993  3.7  1990 
UK  2.2  -4.0  1982  5.1  1988 
EU  1.4  -2.2  1983  3.2  1973 
~:  Own calculations based on the CommissiOn's Autumn 1997 Forecasts (European Commission, 1997). 
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Output gaps 
Differences in the size of  the output gaps are the main element to explain divergences 
in the importance of  the cyclical components across EU Member States  . 
With the recession of 1993, the output gap for the European Union as a whole turned 
negative and reached a trough of -1.7% of trend GDP.  In 1993, output gaps were 
particularly large in Finland (  -8.0%) and Sweden (  -4.6%  ). The negative output gap for 
the European Union as a whole narrowed to -1.0% in 1994 and to -0.7% in 1995 with 
the start of the recovery, but widened again with the slowdown of 1996 to  around 
-1.2% oftrend GDP. 
For 1997, the Commission's Autumn 1997 Forecasts project that the output gap will 
narrow slightly to -1.0% of  trend GDP. Negative output gaps in 1997 are expected to 
continue to be relatively large in Spain and France (-1.3%), while Denmark, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom are expected to have positive output gaps. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the size and the volatility of the output gaps is relatively 
high in the "catching-up" countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, and in some 
of  the smaller Member States as well as in the Nordic countries. 
Cyclical sensitivity of  budget receipts and expenditure 
Budgetary receipts are much more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations than expenditure, 
-owing to the importance of the tax share in the economy and to the progressivity of 
the tax system. 
The  sensitivity of budget receipts to cyclical fluctuations  differs  depending on the 
revenue category: corporate taxes paid by the business sector vary most with the cycle 
due to the sensitivity of  profits to cyclical fluctuations, while social contributions vary 
less with the cycle due to the regressive nature of this tax. The cyclical sensitivity of 
personal income taxes and of  indirect taxes is situated between these two extremes. 
The overall weighted average revenue elasticity with respect to GDP is close to 1.0 for 
the European Union as a whole, and ranges from 1.38 for the United Kingdom to 0.77 
for Italy. These divergences are due to differences in Member State tax rates and tax 
structures.  The  marginal  sensitivity  of budgetary  receipts  to  GDP  is  obtained  by 
multiplying the overall revenue elasticity by the tax to GDP ratio. 
97 Table3: 
Mareinal sensitivity of budeet reyenue and expenditure to GDPfor the European Union 
Member States -1995 
Member  Sensitivity of budgetary  Sensitivity of budget  Sensitivity of budget 
States  receipts to GDP*  expenditure to GDP *  balances to GDP* 
(1)  (2)  (3)=(1)-(2) 
B  0.5  -0.1  0.6 
DK  0.5  -0.3  0.7 
D  0.4  -0.1  0.5 
EL  0.3  -0.1  0.4 
E  0.5  -0.2  0.6 
F  0.5  -0.1  0.5 
IRL  0.4  -0.2  0.5 
I  0.3  -0.1  0.5 
L  0.4  -0.2  0.6 
NL  0.5  -0.2  0.8 
A  0.4  -0.1  0.5 
p  0.4  -0.1  0.5 
FIN  0.5  -0.2  0.6 
s  0.6  -0.2  0.9 
UK  0.5  -0.2  0.6 
EU  0.4  -0.1  0.5 
* F1gures are rounded-off. 
~:  European Commission (1995). 
As  can be  seen in the first  column of Table  3,  the  marginal  sensitivity of budget 
revenues to GDP for the European Union as a whole was 0.4 for  1995. This means 
that each widening of  a negative output gap by 1 percentage point reduces government 
budget revenues by 0.4 percentage points ofGDP. The revenue sensitivity varies from 
0.3 for Greece and Italy to 0.6 for Sweden. 
Government transfers to households to cover costs related to unemployment are the 
main spending category which is deemed to react automatically to cyclical variations. 
Most other categories of  government spending are considerd to remain unaffected. As 
there is only one category of government spending which is  responsive to  cyclical 
fluctuations in economic activity, the marginal sensitivity of government spending to 
GDP  is  significantly lower than  that of budget revenue,  where  almost all  revenue 
categories are affected by the cycle. 
As can be seen in the second column of Table 3, the estimated sensitivity of budget 
expenditures to  GDP  for  the  European Union as  a whole  is  -0.1  for  1995,  which 
means that each widening of a negative output gap by  1 percentage point of trend 
GDP increases government spending by 0.1  percentage points of GDP.  The cyclical 
sensitivity of expenditure does not vary widely among Member States: it ranges from 
-0.05 for France to -0.26 for Denmark. 
The  difference  of the  marginal  revenue  sensitivity  to  GDP  and  the  marginal 
expenditure sensitivity gives the marginal rate of change of the budget balance with 
respect to GDP. The third column of Table 3 shows that the sensitivity of the budget 
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balance to the cycle lies around 0.5 for the European Union as a whole20. This means 
that each deterioration of a negative output gap by  1 percentage point of trend GDP 
increases the average government deficit by 0.5 percentage points. The sensitivity of 
the budget balance to the cycle ranges from 0.4 for Greece to 0.85 for Sweden. 
The importance for the budgetary automatic stabilisers of fluctuations  in revenue is 
clearly much larger than that of  expenditure: as can be seen from the figures presented 
in Table 3, the decrease in government revenue during a recession accounts for four 
fifths of  the deterioration of  the government deficit, while the increase in expenditure 
only accounts for one fifth. 
It can also be noted that those Member States such as Finland, Sweden and Denmark, 
for which the cyclical sensitivity of the budget balance is relatively high due to the 
extensive role of the  government sector in the economy,  have  also registered large 
swings in their output gaps  in recent years.  The  combination of these two  factors 
explains why  these  countries have  registered  such  extreme  values  for  the  cyclical 
component of  the budget balance over recent years. 
III.  DEGREE  OF  STABILISATION  PROVIDED  BY  THE  AUTOMATIC 
STABILISERS 
The  dampening  effect  of the  automatic  stabilisers  on  output  fluctuations  differs 
significantly  across  countries.  It mainly  depends  on the degree  of openness of the 
economy and on the structure of  tax and expenditure systems. 
In the open economies of  the smaller EU Member States, the impact of the automatic 
stabilisers on output fluctuations can be expected to be relatively modest because of 
the importance of  the trade leakages which reduce the domestic effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. In the more closed economies of  the larger EU Member States, the dampening 
effect of the operation of the  automatic  stabilisers should be  more  significant.  The 
more open countries therefore need, ceteris paribus, comparatively larger budgetary 
fluctuations in order to achieve the same degree of output smoothing as obtained in 
the more closed economies which have automatic stabilisers of  a smaller size. 
Depending on the estimation method used,  estimates given in the  literature on the 
dampening impact of the budgetary automatic stabilisers tend to differ considerably. 
Comparable and up-to-date estimates for each of the EU Member States have up to 
now not yet been produced. 
20  The estimates of  the size of the automatic stabilisers used in the Commission services' cyclical 
adjustment method are very close to those used by the OECD and the IMF in their respective 
cyclical  adjustment  methods  (Giomo  et  al.,  1995  and  IMF,  1993).  Both  the  Commission 
services and the OECD use an estimate for the cyclical sensitivity of  the budget balance of 0.5 
for the European Union as a whole, whereas the IMF uses an estimate of approximately 0.6. 
Each of these international organisations largely bases its estimates of the budgetary revenue 
and expenditure elasticities on a seminal OECD Working Paper by Chouraqui et al.  (1990), 
which presented, among several other fiscal  indicators, a method to cyclically adjust budget 
balances. 
99 Recent  estimates  given  in  the  literature  of the  reduction  in  output  fluctuations 
provided by the budgetary automatic  stabilisers  following  a  given shock range,  as 
pointed out by ltalianer and Vanheukelen (1993), between 20% and 50% for the EU 
Member States as well as for most other industrialised countries. 
The OECD (1993), for example, did a simulation exercise whereby the effects of a 
shock in private consumption on output were calculated under a scenario whereby the 
automatic  stabilisers  were  allowed  to  fully  operate.  The  output  changes  obtained 
under this scenario were then compared to a situation where governments blocked the 
workings of the automatic stabilisers via a compensatory change in taxation and thus 
prevented  changes  in the  government  deficit  from  taking  place.  The  dampening 
impact  on output  of the  automatic  stabilisers  was  then  calculated  by  taking  the 
difference in the output changes between both scenarios. 
The results obtained by the OECD showed that, for the major EU Member States, the 
operation of the  budgetary  automatic  stabilisers  reduces  the  amplitude  of cyclical 
fluctuations  by one quarter,  i.e.  output fluctuations  following  a  given shock in an 
individual country are  dampened by around 25% via the working of the automatic 
stabilisers. 
The OECD also found that the automatic stabilisers were less effective in dampening 
output fluctuations in the smaller European countries due to the higher trade leakages 
in  these  countries  and  that  the  Nordic  countries  achieved  a  degree  of output 
stabilisation comparable to that of  the larger countries owing to the particularly large 
size of  their budgetary stabilisers2I. 
In a  similar simulation exercise, Pisani-Ferry et al.  (1993) estimated the degree of 
shock absorption automatically provided by the budget following a fall in the demand 
for exports and found an overall stabilisation effect of around 3  7% for France and 
between  34%  to  42%  for  Germany,  depending  on  whether  or  not  inter-regional 
transfers between the Lander were taken into account. 
To obtain comparable estimates of the smoothing impact of the budgetary automatic 
stabilisers for each of  the EU Member States in the current institutional environment, 
a  simulation  exercise  was  set  up  with  the  Commission  services'  QUEST  model 
(European Commission, 1996). 
The exercise with the QUEST model was carried out in a similar way as the OECD 
simulation exercise discussed above. The first year effects on output of  a 1% increase 
in private consumption in a specific country were calculated under a scenario whereby 
the  automatic  stabilisers were  allowed to  fully  operate.  Output changes  were then 
calculated  under  an  alternative  scenario  in  which  the  government  prevented  the 
21  The OECD also underlined that the automatic stabilisers in the United States and Japan had a 
significant stabilising impact on the economy because of the below-average openness of these 
two economies, even though the size of their automatic stabilisers is smaller than those in the 
EU Member States (OECD, 1993). 
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working  of  the  automatic  stabilisers  and  kept  tax  revenues  unchanged  via 
counterbalancing measures.  An estimate for  the dampening effect of the  automatic 
stabilisers was then obtained by taking the difference in output changes between the 
two scenarios. 
As  can be  seen  in  Table  4,  the  results  obtained  with  the  QUEST  model  broadly 
correspond to the OECD estimates discussed above22.  The exercise with the QUEST 
model  found  that the  stabilising impact of the  budgetary  automatic  stabilisers  lies 
around 30% for the major EU Member States except France (Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom), i.e.  output fluctuations  in these countries are  reduced by around 
30% when the automatic stabilisers are allowed to work compared to a situation where 
they do not operate. 
For example, as is shown in Table 4, a 1% increase in private consumption led to a 
real  GDP  increase  of 1.38%  in  Germany  when  the  automatic  stabilisers  were 
prevented from operating and to an increase in real  GDP  of only 0.96% when they 
were allowed to  fully  operate.  The results of the  exercise with the  QUEST model 
show that, for Germany, the operation of the automatic stabilisers thus reduced the 
real GDP growth rate by 0.42 percentage points after a 1% positive shock in private 
consumption, which corresponds to a dampening impact of  30%. 
The  QUEST exercise  also  confirms that the Nordic  countries,  with their relatively 
large budgetary automatic stabilisers, obtain a similar or even higher degree of  output 
stabilisation compared to  the  large  EU  Member  States with their lower automatic 
stabilisers. 
For  example,  the  QUEST  estimates  show  that  the  high  automatic  stabilisers  in 
Denmark  produce  the  same  stabilising  impact  of output  as  the  relatively  lower 
stabilisers  of Germany.  Denmark  obtains  the  same  stabilising  impact  of 30%  as 
Germany, with a cyclical sensitivity of  the budget balance of0.7 as compared to 0.5 in 
Germany.  In  Finland  and  Sweden,  with  automatic  stabilisers  of 0.65  and  0.85 
respectively, the degree of stabilisation provided by the automatic stabilisers is even 
higher than in Germany and lies around 40%23. 
22 
23 
Even though the results obtained with the QUEST simulations are very close to those of the 
OECD,  they  must nevertheless  be  considered  with  care.  In  order to  have  a  fully  accurate 
measure of the degree of stabilisation provided by the automatic stabilisers, the budget deficit 
should be kept constant during the simulation without stabilisers on both the expenditure and 
the revenue side, and not on tax revenues only as in the current simulation exercise. 
The Nordic countries in general adopt an active counter-cyclical budgetary policy stance over 
the cycle, and especially during recessions. In view of the results obtained with the QUEST 
model, this cannot be explained by the  low degree of output stabilisation provided by their 
automatic  stabilisers.  Indeed,  the  automatic  stabilisers  in  the  Nordic  countries  already  by 
themselves  provide  a  relatively  high  degree  of output  stabilisation.  The  workings  of the 
automatic stabilisers is then further reinforced via the active counter-cyclical budgetary policies 
undertaken by the Nordic governments. 
101 The degree of stabilisation is, however, significantly lower in the southern countries 
(Greece, Spain and Portugal). The stabilising impact of  the automatic stabilisers even 
lies below 20% in these countries. 
Table 4: 
Deeree of  stabilisation provided by budutary automatic stabilisers Results ofthe QUEST simulation exercise 
% change after 1  o/o  positive consumption shock: 
Output change when  Output change under full 
Difference in 
Stabilising impact 
Member  automatic stabilisers are  operation of the automatic  of  the automatic 
States  prevented from operating  stabilisers  output change  stabilisers (in%) 
(1)  (2) 
(3)=(1)-(2)  (4)=(3)/(1) 
B  1.02  0.76  0.26  26% 
DK  1.09  0.75  0.34  31% 
D  1.38  0.96  0.42  30% 
EL  1.09  0.93  0.16  15% 
E  0.99  0.81  0.18  18% 
F  1.21  0.93  0.28  23% 
IRL  1.51  1.04  0.47  31% 
I  1.18  0.87  0.31  26% 
L  - - - -
NL  1.08  0.76  0.32  30% 
A  0.96  0.71  0.25  26% 
p  0.94  0.77  0.17  18% 
FIN  1.33  0.79  0.54  41% 
s  1.39  0.86  0.53  38% 
UK  1.18  0.77  0.41  35% 
EU  1.21  0.87  0.34  28% 
~:  Calculations w1th the Comm1ss1on serv1ces' QUEST model. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
For most EU Member States, both the size and the stabilising effect of the budgetary 
automatic stabilisers are quite important. The larger countries obtain a relatively high 
degree of output smoothing with average-sized automatic stabilisers because of the 
relative closedness of their economies, while the Nordic countries realise a similar or 
even higher degree of stabilisation with larger automatic stabilisers in spite of the 
trade leakages in these more open economies. In the southern countries, the size of  the 
budgetary automatic stabilisers is relatively small because of the lower weight of the 
government  sector  in  the  economy  and  their  stabilising  effect  is  as  a  result  less 
significant. 
As the operation of the  automatic stabilisers already provides by  itself a sufficient 
degree of  output smoothing in the larger EU Member States, the governments of  these 
countries  often  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  adopt  an  active  counter-cyclical 
budgetary policy to further stabilise the economy. As a result, the governments of  the 
larger EU Member States will often just let the automatic stabilisers operate without 
102 actively adopting a discretionary policy stance or might even be inclined to undertake 
a pro-cyclical discretionary policy in order to offset their effect on the budget balance. 
The  Nordic  countries,  on  the  other  hand,  often  undertake  active  counter-cyclical 
budgetary  policies  to  further  smoothen  out  cyclical  fluctuations,  even  though  the 
degree of  output stabilisation provided by their relatively large automatic stabilisers is 
similar to that of  the larger countries. 
In setting their medium-term budgetary targets over the cycle, the Nordic countries 
would therefore have to aim for sound budgetary positions in normal circumstances, 
characterised  by  budgetary  surpluses  and  very  low  government  debt  ratios.  This 
would not only allow their relatively large automatic stabilisers to fully operate over 
the  cycle,  but  would  also  give  them  additional  room  for  manoeuvre  to  conduct 
expansionary budgetary policies during recessions. 
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(11.8) 
BUDGETARY POLICY COORDINATION 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the literature on EMU, co-ordination of budgetary policies is advocated to achieve 
three  objectives:  (i)  to  maintain  budgetary  discipline;  (ii)  to  provide  an  adequate 
degree  of budgetary  stabilisation  and  ensure  an  appropriate  monetary-budgetary 
policy  mix;  and  (iii)  to  promote  economic  efficiency  by  avoiding  unfair  tax 
competition and taking into account the public goods nature of some types of public 
expenditure. 
The Treaty on European Union has set up a framework for budgetary policies in EMU 
which is aimed to provide for the required degree of co-ordination while respecting 
the equally important need for national budgetary autonomy.  This paper focuses on 
the  stabilisation  and  policy-mix  aspect  of budgetary  co-ordination.  The  issue  of 
budgetary  discipline  is  dealt  with  in  another  contribution  in  this  volume.  The 
efficiency aspect (avoiding unfair tax competition etc.) is perhaps more closely related 
to the operation of the Single Market and the free  movement of capital than to the 
single currency per se and is not considered in this paper. 
The  term  "policy  coordination"  is  used  here  in  a  broad  sense  in  conformity  with 
normal usage  in international and Community debates,  including  in the  Treaty  on 
European  Union.  It thus  encompasses  information  exchange,  surveillance,  policy 
discussions  and  recommendations,  as  well  as  jointly  agreed  policy  actions.  Co-
ordination  may  also  include  "approximation"  of certain  policies  with  a  view  to 
achieve greater similarity in economic structure across countries1• 
Any justification of  the need for budgetary co-ordination must rest on a demonstration 
that there are considerable spill-overs on EMU partners which need to  be properly 
taken into account in national policy formulation.  Section 2 examines the economic 
spill-overs of  budgetary policies in EMU.  Section 3 briefly reviews the pros and cons 
of attempting  to  use  discretionary  budgetary  policies  for  stabilisation  purposes. 
Against this background, the two  following  sections deal  with the extent to which 
budgetary co-ordination may be required and the form it should best take.  Section 4 
describes the case of Community-wide economic  disturbances  and the  problem of 
achieving an appropriate overall monetary-budgetary policy-mix while section 5 deals 
with  the  case  of country-specific  disturbances.  Section  6  sums  up  the  main 
conclusions. 
Some writers prefer to reserve the term "coordination" for the most binding form of  cooperation 
which "involves mutually agreed modifications in the participants' national policies" (Kenen, 
1988, p. 74).  In the terminology adopted here, such instances are termed "coordinated policy 
actions" or "joint policy actions". 
105 II.  THE SPILL-OVERS OF NATIONAL BUDGETARY POLICIES IN EMU 
The effects of a given budgetary policy action in a country will spill over to its EMU 
partners through three principal channels: (i) the import channel; (ii) possible effects 
on the area-wide interest rates, and (iii) possible effects on the common exchange rate. 
Short-term growth spill-overs are ambiguous and probably small 
A  budgetary  expansion  in  one  or more  EMU  countries  will  tend  to  raise  these 
countries' imports but increased government borrowing will likely lead to higher area-
wide interest rates and an appreciation of the euro exchange rate (the opposite holds 
for budgetary contraction).  The scale of these effects will depend on the size of the 
budgetary policy action relative to the whole of the euro-zone economy.  The cross-
border  repercussions  on output  in  EMU  partner  countries  will  work  in  opposite 
directions.  On the one hand, partner countries will benefit from increased exports to 
the country or group of countries undertaking the budgetary expansion.  On the other 
hand, investment and external competitiveness will be depressed by the higher interest 
rates and the induced appreciation of the euro exchange rate.  Although these effects 
need not off-set each other exactly, they will tend to cancel out. 
For this reason, the net short-term spill-over effects on demand and output are likely 
to  be small  in EMU and  it  is  not clear whether the net effect will  be positive or 
negative.  This conclusion is reached in theoretical analyses (e.g.  Frenkel and Razin 
(1987)) and tends to be confirmed by simulations with large-scale econometric models 
(Commission (1990), Masson and Taylor (1993))2. 
Moreover, the short-term repercussions on output in partner countries of  budget policy 
changes will not necessarily be larger in EMU than in the present regime.  Already 
prior to  EMU,  the  economies of EC  Member States  are  highly  integrated via the 
Single Market and their -interest rates and exchange rates are strongly interdependent. 
For instance, in the ERM there would be important interest rate and exchange rate 
externalities of German economic conditions, and simulation exercises indicate that a 
German fiscal expansion would tend to lead to falls in output in the countries whose 
currencies  are  pegged  to  the  DM  (cf.  Masson  and  Taylor  (1993)).  However, 
simulations with OECD's INTERLINK model give a small positive effect in the short 
run (cf. Eglander and Egebo (1993)). 
While not all cross-border spill-overs will be larger in EMU than before, they will be 
modified.  Externalities  on  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates  will  become  more 
symmetric.  And over time, import leakages will become larger as the economies of 
participating countries are tied closer together. 
2  Both small theoretical  and  large-scale  empirical models  typically  rest  on  the  assumption of 
linearities  in  economic behaviour.  If there  are non-linearities depending  on  the state of the 
economic cycle, there may well be occasions where the  spill-overs of budgetary policies are 
larger. During a severe recession a budgetary stimulus in one or more countries might only have 
a marginal impact on  inflation expectations, and on EMU interest and exchange rates.  Non-
linearities could also be  present in cases of overheating where a budgetary contraction might 
well have positive cross-border repercussions. 
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Impact on growth composition and capital accumulation 
The sentiment that cross-border spillovers of fiscal  policy are  likely to  be small in 
EMU  have  led  some  observers  to  conclude  that  the  benefits  of more  extensive 
budgetary coordination would be slight (e.g. Eichengreen (1997)).  However, whether 
or not the cross-border repercussions are likely to cancel out in terms of their impact 
on short-term output growth, they will have an impact on the composition of growth 
among  EMU partners.  Investment  and  competitiveness  on world  markets  will  be 
depressed by the interest and exchange rate externalities.  The lower rate of capital 
accumulation will  negatively  influence the  medium-term prospects  for  growth and 
employment. 
These "secondary effects" are likely to be of  considerable importance.  If  one takes the 
perspective of  an individual country, it is clear that the combined budgetary stance of 
its EMU partners may have a considerable influence on its interest and exchange rates, 
and thus on its growth composition and the rate of  capital accumulation. 
The secondary effects introduce a fundamental  asymmetry.  Budgetary expansions 
which raise the area-wide interest rate and appreciates the euro exchange rate will be 
associated with negative spill-overs on partner countries; and vice-versa for sound and 
prudent budgetary policies3. 
With integrated global capital markets, risk-adjusted real long-term interest rates in 
the Community are highly influenced by world conditions.  But contrary to what is 
argued by some commentators, this does not mean that European governments cannot 
influence real short- and long-term interest rates significantly.  In fact, the budgetary 
policies of  EMU governments will have a considerable influence on real interest rates, 
both related to the monetary-budgetary policy-mix over the short- and medium-term 
and related to the credible maintenance of  fiscal discipline over the long haul. 
The interdependence between monetary and budgetary policies is a practical everyday 
experience of  policy-making.  Even with global capital markets, short- and long-term 
real  interest rates in EMU may deviate temporarily from  the corresponding "world 
real interest rates", but these deviations must be balanced by expected real exchange 
rate changes and this will be reflected in deviations of  the euro' s current real exchange 
rate  from  its  long-term  equilibrium  (e.g.  high  real  interest  rates  will,  in order  to 
maintain uncovered interest parity, be associated with an "overvalued" real exchange 
rate and expectations of  a depreciation in real terms). The US expansion under Reagan 
in the early 1980s and the German unification boom in the early 1990s are but the best 
known examples of  a sharp rise in budget deficits leading, via its impact on aggregate 
demand, to a significant rise in real interest rates and the real exchange rate over the 
short and medium term. 
3  Whereas low interest rates are generally regarded as preferable to high interest rates, it is not the 
case  that a  lower exchange rate  is  generally preferable to  a higher exchange  rate  (Wyplosz 
(1991)).  Even  so,  temporary  exchange  rate  appreciation  induced  by  partner  countries' 
budgetary policies would generally seem unlikely to be welcome among EMU governments. 
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expansion in one  or more  countries  may have  a  significant impact on the  overall 
policy-mix and thus  on the  common interest and exchange  rates4.  Given that all 
countries have a joint interest in avoiding an unbalanced policy-mix of  this kind, there 
is a strong prima facie case for co-ordination of  budgetary policies to avoid large and 
sudden budgetary expansions in circumstances where this may have an undesirable 
impact on the policy-mix. 
With respect to  the  benefits of budgetary discipline over the long haul,  which are 
covered in more detail in other papers in this volume, the EMU regime will also have 
a positive influence on real interest rates.  The Community represents a large player 
on world financial markets and its actions, either alone or in conjunction with other 
major economies, will influence the world risk-free rate.  Moreover, the emphasis on 
budgetary discipline and a credible monetary regime in EMU (independent central 
bank, prohibition on debt monetization as  well as, by definition, the elimination of 
internal currency risks) imply that financial risk premia in the euro area will be among 
the lowest in the world.  There is evidence that the prospective reduction in fmancial 
instability and budget deficits helps reduce long-term interest rates throughout Europe 
and even in the Member States (notably Germany) which have hitherto enjoyed the 
highest  credibility  of sound  and  stable  macroeconomic  policies  (on  German  long 
interest rates, see Zettelmeyer (1996)). 
Co-ordination is required to ensure spill-overs are taken into account 
Closer co-ordination of  budgetary policies in EMU is required to ensure that the spill-
overs on EMU partners are properly taken into account in national policy formulation. 
Without co-ordination,"[n]o government. .. can be expected to pay much attention to 
the effects of  its own fiscal policy on the fiscal stance of  the EC as a whole, although 
it will have important effects on each and every EC country ... because of its effect on 
interest rates and [euro] exchange rates" (Kenen (1995)).  This implies that there could 
be a general tendency among EMU participants not to take negative interest rate and 
exchange effects adequately into account.  At the same time, there could be a tendency 
for governments not to give enough consideration to the potential spill-overs through 
trade leakages.  Co-ordination is intended to internalise these externalities. 
Before turning to  these issues,  however,  the merits of using budgetary policies for 
stabilisation purposes and the implications for the required degree and form of co-
ordination of  budgetary policies in EMU are briefly discussed in the next section. 
4  Within existing monetary unions and federal  countries, there have already been examples of 
excessive budgetary expansion in one state negatively affecting area-wide interest and exchange 
rates (e.g. the budgetary expansion of the province of Ontario in Canada in the late 1980s, cf. 
Courchene (1993)).  In general the budgetary room for maneouvre of  lower-tier governments in 
federal states is limited by strict rules. 
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The  stabilisation  function  of budgetary  policies  may  be  performed  through  the 
operation  of  automatic  budgetary  stabilisers  and/or  through  counter-cyclical 
discretionary measures. While there is generally broad agreement on the usefulness of 
allowing  automatic  stabilisers to  operate  over the  cycle,  there  is  a  large  literature 
dealing  with  the  pros  and  cons  of attempting  stabilisation  through  discretionary 
measures. A number of obstacles to the successful use of discretionary fiscal policy 
have been identified: 
(i)  the "inside lag",  consisting of the recognition lag and the decision lag,  may be 
very long  (depending on the decision-making procedures and traditions in each 
country, ranging often between half and one-and-a-half years); 
(ii) fiscal instruments have behavioural and structural consequences and their use for 
stabilisation purposes may conflict with tax-smoothing and efficiency objectives; 
(iii) efforts at fine-tuning  may reduce  wage  flexibility  by protecting the  employed 
"insiders"; 
(iv) the democratic and  political process  often implies that it is  easier to  mobilise 
support to raise budget deficits than to cut them back or create surpluses; and 
(  v) in EU countries, efforts to support the economy during downturns have often been 
made through expenditure commitments which have subsequently proven de facto 
irreversible; this has resulted in an upward "ratchet" effect of  the size of  the public 
sector in the economy, on both the tax and the expenditure side. 
Against this background, most EU Member States have become highly sceptical about 
the potential benefits of "fine-tuning".  This also appears to be the consensus view in 
the economic literature on the subject. 
Co-ordination  of discretionary  policies  for  stabilisation  purposes  in  EMU  would 
further be complicated by  the  fact  that the length of parliament&ry  procedures, the 
traditions for adjusting fiscal  policy between budgets, and thus the  scope for  rapid 
action  differs  widely  between  countries.  Furthermore,  negotiations  to  reach 
agreement on co-ordinated action could add to  the  decision lag.  For co-ordinated 
discretionary budgetary action among EU countries, the "inside lag" would therefore 
become even larger (Goodhart and Smith (1993)). 
This suggests that budgetary co-ordination should not least be aimed at creating the 
conditions for  the  proper working  of automatic  budgetary  stabilisers.  Jointly  co-
ordinated and announced budgetary actions would be desirable only in special cases 
of  severe disturbances and in cases where Member States have clear common interests 
which may facilitate rapid agreement. 
In the following two sections, the requirements for co-ordination of  budgetary policies 
are  analysed  frrst  with  respect  to  the  problem  of  achieving  an  appropriate 
macroeconomic  policy-mix for  the  euro-zone  as  a whole,  in the  face  of common 
circumstances  or  symmetric  shocks,  and  secondly  with respect  to  the  problem  of 
achieving an appropriate mix at the level of the individual country between the single 
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circumstances. 
IV.  AN  APPROPRIATE  POLICY  MIX  FOR  THE  EURO-ZONE  AS  A 
WHOLE 
The EU budget is too small to play any role in cyclical stabilisation and in any case it 
is directed towards specific purposes.  At least for the foreseeable future, the prospect 
of an EU budget large enough to play any role in cyclical stabilisation would seem 
neither realistic  nor,  in view of the  importance of subsidiarity  and  the  significant 
stabilisation potential of  national budgetary policies, desirable. 
Thus,  the  EMU  framework  combines  a  centralised  monetary  policy  (under  the 
responsibility of the  European Central  Bank) with decentralised budgetary policies 
(under the  responsibility of national  governments,  subject to  Community  rules  on 
budgetary discipline) and decentralised structural policies and wage setting. 
In the first instance, this provides for a simple and clear assignment of policies: the 
single monetary policy would, within the framework of preserving price stability, be 
able to provide a common response to aggregate economic developments5, whereas 
decentralised  budgetary  policies  and  other  national  economic  policy  instruments 
would  be  available  for  responding  to  country-specific  circumstances.  Naturally, 
however,  the  proper conduct of budgetary policies  and  the  operation of automatic 
budgetary  stabilisers  will  be  important  also  in  the  face  of area-wide  economic 
disturbances in supporting and complementing the  stabilisation efforts of monetary 
policy. 
IV  .1. Creating room for automatic stabilisers to operate 
In  the  literature  on  EMU,  two  general  concerns  have  been  raised  that  budgetary 
stabilisers might not  operate  fully  in EMU:  (i)  the  Treaty  rules  which restrict the 
acceptable  budget  deficit  to  close  to  3  per  cent  of GDP  except  in  exceptional 
circumstances could put limits on automatic stabilisation during economic downturns 
(e.g.  Eichengreen (1997));  and (ii) if countries dislike fluctuating deficits and fiscal 
stabilisation, partly due to the trade leakages of  individual budgetary action, then there 
may  be  a  tendency  for  governments  to  free-ride  on the  stabilisation  provided  by 
others-- if widespread, this would lead to "understabilisation" for the EMU area as a 
whole against common shocks (Allsop and Vines (1996)6).  Another concern is that 
Member States might be tempted during economic upswings to  spend the bonus of 
higher  tax  revenues  and  reduced  unemployment  outlays,  thereby  off-setting  the 
5 
6 
Taking  the  example  of  the  German  Bundesbank,  whose  primary  objective  equally  is  to 
maintain price stability, research suggests that it responds to inflation and output developments 
in a similar fashion to e.g. the U.S. Federal Reserve (see Clarida and Gertler (1996)). 
However, these authors also point out that if  the cost of  stabilisation is perceived as arising from 
taking  discretionary  anti-cyclical  measures,  the  optimal  response  would  be  to  allow  the 
automatic  budgetary  stabilisers  to  operate  and this  would provide  a  considerable  degree  of 
stabilisation. 
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budgetary position. 
While  none  of these  potential  risks  should  be  overplayed,  they  do  highlight  two 
important  requirements  for  budgetary  policy  co-ordination  in  EMU:  (i)  national 
underlying or "structural" budgetary positions should provide for a sufficient safety 
margin to allow room for budgetary manoeuvre during economic downturns; and (ii) 
countries should be willing and able to let their automatic stabilisers operate in both 
the upward and the downward directions, while avoiding excessive deficits. 
The Stability and Growth Pact goes a long way towards satisfying these requirements. 
It requires Member States to establish sound medium-term budgetary positions close 
to balance or in surplus, and to present stability programmes (or, in the case of non-
participating Member States, convergence programmes) with a specified path towards 
their  medium-term  objective.  This  co-ordination  of budgetary  policies  towards 
medium-term  goals  with  close  year-by-year  monitoring  of implementation  has 
important and continuous consequences for the conduct of  budgetary policies. 
The main aim of establishing sounder underlying budgetary positions is to provide 
room  for  budgetary  manoeuvre  -- including  notably  the  operation  of automatic 
stabilisers -- during economic downturns while keeping the government deficit within 
the reference value of 3 percent of GDP (in exceptional circumstances as  defined in 
the Stability and Growth Pact budget deficits may temporarily exceed 3 per cent of 
GDP). 
Moreover,  co-ordination towards  sound  medium-term  objectives  discourages  large 
and abrupt changes  in the  stance of budgetary policies (although this  will  still  be 
possible and may be appropriate in certain circumstances).  This is likely to reduce the 
risk of  overly expansionary policies -- which could put upward pressure on area-wide 
interest rates and the euro exchange rate and lead to a severely distorted policy-mix 
for the euro-zone -- also in times when the actual budget balances are clearly below 
the reference value or even in surplus. 
It follows that Member States'  strict adherence to the elements of the  Stability and 
Growth pact which aim for medium-term budgetary positions close to balance or in 
surplus will go a long way towards securing an appropriate and well-balanced policy-
mix in the euro-zone,  both in terms of letting  automatic  stabilisers  operate  and in 
terms of  avoiding unwarranted policy shocks. 
Notwithstanding  these  prospective  benefits,  the  appropriateness  of the  collective 
budgetary  stance  of EMU  countries  and  the  interaction  with  the  single  monetary 
policy should be continuously monitored and assessed at the level of  the euro-zone as 
a whole in the light of the objectives of achieving internal balance (sustained non-
inflationary growth and high employment) as  well  as  external balance (sustainable 
balance of  payments). 
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levels 
The  strong  arguments  against  attempting  to  co-ordinate  discretionary  budgetary 
policies for "fine-tuning the economy" do not rule out that there may be special cases 
-- namely  severe  and  potentially  protracted  economic  shocks,  or  cases  where 
recognition  lags  are  short  and  there  are  clear  common  interests  -- where  joint 
budgetary action could and would be desirable.  This would have to be assessed and 
agreed on an ad hoc basis.  The most important potential examples are: 
Risk of overheating: if  there were a risk of  overheating of  the Community economy, 
a tightening of aggregate budgetary policies could be  desirable to alleviate the need 
for higher interest rates.  This could well be the case even if budget positions were 
already close to balance or in surplus.  But the desired fiscal tightening might not be 
forthcoming  if each government believed that,  by  acting  on its own,  it would not 
succeed  in preventing  interest  rates  from  rising.  Co-ordinated  budgetary  restraint 
could help prevent interest rates  from  rising and thus make the overall policy mix 
more  conducive  to  sustained  and  balanced  growth  of investment,  activity  and 
employment. 
Severe common recessions:  provided price stability is secured, the combined impact 
of monetary easing and automatic fiscal  stabilisers would normally be  sufficient to 
underpin recovery from  an economic downturn.  But in the advent of a severe and 
prolonged recession, there might be a need for co-ordinated budgetary action.  This 
would be the case if  interest rates were so low that further reductions would have only 
small effects on demand, or if  further monetary easing carried the risk of  inappropriate 
exchange rate weakness.  Countries might individually have insufficient incentives to 
take budgetary action because a large part of the domestic  demand impulse would 
benefit foreign suppliers and jobs. In such instances, co-ordinated budgetary policies 
could  contribute  positively to  a non-inflationary  recovery  in  demand  and  activity. 
This would need to  be  discussed and co-ordinated with the ECB  in order to  avoid 
unwanted effects on interest and exchange rates. 
Supply shocks: in the case of supply shocks, which tend to propel prices and output 
in opposite directions, demand policies may have  a role to  play in facilitating  and 
easing -- to the extent possible -- the necessary adjustment of  real wages, productivity 
and factor mobility.  In the case of a significant upward import price shock for the 
euro-zone, when interest rates may have to go up to maintain or restore price stability, 
it  is  important  that  budgetary  policies  underpin  the  efforts  of the  central  bank. 
Otherwise, interest rates might have to rise  further  and price and  wage  adjustment 
would be delayed. 
Intense exchange of information and frank policy discussions, taking into account the 
differences  in  individual  countries'  circumstances  and  needs,  would  allow  each 
country to take into account the interaction of  its policy stance with that of  its partners 
and with that of  the ECB. 
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The role of co-ordination in Stage 3 should also be to ensure that the overall policy 
mix of the Community is adequate in the context of the world economy, particularly 
with regard to the common exchange rate and current account. 
• The  euro  exchange rate  relative to  other world currencies  will  depend upon the 
current and prospective policy mix in the euro area relative to its main international 
partners.  The ECB can influence the euro exchange rate only to the extent that this 
is consistent with price stability in the euro area.  An inappropriate budgetary stance 
of  the euro zone as a whole could lead to exchange rate misalignment. 
• A significant imbalance on the current account of the euro area as a whole, which 
might be caused by unjustifiably large imbalances of a subset of countries, could 
have  consequences  for  the  euro  exchange  rate  and  direct  implications  for  their 
partners. 
• Co-ordination will be required to ensure that the euro-zone countries speak with one 
voice on macroeconomic policies, as far as possible, in the various international fora 
dedicated to global economic and financial co-operation, in particular the 07 and the 
IMF.  International co-ordination notably with the US and Japan could be called for 
if there  were  a  need  to  restore  (or  preserve)  an  acceptable  pattern  of external 
balances and to  avoid currency overshooting.  Achieving those objectives would 
require  some  flexibility  in  the  policy-mix  of all  the  major  partners.  Without 
budgetary  co-ordination,  only  the  ECB  would  be  able  to  engage  in  policy 
coordination at the world level (Lamfalussy (1989))7. 
Common interests with respect to the level of the shared exchange rate and the euro-
zone' s current account would, in relevant cases, create strong incentives to co-operate. 
IV.4. "Top-down"  and  "bottom-up"  approaches  to  co-ordinated  budgetary 
action 
In the literature on budgetary policy coordination in EMU, it has often been stressed 
that attention would need to be paid to the aggregate stance of budgetary policies.  In 
some cases, this has been taken to imply that co-ordinated action should proceed in a 
''top-down"  approach  in  two  steps:  first,  agreeing  on  the  amount  of adjustment 
required at the euro-zone level, and second, sharing the burden of adjustment among 
individual participants. 
However, for an assessment of  the appropriateness of the policy stance, it is not only 
the aggregate budgetary stance which matters; it is equally important to pay attention 
to  how  a  given  aggregate  budgetary  stance  is  distributed  among  participating 
countries. 
In a "bottom-up" approach, each country's stance is assessed in the light of its own 
situation and objectives, including the objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact.  If 
well applied, this approach will go a long way towards ensuring an appropriate stance 
7  Some  authors  are  sceptical  about  the  potential  usefulness  of international  monetary  co-
ordination, see e.g. Rogoff ( 1985). 
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position, allows budgetary stabilisers to work over the cycle and aims at establishing -
- through  budgetary  measures  as  well  as  other  elements  of economic  policies  --
internal balance (sustained non-inflationary growth and high employment) as well as 
external  balance  (sustainable  current  accountS),  then  the  same  objectives  will  be 
pursued  at  the  level  of the  euro-zone  as  a  whole.  Only  if countries  in  similar 
circumstances were to get locked in a situation where each were waiting for the others 
to take the lead there might be a need to share out a commonly agreed adjustment 
burden.  In such cases, the cyclical situation, the prospects for  inflation, the current 
account balance and the  budgetary and  debt position of each Member State would 
need to be taken into account in discussions on the need for policy adjustment in each 
country. 
IV.5  Budgetary and monetary policy co-ordination 
The  proper economic rationale  for  co-ordination between budgetary  and  monetary 
policies  does  not rest  upon  any  need to  establish a  "counterweight" to  the  single 
monetary policy in EMU, nor on imaginary conflicts between price stability and job 
creation.  The  credibility of the  ECB  in delivering  price  stability  is  of paramount 
importance in achieving low long-term interest rates  and influencing positively the 
behaviour of  price and wage setters.  Through these channels, high ECB credibility is 
an important asset in delivering higher levels of  investment, growth and employment. 
Therefore, budgetary co-ordination procedures must aim to contribute to a sound and 
balanced aggregate policy-mix for the euro-area while respecting the objectives and 
the independence of  the ECB 
In deciding  its  monetary  policy,  the  European  Central  Bank is  likely to  take  into 
account a wide range of factors,  including the prospective budgetary developments 
and  wage  trends  in  participating  countries.  Correspondingly,  in  preparing  their 
budgetary and economic policies, participating countries may wish to sound out the 
ECB'  s  views  on  the  economic,  monetary  and  financial  situation  and  prospects. 
Therefore, a well-functioning dialogue between the governments of the participating 
countries and the ECB is an important element in achieving a balanced and tension-
free policy-mix.  Such a dialogue will ensure that policy-makers are in a position to 
assess  and  take  into  account  the  potential  interactions  between  monetary  and 
budgetary policies9. 
The dialogue provided for in the Treaty's Article 1  09b will allow such exchanges of 
views and information to take place.  The Treaty allows for the Council President to 
be present and make deliberations in meetings of  the Governing Council of the ECB, 
8 
9 
The significance of national current account positions clearly alters in EMU, and statistics may 
become  less  accurate,  but national  current balances  will  continue  to  affect the  international 
distribution of wealth and the geographical location of economic activity (Masson and Melitz 
(1990)). 
See e.g.  Meade and Weale (1995) for theoretical examples of possible instabilities or inferior 
outcomes which might result if budgetary and monetary authorities did not take into account 
each other's actions. 
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is discussing matters relating to the objectives and tasks of  the ESCB. 
In addition,  the  medium-term  framework  for  budgetary  policies  established in the 
Stability and Growth Pact and Member States' stability programmes are likely to help 
solve the informational needs between budgetary and monetary policies by increasing 
the credibility and predictability of budgetary policies.  While practical experience 
with the  functioning  of stability programmes  still  has  to  be  gained,  the  envisaged 
improvement  in  discipline  and  prudence  in  budgetary  policies  will  facilitate  the 
conduct of  monetary policies. 
V.  AN  APPROPRIATE  POLICY-MIX  FOR  INDIVIDUAL  EMU 
PARTICIPANTS 
To the extent that some countries may, prior to EMU, have been able to control their 
domestic monetary conditions and exchange rate fluctuations in such a way as to have 
a  generally  stabilising  influence  on the  economy,  such  countries  may  find  that  a 
greater onus will be placed on budgetary policies in EMU for stabilisation purposes1o. 
For  all  countries,  it  is  important  to  retain  a  high  degree  of national  budgetary 
autonomy  and  flexibility  to  be  able  to  respond  to  country-specific  demand 
developments.  This  requires,  inter  alia,  the  establishment of a  sound  underlying 
budgetary position to  create room for the budget deficit to vary over the  economic 
cycle without breaching the 3 per cent of GDP reference value.  In this sense, the co-
ordination towards sound medium-term objectives in the Stability and Growth Pact 
facilitates the stabilisation function of  national budgetary policies if and when needed. 
Furthermore, the leverage of national budgetary policies over the domestic economy 
is likely in most cases to be higher in EMU than before  because adverse financial 
effects are reduced and because "non-Keynesian" or expectations effects are likely to 
be less important when the budgetary starting position is sound. 
Attempts to take co-ordinated budgetary "action" would be unlikely to be required or 
desirable in promoting adjustment to country-specific disturbances: 
(i)  While only the budgetary policies of the country itself would have any significant 
leverage  over the  domestic  economy,  adjustment of budgetary  policies  among 
partner  countries  would  be  inefficient  because  of the  costs  of adjusting  their 
policies,  because of possible  off-setting  interest and  exchange  rate  effects  and 
because it would risk jeopardising the balance of the overall policy-mix of the 
euro-zone; 
(ii)  Each  government  would  have  an  informational  advantage  on the  state  of the 
domestic economy and would be in a position to take rapid action, if appropriate, 
10  Fiscal stabilisation may be an appropriate tool in the face of  domestic demand shocks, but not in 
the case of some other shocks, such as those requiring a change in the real exchange rate (see 
e.g.  Allsop  and  Vines  (1996),  Commission  (1990),  and  Berthold  (1994)),  even  though 
budgetary policies may have a role to play in smoothing adjustment also in such cases. 
115 to deal with its specific circumstances; the same could not necessarily be said for 
co-ordinated actions; 
(iii) It is in the interest of each country itself to maintain a good balance between the 
single monetary policy and its national budgetary policy, and each country will 
have to bear the brunt of  the consequences of  its actions. 
The  Community  institutions  and  EMU  partners  should,  however,  encourage 
appropriate national policies and responses to asymmetric shocks (not just in terms of 
budgetary policies but also in terms of structural policies and wage developments). 
As before, the justification for such co-ordination would be the potential repercussions 
on EMU partners of  inappropriate policies, as well as the common interest of  all EMU 
participants in a good economic performance in all countries. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The potential need for a co-ordination of  budgetary policies among EMU participants 
arises  from  the  likely  spill-over  effects  which  budgetary  policies  in  one  or more 
Member States may have on their EMU partners, and from the need to avoid countries 
"free-riding"  on  other  countries'  efforts  to  provide  budgetary  discipline  or 
stabilisation. 
In general, budgetary policy changes in an individual EMU country are unlikely to 
have  a  significant  short-term  growth  impact  on  EMU  partners  because  the  direct 
demand effects are offset by opposing interest rate  and exchange rate effects.  But 
there  will  be  important  secondary  spill-overs  on the  composition of demand,  the 
international  competitiveness,  and  the  rate  capital  accumulation,  thus  affecting 
medium-term growth prospects.  These  spill-overs  imply  an important asymmetry: 
budgetary  expansions  which  raise  the  common  interest  rate  and  appreciates  the 
exchange rate may be associated with negative spill-overs on partner countries while 
prudent budgetary policies may be associated with positive spill-overs. 
The analysis in this paper suggests that: (i) there is a need for co-ordinating budgetary 
policies  towards  sound  medium-term  objectives;  (ii)  in  case  of euro-area  wide 
disturbances (symmetric shocks) the main stabilisation function will be performed by 
the  ECB  subject  to  the  paramount  goal  of price  stability,  and  the  main  role  for 
budgetary policies would be to allow automatic stabilisers to operate; (iii) in special 
cases of severe common shocks or imbalances, there may be a role for jointly agreed 
and announced budgetary policy action; such co-ordination of  discretionary budgetary 
policies should avoid the traditional pitfalls of  "fine-tuning"; (iv) cyclical disturbances 
affecting an individual economy (asymmetric shocks) could and should be dealt with 
by that country itself; any co-ordinated budgetary action among its partners would at 
best have small benefits in terms of stabilising the affected economy and these would 
be  unlikely  to  outweigh  the  costs  of adjusting  policies  in  partner  countries;  (v) 
continuous  close  monitoring  of developments  and  peer  pressure  would  play  an 
important role in promoting appropriate budgetary and other policy responses among 
EMU countries. 
116 The EMU framework contains the necessary provisions to provide the required degree 
of  co-ordination and monitoring both in terms of  budgetary discipline and with respect 
to  the  overall monetary-budgetary policy mix  (Treaty  Articles  104  (prohibition of 
monetary financing of  deficits), 104a (no priviliged access to financing), 104b (no bail 
out), 104c (avoiding excessive deficits) and the Stability and Growth Pact, Article 103 
on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and multilateral surveillance, and Article 
109b  on the  dialogue  between the  ECB  and  the  ECOFIN  Council).  Following  a 
request  from  the  European  Council  meeting  in  Amsterdam  in  June  1997,  the 
Commission and the  Council are  studying ways  of improving the effectiveness of 
economic policy co-ordination in stage three of  EMU consistently with principles and 
practices of the Treaty.  Enhanced economic policy co-ordination will be a learning 
process and the process may develop over time as experience is gained. 
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SHOCKS AND CYCLES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Deviations  of  GDP  from  its  growth  trend  are  formally  defined  as  economic 
fluctuations  or  business  cycles,  a  term  which  Lucas  (1977)  specifically  uses  to 
characterize movements around trend in the gross national product  I.  Comovements of 
these deviations from the growth path among different time series represent business 
cycle  regularities.  Therefore,  synchronous  or  asynchronous  international  business 
cycles may be defined as comovements of deviations from a growth or trend path, or 
the lack thereof, respectively, for a given set of  variables in at least two countries. 
When deviations of GDP  from  trend in two  or more  countries  are  symmetric and 
possibly  of the  same  amplitude  then  the  need  for  stabilization  policy  is  also 
symmetric. However, when the cycle is not synchronized, the needs for stabilization 
policies  will  differ accordingly,  with those  experiencing  excess  demand  following 
deflationary  policies  and  those  experiencing  excess  supply  following  reflationary 
policies. Furthermore, if economic fluctuations are asynchronous, the Member States 
will have little incentive to  adopt common polices and perhaps to co-operate in the 
operation of the monetary union. The problem of business cycle synchronization for 
monetary  union  is,  therefore,  very  similar  to  the  question  of symmetric  versus 
asymmetric  shocks.  It  may  thus  be  argued  that  when  symmetric  shocks  are 
experienced  across  the  members  forming  a  monetary  union  a  common  monetary 
policy is necessary and sufficient for stabilization purposes and a monetary union by 
design makes such symmetric policy responses possible; when idiosyncratic shocks 
are  experienced  by  the  members,  then  a  monetary  union  would  not  permit  an 
asymmetric response where in fact it is necessary. 
The purpose of  the present note is to review both the stylized facts of business cycles 
in EU Member States, and to  examine the possible role of EMU in business cycle 
behaviour. A key question here is whether EMU will make a difference to the cyclical 
behaviour of  the participating economies, and if  so how. This question is addressed in 
the present note through the following sections: The first issue, reviewed in section II, 
concerns the nature and causes of  business cycles distiguishing between the traditional 
Keynesian  and  monetarist  theories  of business  fluctuations  and  the  more  recent, 
equilibrium or real business cycle theories. Knowing what are the causes of business 
cycles  is  important  before  examining  the  potential  effects  of  EMU  on  the 
synchronization of economic fluctuations across the Member States. Some empirical 
evidence for selected Member States, especially from a growing literature testing the 
real  business cycle  model,  is  presented and  discussed in section III;  furthermore, 
some evidence in particular on the role of  the exchange rate regime in business cycles 
is also marshalled which, together  the importance of the stylized facts in relation to 
EMU, is reviewed in section IV; finally, section V concludes. 
SeeR. Lucas (1977). 
120 II.  SOURCES  OF  BUSINESS  FLUCTUATIONS  AND  OUTPUT 
CO-MOVEMENTS IN THE UNION 
Deviations of output from its trend path can be caused by either or a combination of 
two sets of  forces: exogenous shocks, and policy shocks, and the associated dynamics 
of the  system2•  The  traditional  theory  places  importance  on  aggregate  demand, 
monetary, and Keynesian-type of causes.  In the real, or equilibrium, business cycle 
theory  deviations  of output  from  trend  is  associated  with  the  initial  quantitative 
research finding that the role of  monetary and financial variables in causing economic 
fluctuations was difficult to determine and/or to establish. Consequently, the emphasis 
shifted towards the role of other factors - technology shocks, shocks to the terms of 
trade,  tax policy variables etc.  The  theory  sees  business  cycles  as  the  maximizing 
response of  economic agents to various shocks and subject to production possibilities 
and resource constraints.  Prominent shocks are those in technology or productivity. 
One implication of  the real busines cycle model is that government policies aimed at 
correcting the business cycle are suboptimal since they interfere with the optimization 
behaviour of economic agents.  It is  clear that in this  highly  simplified framework 
shocks are exogenous and unpredictable and while they generate temporary deviations 
from trend government policies,  such as  fixing  the  nominal  exchange rate,  are  not 
only suboptimal but also irrelevant. 
The traditional theory notes that business cycles can originate in a two-period, second-
order,  linear  difference  equations  in which  model  parameters  on the  endogenous 
variables  are  sufficiently  large  to  induce  instability  but  not  to  lead  to  explosive 
behaviour3. In this model cyclical behaviour, which might be thought of as reflecting 
market failure on a grand scale4, is self-sustaining, and when combined with random 
shocks  cyclical  behaviour  is  reinforced.  Impulse  mechanisms,  which  affect  the 
amplitude of the cycle, include exogenous shocks as  well as  endogenous responses 
(expectations, liquidity, inflation); propagation mechanisms transmit these impulses to 
the economy  and  are  responsible  for  oscillatory behaviour,  for  the  duration of the 
cycle,  and  its phases.  Finally,  the  role  of monetary  policy  and  of other financial 
variables  was  explicitly  recognized  as  a  contributor  to  fluctuations  especially  in 
macroeconometric models such as the DRI model of the US economy.  For example, 
notwithstanding  the  uncertainty  about  whether  monetary  policy  can  stabilize  the 
economy,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  bad  monetary  policy  will  destabilize  the 
economy.  In  this  framework,  government  policies  can  not  only  cause  business 
2 
3 
4 
5 
A broad but detailed characterization of causes of economic fluctuations in the US is provided 
by Eckstein and Sinai (1986);  no  corresponding source  discussing  in  a  taxonomic  manner 
causes of European fluctuations  is  available but, possibly,  the sources of business cycles in 
Europe could not be different from those in the US;  see also Kydland and Prescott (1990) on 
the various hypotheses about the causes of  business cycles. 
For a discussion of  this generic cyclical mechanism see Eckstein and Sinai (1986), p. 54-59. 
This is Mankiw's (1989) term. 
Eckstein and Sinai (1986) discuss this classification in some detail;  see their Table 1.5. 
121 fluctuations but they are also  necessary to  stabilize the economy and to  smooth out 
fluctuations6. 
A  central  feature  of EMU  involves  the  adoption  of a  common  currency.  One 
implication of this is that borrowing and lending internationally and, especially, the 
financing of  current account deficits and surpluses of  the Member States will be made 
easier,  partly  as  currency  risk  premia  will  be  eliminated  compared  to  the  present 
multiple currency world,  and partly due  to  the  completion of the  Union's financial 
markets;  as a result, the magnitude and the character of economic fluctuations across 
the Member states will, in principle, be affected. This effect is related to two factors: 
first,  the ability to smooth consumption by resorting to  international borrowing and 
lending,  and,  secondly,  to  the  willingness  of international  investors  to  finance 
investment  in  the  domestic  economy  through  international  capital  flows.  Both 
consumption  smoothing  and  international  capital  flows  act  as  transmission 
mechanisms through which a given shock is transmitted internationally. International 
risk sharing would tend to produce large correlations of  consumption across countries; 
but the  ability  to  borrow  and  lend  internationally  to  finance  investment  positions 
would  tend  to  lower  the  correlation  between  domestic  savings  and  domestic 
investment,  and  strengthen  the  correlation  between  domestic  investment  and 
international  capital  flows7.  Thus,  the  elimination  of currency  risk  would  likely 
strengthen  the  process  of consumption  smoothing  and  of international  portfolio 
diversification;  while the  former  will  tend to  promote convergence  in the  cyclical 
characteristics across the Member States' economies, the later may not. 
6 
7 
Table 1 
Volatility and cross-correlation of real GDP in four Member States 
Vol.  xt-5  xt-4  xt-3  xt-2  xt-1  X  xt+l  xt+2  xt+3  xt+4  xt+5 
D  1.6  -0.02  0.23  0.35  0.46  0.67  1.0  0.67  0.46  0.35  0.23  -0.02 
F  0.9  -0.06  0.10  0.30  0.54  0.77  1.0  0.77  0.54  0.30  0.10  -0.06 
UK  1.5  -0.02  0.07  0.20  0.37  0.55  1.0  0.55  0.37  0.20  0.07  -0.02 
I  1.7  -0.21  -0.04  0.22  0.52  0.80  1.0  0.80  0.52  0.22  -0.04  -0.21 
.. 
Vol= volatility, standard dev1at1on of  real GOP 
~:  From Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994), Table 1. 
An interesting hypothesis, which finds  no  support for regular business fluctuations  but could 
account for country- and period-specific ones, is the political business cycle model.  Here, pre-
election  expansionary  policies,  followed  by  post-election  contractionary  policies,  could 
conceivably  account  for  some  output  deviations  from  trend;  however,  rational  agents  will 
ultimately perceive  correctly this  game  and,  as  a result,  the  usefulness  of such  propagation 
mechanisms in explaining business fluctuations is very limited. 
These effects have been substantiated in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992). 
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• (9) 
However, if  the real business cycle model represents reality more accurately than the 
alternative,  then  fixing  the  nominal  exchange  rate  will  limit  significantly  the 
variability  of the  real  exchange  rate  and  thus  prevent  agents  from  optimizing  in 
response to exogenous shocks;  a common currency in this framework will represent a 
new  technological  constraint  on  agents'  optimization  which  will  not  eliminate 
business  cycles  and will  not  foster  greater  than  heretofore  synchronization.  If the 
conventional view is appropriate, then greater policy co-ordination through a common 
currency could conceivably foster greater synchronization of economic fluctuations. 
Note finally that in the intermediate cases, where both exogenous and Keynesian-type 
causes are present, greater policy co-ordination, ceteris paribus, will also contribute to 
business cycle convergence. 
These views on the business cycle can likely only be  resolved empirically.  At this 
stage, it is important to know some key cyclical characteristics in the Union Member 
States, and for this purpose two tables have been prepared: Table 1, where the cyclical 
regularities for real output are presented for four Member States (D,  F, UK, and I), 
and Table 2 where evidence on the synchronization of the cyclical fluctuations in the 
Member States of  EC-12 is shown. 
The data in Table 1 suggest that deviations of  output from its smooth trend are volatile 
and highly persistent, with the lowest volatility displayed by France while volatility of 
cyclical  fluctuations  in the  remaining  three  is  broadly  similar.  The  strong  positive 
autocorrelation of the output deviations characterize D,  F,  and I,  but in the UK the 
autocorrelation is weaker.  These data are consistent with the notion that technology 
shocks are persistent and that the economy adjusts to the emerging new equilibrium in 
a gradual manner; these are also the predictions of the real business cycle model. All 
components  of expenditure  are  found  to  be  procyclical  except  for  government 
expenditure which, while less variable than GDP in the four Member States, it is not 
uniformly pro- or counter-cyclical; this is, not surprisingly, a reflection of differences 
in institutions, preferences, and policies. 
Turning to the synchronization of business cycles across the Member States, it ought 
to  be  stressed at the  outset that the  evidence  points to  substantial  comovement in 
business cycles, especially those characterizing the industrial countries, with cyclical 
movements in real  output,  consumption,  investment,  and  in the labour input being 
positively correlated across countries9. For the Member States alone Christodoulakis 
et.  al.  (1993,  1995)  have  produced  evidence  supporting  the  notion  that,  broadly 
speaking, there is a substantial degree of comovement in the cyclical component of 
output  in  the  Union.  Their  principal  results  are  presented  in  Table  2  where  the 
standard  deviation  and  contemporaneous  cross-correlations  of deviations  of real 
output from its Hodrick-Prescott value are shown, for the period 1960-1990, for the 
Member States of EC-12. The first thing to note is that the variability of the cyclical 
8 
9 
For example, that there is a multiplicity of shocks impinging upon cycles in US  real GDP is 
confirmed by Fair (1988) from evidence based on his macroeconometric model. 
See,  for  example  Baxter  (1992),  for  a  discussion  of these  issues;  Baxter  attributes  these 
comovements to capital accumulation and to international capital fllows. 
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DK 
F 
WD 
GR 
IRL 
I 
L 
NL 
p 
E 
UK 
EC 
Table 2 
Percentage standard deviations and contemporaneous cross-correlations 
for real output across EC Member States 
(Real output deviations from Hedrick-Prescott filtered logarithms, annual data 1960-90) 
SD  B  DK  F  WD  GR  IRL  I  L  NL  p  E  UK 
1.71  1.00  0.06  0.83  0.74  0.45  0.42  0.44  0.72  0.65  0.70  0.67  0.38 
1.79  1.00  0.01  0.41  0.38  -0.28  0.02  0.43  0.33  -0.01  0.15  0.54 
1.20  1.00  0.78  0.57  0.58  0.51  0.60  0.67  0.79  0.52  0.45 
1.84  1.00  0.71  0.41  0.43  0.66  0.73  0.60  0.43  0.50 
2.20  1.00  0.31  0.21  0.42  0.45  0.44  0.22  0.51 
2.14  1.00  0.43  0.18  0.40  0.38  0.26  0.06 
1.83  1.00  0.27  0.34  0.52  0.29  0.23 
2.82  1.00  0.60  0.47  0.64  0.68 
1.76  1.00  0.43  0.42  0.50 
2.75  1.00  0.41  0.43 
2.44  1.00  0.56 
1.88  1.00 
1.34 
SD = standard deviation;  EC = EC-12 
~From  Christodoulakis et. al. (1993, 1995), Table 5 
EC 
0.80 
0.22 
0.91 
0.84 
0.62 
0.53 
0.59 
0.71 
0.78 
0.73 
0.62 
0.68 
1.00 
component of real output is higher in the catching-up countries (OR, IRL, P, E) than 
in the rest of the EU-12, although the variability in Luxembourg's case is also very 
high. 
Secondly, there are remarkably high correlations in cyclical output components across 
several Member States, most particularly between a core of  countries comprising B, L, 
F, WD, and NL, but also others such as OR (in relation to WD), P (in relation to B), E 
(in relation to B and L) and the UK (in relation to L  ).  This evidence suggests that a 
significant  degree  of comovement,  or  synchronization  of the  business  cycle,  has 
already existed among the Member States over the past 30 or so years. 
Thirdly, adopting arbitrarily and for illustrative purposes a value higher than 0.7 for 
the  correlation  coefficient  to  group  the  synchronization  of business  cycles  across 
Member States, the data suggest that such synchronization characterizes the cyclical 
fluctuations in the group B, F, WD, L, NL, P, and the UK, but the highest frequency 
of this value is  found  in the group  B,  F,  WD,  and NL, the traditional core of the 
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Union;  should a lower value be adopted, there is  a corresponding widening of the 
group where the cycle is synchronized. 
Finally, cycles in DK, IRL and I show a lesser degree of synchronization compared to 
the other Member States, with DK standing out particularly as an isolated example of 
asynchronous cyclical behaviour relative to the rest of  the Union  . 
Additional  evidence  on  the  synchronization  of business  cycles  can  be  found  in 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1993) for five Union Member States (D, F, I, A, UK), 
measured against the  corresponding US  cycle•o.  And Brandner and Neusser (1992) 
show that  Austrian  and  German  cycles  in  output  (sample  1964:Q1-1989:Q4)  are 
correlated with a contemporaneous coefficient equal to  0.61;  this ranks among the 
highest of  those reported in Christodoulakis et. al. (1993, 1995). 
The evidence that cyclical output movements in the Union are broadly synchronous 
may  be  related  to  two  factors:  first,  the  expansion  of international  trade  and  of 
international capital flows  among the Member States throughout the period and the 
consequent fostering of  interdependence; and, secondly, the closer policy convergence 
in recent years.  No evidence is available which compares changes in the degree of 
synchronization  over  time••.  Before  one  concludes  that  policy  convergence  has 
contributed to  convergence in business  cycles,  it is  essential to  examine  to  which 
extent business fluctuations in the Union are policy-related or whether they are due to 
exogenous factors, or perhaps due to some combination of both.  Some evidence on 
this matter is reviewed in the following section. 
10 
11 
See Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1993);  similar evidence is prepared and reviewed in Backus, 
Kehoe,  and Kydland (1992),  and in  Baxter (1992).  It is  worth  stressing that Backus et.  al. 
(1993) fmd generally higher correlations than Backues et. al. (1992), owing clearly to the longer 
data sample used in the latter study. 
There is, however, evidence based on samples dating as far back as the late 1800s to the mid-
1980s for Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK- see Backus and Kehoe (1992), Table 4.  This 
evidence shows that the highest synchronization of business fluctuations were recorded in  the 
period between world war I and II; the lowest values are recorded in the period prior to world 
war I.  Backus  and  Kehoe  attribute  this  to,  first,  the  same  recessionary  experience  of the 
interwar periodshared by  all  countries,  and,  secondly,  to  the  possibility  of country-specific 
measurement errrors being larger in the pre- rather than in the post-war period.  In the presence 
of  the latter it is possible that the measured low correlations are of little meaning regarding the 
synchronous movements of cyclical fluctuations.  Finally, it is worth noting that the inter-war 
synchronization of  business cycles for the European countries in the sample reported in Backus 
and Kehoe is generally higher than the post-war II synchronization reported in Christodoulakis 
et. al. (1993, 1995).  One reason for this is, perhaps, the uniform circumstances shared by all in 
the inter-war period;  another could be that the policy environmennt in the Christodoulakis et. 
al.  (1993,  1995) sample is  not comparable to the  earlier one;  and yet another could be that 
statistical measurement has become superior in recent years compared to inter-war standards 
and, thus, measurement errors have diminished. 
125 III.  A BRIEF REVIEW OF EVIDENCE ON SHOCK (A)SYMMETRY AND 
ON  THEIR  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  BUSINESS  FLUCTUATIONS, 
ESPECIALLY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The evidence briefly surveyed here falls into two groups:  in the first, some reference 
is  made to the empirics of symmetric and asymmetric shocks in the EU which, as 
noted  previously,  is  analytically  similar  in  its  implications  to  the  question  of 
synchronization of business cycles;  and in the  second group the  evidence on the 
nature of economic fluctuations in the EU is reviewed.  The review is only selective 
but not comprehensive, in the sense that only material relevant to the issue at hand are 
considered. 
An early reference on the asymmetry of shocks is due to Cohen and Wyplosz (1989). 
They found that symmetric were much larger than and dominated asymmetric shocks. 
A difficulty with the Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) paper is that it does not recognize 
that movements in the output data can be the result of demand and of supply shocks. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) show that output growth and inflation variability 
among the Union Member States, excluding the three new ones, can be divided two 
groups.  Using a structural V  AR framework, they show that both demand and supply 
shocks impinge upon an EU of eleven Member States, and that demand shocks are 
more  uniform but less pronounced across  the  Member States compared to supply 
shocks which are more idiosyncratic.  Supply shocks are more highly correlated and 
more  uniform  in the  first  group  of countries  - consisting  of Belgium,  Denmark, 
France,  Germany and the Netherlands - and are  of similar magnitude  and display 
greater coherence  compared to  those  in the  other  groups  - Greece,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the UK.  The authors find no evidence that the shocks affecting 
these two groups tend to  converge in the sense of becoming less pronounced over 
time, evidence which is  unfavourable to an one-speed monetary arrangement in the 
Union.  Furthermore, they find that the  speed of adjustment to supply and demand 
shocks are faster in the first than in the second group, and in the latter slower than the 
corresponding parameters in US regions. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen conclude that while their evidence supports greater policy 
autonomy rather than monetary union in the Union as a whole, in a group of  Member 
States (B, DK, F, D, L, and NL) a workable monetary union, along the experience of 
the US, would be feasible.  However, while one would expect that demand shocks 
could be more  highly  correlated across  these  Member  States  than supply  shocks, 
possibly  reflecting  policy  convergence,  they  find  the  opposite.  It  is  difficult  to 
rationalize why supply shocks would be more uniform and show higher correlation 
across this group, especially since supply shocks have generally been found to be of 
unpredictable and random nature. 
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Quarters  AD 
France 
1  74.66 
4  72.90 
8  68.40 
20  45.31 
32  27.00 
Table 3 
Output variance decompositions 
Fraction of output explained by shock to aggregate demand (AD), technology (TC), 
and non-oil aggregate supply (AS) 
TC  _I 
AS  Quarters  AD  TC  AS  Quarters  AD  TC 
Germany  United Kingdom 
0.18  25.34  1  75.03  6.21  24.66  1  34.60  54.48 
0.41  26.87  4  63.48  14.10  30.99  4  40.57  46.49 
2.68.  27.27  8  26.74  41.92  47.70  8  29.21  43.95 
14.27  32.24  20  6.54  51.24  52.93  20  15.15  50.54 
24.37  39.65  32  3.29  52.04  53.09  32  9.55  53.54 
AS 
61.68 
56.49 
54.98 
56.55 
58.04 
~From  Karras (1994), Table 3. 
Karras (1994) addresses the question of  the contribution of  demand and supply shocks 
to  output  fluctuations.  In  Table  3  he  shows  representative  results  for  France, 
Germany, and the UK.  The objective is to distinguish between the contribution of 
Keynesian- or demand-type, and classical- or supply-side, shocks in the generation 
and propagation of business cycles in these countries.  The data reported show the 
percentage of output  forecast  error  due  to  three  structural  innovations  (aggregate 
demand (AD), technology (TC), and non-oil aggregate supply (AS)) over a horizon 
extending from one to 32 quarters.  The results show that in France and Germany 
aggregate  demand  shocks  dominate  in  the  short  run,  but  in  the  long  run  their 
importance diminishes and aggregate supply shocks become important;  in the case of 
Germany,  in particular,  the  medium-term  contribution  of the  latter  in  explaining 
output variability is somewhat higher than 50 percent.  In France aggregate demand 
shocks contribute almost 30 percent of  the variability in output over the medium term, 
but the non-oil aggregate supply shock dominates. Melitz and Weber (1996) obtain 
corroborating  evidence  on the  dominant role  of demand  in output  (and  inflation) 
fluctuations especially over shorter (less than ten quarters) frequencies;  in France they 
are found to dominate over supply shocks over much longer horizons.  Sources of 
output  fluctuation  in  the  UK in the  medium  term  resemble  those  impinging  on 
Germany's output;  in the short run it shares many features common to Germany and 
France although less pronounced than in the latter.  This evidence is inconsistent with 
the  real  business  cycle  model  prediction  that  aggregate  demand  shocks  are 
unimportant even in the short run for output fluctuations.  However, the evidence is 
consistent with a weak version of the real business cycle model according to which 
even if aggregate supply shocks are more important than aggregate demand shocks 
even in the short run, the role of aggregate demand shocks in economic fluctuations 
continues to be important12. 
12  This apparent idiosyncrasy of  the business cycle in the UK has been noted by other researchers. 
Holland and Scott (1996)  fmd  that UK business cycles can be  accounted for  by two forces, 
127 The evidence in Karras ( 1994) supports the notion that the structural shocks have been 
synchronous in the three  Member States,  and that their business cycles have been 
highly  and positively  correlated.  These  findings  are  also  confirmed  by  Bergman 
( 1996)  who  also  finds  that  transitory  or demand  shocks  are  important  factors  1n 
explaining output fluctuations in Germany and the UK  13. 
Helget. al. (1995) provide evidence on shock symmetry in Europe from sectoral data. 
They note that the average industry correlation within a given country is higher than 
the average correlation of each industrial output variable across countries and that the 
core countries have higher within-country correlation coefficients than the peripheral. 
They interpret the contribution of the industry dimension to  the explanation of the 
output variance as reflecting symmetric shocks, and that of the country dimension as 
reflecting asymmetric shocks.  This evidence makes possible the ranking of Member 
States in terms of synchronised economic behaviour as follows:  Belgium, Germany, 
and  the  Netherlands;  closely  followed  by  Denmark,  France,  and  the  UK;  then 
followed by Italy, and Spain;  and finally followed by Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 
A  final  issue  concerns  the  assumed  exogeneity  of productivity  shocks;  there  is 
evidence casting doubt on this notion.  Evans (1992), using multivariate regression 
and V  AR analysis shows that about one quarter of the variance of the productivity 
impulse  can  be  attributed  to  aggregate  demand  shocks.  The  implication  is  that 
exogenous  productivity  shocks  as  the  principal  cause  for  business  fluctuations,  as 
postulated in real business cycle models, finds no support in the US, and arguably in 
European, data. 
IV.  BUSINESS CYCLES, THE EXCHANGE RATE, AND EMU 
There is a presumption in many theoretical models that the transmission of monetary 
and  real  shocks  across  economies  depend  on  the  exchange  rate  regime.  This 
presumption has a statistical counterpart in that it implies that, holding the sources of 
shocks constant, the business cycle characteristics of  the time series in a given country 
or  between  countries  would  be  conditional  upon  the  exchange  rate  regime14• 
13 
14 
productivity shocks and preference, or supply and demand,  shocks.  They also fmd that while 
productivity  shocks  are  largely  unpredictable  by  other  variables,  preference  shocks  are 
predictable by supply and demand variables (oil prices, the terms of trade, money, and prices). 
By implication, demand variables can have an effect on economic fluctuation in the UK. 
See the impulse responses shown in  Bergman (1996), Figure 2.  Bergman finds that demand 
shocks have virtually no output effect in the case of  Sweden and Japan. 
A clear case is  that of real disturbances under a flexible exchange rates which affect the real 
exchange rate through the nominal exchange rate while, under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
they affect principally the level of  international reserves, the money supply, and prices, and thus 
the real exchange rate.  For example, under flexible exchange rates and perfect capital mobility 
an output-expanding shock in country A would raise the demand for goods, and the domestic 
rate of interest, and would appreciate the real exchange rate thus reducing output in country A 
to the original level and generating a current account deficit;  output in the partner economy B 
would rise through its  exchange depreciation;  here, the cycles could be asymmetric.  Under 
128 Adopting  a common currency  in  EMU  would  be  expected prima facie  to  have  an 
influence  on  the  degree  of comovements  of macroeconomic  variables  across  the 
Member  States,  an  important  consideration  enhanCing  the  efficiency  of 
macroeconomic policies 
There is limited evidence on the relationship between the exchange rate regime and 
business fluctuations.  Baxter and  Stockman (1989)  suggest that,  broadly  speaking 
and with the exception of the real exchange rate, the cyclical characteristics of other 
macroeconomic  variables  do  not  appear to  depend  crucially  on the  exchange  rate 
regime.  Nevertheless, from  data of the floating rates period  1973-1985  Baxter and 
Stockman find that the international correlation of output fluctuations had decreased 
compared to the Bretton Woods sample1s.  Therefore, fixing the exchange rate, and 
possibly adopting a common currency, may strengthen the interdependence in cyclical 
output movements  among  the  Member  States,  especially  through  diminishing  the 
variability of  the real exchange ratet6. 
As noted previously, the impact of EMU on the synchronization of business cycles 
would depend on whether the sources of business cycles in the Union are related to, 
and influenced by,  economic policies  When  shocks  are  exogenous  exchange  rate, 
monetary,  and other arrangements  will  have  no  impact  on the  synchronization of 
business cycles.  It is  possible, nevertheless, that EMU  could exacerbate economic 
fluctuations when shocks are asymmetric, as the experience of  France in the aftermath 
of  German unification, or that of  the UK following the conflict between the exchange 
rate  policy requirements of supply  shocks  of the  1980s  and  the  shadowing  of the 
ERM, have shown 
The presumption in the present context is  that EMU,  to  the  extent that it makes a 
difference, it will at best enhance, or at the minimum leave unchanged, rather than 
diminish, the prevailing degree of synchronization of economic fluctuations.  There 
are  no  a  priori  circumstances  where  the  prevailing  degree  of synchronization  of 
cyclical movements, such as that depicted in Tables 1 and 2, would decline.  On the 
contrary,  cross-country  output  correlations  would  tend  to  rise  over  time,  as  a 
consequence of  three principal factors:  first, due to increasing trade interdependence; 
secondly,  increasing  integration  of financial  markets  will  likely  be  strengthened 
following  the  adoption of a  single  currency;  this  interdependence  would  tend  to 
amplify the effect of country-specific shocks across national borders;  and,  thirdly, 
policy convergence in the European Union, to the extent that it affects the incidence 
and  characteristics  of business  cycles,  would  tend  to  minimize  the  probability  of 
country-specific policy shocks as a source of demand-induced business cycles.  The 
15 
16 
fvced exchange rates, on the other hand, the shock would raise output in country A, raise its 
interest rate and its capital account surplus to fmance the reduction in the trade surplus, and 
would also raise output in partner country B;  here, the cycles would be symmetric. 
See also Stockman (1988) for further comments and references on this comparison. 
von Hagen and Neumann (1992) show that real exchange rate variability decreased under the 
ERM, contrasting with the variability of, for example, the real exchange rate of sterling which 
did not participate in the ERM prior to 1989, and with real exchange rate variability during the 
earlier non-ERM period. 
129 evidence  on the  synchronization  of business  cycles  across  Member  States  implies 
either that shocks have been common or that other factors  (such common shocks as 
trade  liberalization and  removal of exchange  restrictions,  for  example)  have  had a 
significant  impact  in  fostering  convergence  in  economic  cycles.  Under  a  single 
currency,  a  common  monetary  policy,  and  fiscal  restrictions  in  the  form  of the 
stability pact, the probability of country-specific policy shocks would be minimized, 
while if there are monetary policy shocks (in the form, for example, of policy errors) 
these would be symmetric across the Union. 
As  noted  in  section  II,  an  important  implication  of monetary  unification  is  the 
possibility  of fostering  consumption  smoothing  across  the  Member  States  and  of 
enhancing the intra-EU mobility of capital.  Trade in goods and in  financial  assets 
contributes already substantially to  the international transmission of business cycles. 
To the extent that the shocks affect all the Member States, consumption smoothing 
and investment financing through international borrowing and lending would tend to 
be further encouraged under EMU, leading to converging cyclical fluctuations.  In the 
case of an  asymmetric deflationary shock consumption in the country suffering the 
shock  would  decline  by  less  under  conditions  of smoothing,  thus  limiting  the 
deflationary effect on its national income and also on the  exports of its trading and 
Union partners.  On  the  other hand,  a  supply  shock  raising  the  rate  of return  on 
domestic capital would tend to draw domestic and international savings to finance the 
new  investment,  thus  making  possible  the  increase  in  output  in  the  country 
experiencing the shock and exacerbating the cyclical deviation of  this country's output 
from  that of its  Union  partners.  In  this  case,  monetary  union  would  facilitate  the 
asynchronization  of business  cycles;  note,  however,  that  here  monetary  union  is 
simply inadequate to contain asymmetric shocks rather than contributing to diverging 
cyclical fluctuations. 
V.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Would  EMU  lead to  closer,  or possibly  diminish the,  synchronization  of business 
cycles  across  the  Member  States,  and  what  are  the  possible  implications  of such 
synchronizations? The proximate sources of business cycles and the model  used to 
interpret  them  would  play  an  important  role  in  deciding  whether  a  co-ordination 
mechanism such as the common currency would make a difference to the character of 
cyclical  behaviour.  In  particular,  if cyclical  fluctuations  are  caused  by  exogenous 
shocks, and if these shocks are  asymmetric across the Member States, EMU would 
make  little  difference;  economic  interdependence  through  trade  and  capital  flows 
would tend to transmit shocks across national borders, and in the same direction, and 
the cycles would be synchronized through the multipliers of  the external accounts.  If 
shocks  are  symmetric  across  the  Member  States,  deviations  of actual  from  trend 
output would  also  tend  to  be  in  the  same  direction  in  each  Member  State,  and  a 
common currency would make  little difference in the  degree  of synchronization of 
these fluctuations. 
The  evidence  reviewed  suggests  that  economic  fluctuations  in  the  EU  can  be 
attributed to both demand and supply shocks and that the assumption of exogenous 
130 supply shocks finds no support in the data;  on the contrary, supply shocks are also 
correlated with demand shocks.  Strengthening policy co-ordination under EMU will 
tend to  foster  policy  convergence  across  the  Member  States.  To  the  extent  that 
business fluctuations are caused, and dominated, by policy shocks, such co-ordination 
would tend to foster synchronization in business cycles. 
An important consequence of EMU will be the completion of the Union's financial 
markets and the elimination of exchange rate-related risk premia. An implication of 
this  is  that the  process  of consumption  smoothing  and the  financing  of domestic 
investment through international capital flows will be enhanced. This has an important 
consequence  for  symmetric  and  asymmetric  shocks.  Under  symmetric  shocks 
consumption smoothing will tend to cushion business fluctuations across the Member 
States, and enhanced international capital mobility will tend to reduce the dependence 
of domestic  investment  on domestic  savings;  in  either  case,  EMU  may  limit  the 
amplitude  of symmetric  cyclical  fluctuations.  In  the  case  of asymmetric  shocks, 
however,  while  consumption  smoothing  may  tend  to  iron  out  the  amplitude  of 
asymmetric cyclical movements, enhanced international capital mobility could well 
accentuate them. 
Trade  and  financial  liberalization  as  well  as  the  single  market  have  undoubtedly 
played  a  fundamental  role  in  strengthening  interdependence  among  the  Member 
States'  economies over time.  The  evidence points to  significant contemporaneous 
correlation between the cyclical component of  macroeconomic variables although this 
varies according to whether a Member State belongs to an inner core or not.  It is 
unlikely that this cyclical synchronization will diminish in EMU, but, if anything, it 
will likely strengthen further as residual impediments to integration are removed and 
as policy-induced shocks are synchronized or eliminated altogether. 
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ADJUSTMENT CHANNELS 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although the costs of loss of the exchange rate instrument in EMU may have been 
over-emphasised, the basic argument in favour of floating exchange rates is that they 
ease  the  process  of adjustment  to  external  shocks  in  an  open  economy  .  Once  a 
country  has  joined EMU  it will  lose  the  exchange  rate  as  an  instrument  for  the 
adjustment to shocks hitting its economy.  On the basis of the theoretical concept of 
optimal currency areas (OCA), the economic literature has analysed the existence of 
alternative instruments for absorbing such shocks once national authorities have lost 
monetary independence.  Two  such potential instruments are usually considered: the 
functioning of markets, and fiscal  policy stabilization. This chapter will exclusively 
refer to  the first  instrument,  and,  more  specifically, to  the channels through which 
adjustment takes place. 
Although there  seems to  be  an  almost general agreement regarding  the  benefits of 
higher economic integration, there is also  a degree of concern about the possibility 
that nations may experience large  adverse  shocks,  whose  effects  are  magnified by 
high degree of integration!. Krugman (1993), for instance, has argued that regions in 
the US  have been the subject of this kind of shock,  since they have no  recourse to 
adjust the exchange rate, nor to apply the well-known instruments of monetary and 
fiscal policies to adjust to shocks. Leaving apart the discussion of  the effectiveness of 
these instruments as  adjustment mechanisms, as  well as  the fact the Member States 
within EMU will still have a considerable degree of fiscal autonomy, a more or less 
pertinent parallelism between US regions and EMU members would suggest that, due 
to EMU, Member Sates could be the subject of  large asymmetric shocks, which would 
require enhancing alternative adjustment channels. 
Structural  differences  amongst  EMU  members  would,  obviously,  be  the  ultimate 
cause  of shocks  having  asymmetric  effects.  Differences  in  a number  of structural 
features  of EMU  economies,  like  production  specialisation,  institutions  or  tastes, 
would explain that movements on the euro' s real effective exchange rate, changes in 
the cyclical position of EMU,  or monetary  policy mistakes,  could affect particular 
EMU members differently.  Analogously,  such structural factors  would explain that 
different EMU members recorded different inflation rates or showed different degrees 
of wage flexibility, and thus different external positions. Whatever the origin and the 
nature of the  shock,  due  to  those  structural  factors,  the  result will  be transitory or 
permanent  growth  differentials  across  EMU  members,  unless  adjustment  channels 
exist to restore the initial equilibrium. 
Since  EMU  prevents  from  changes  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate  as  a  means  to 
modifying  the  relative  prices  between  EMU  members,  flexibility  must  be  found 
See, for instance, Torres and Giavazzi (1993). 
135 elsewhere  in  the  economy.  Although  the  working  of the  labour  market  has  been 
particularly stressed in the OCA literature, what matters for economic adjustment is, 
more generally,  market flexibility.  This chapter is  concerned with issues related to 
flexibility of factor and product markets in general, while the next one is specifically 
devoted to labor market issues. 
The  traditional  OCA  literature  regards  adjustment  through  prices  and  adjustment 
through quantities symmetrically. In the case of labor, for instance, wage flexibility 
and  labour  mobility  would  be  quasi-interchangeable.  However,  recent  theoretical 
developments  have  pointed  out that  these  two  channels  play  a  very  different role 
according to the degree of persistence of shocks. In this chapter, adjustment through 
quantities is analyzed separately from adjustment through prices. In general, we can 
consider that,  once  an  economy  has  lost  control  of the  money  supply  and  of the 
exchange rate,  and assuming that the adjustment can only be  partially provided by 
national  fiscal  policies,  it will  have  to  adjust to  shocks  through  changes  in factor 
quantities and/or factor and output prices.  Adjustment via quantities will take place 
through changes in investment and/or employment, whilst adjustment via prices will 
take place through wages, profits (or Marshallian quasi-rents), export prices, and/or 
production prices. 
Although  most  of the  OCA  literature  treats  economic  disturbances  as  purely 
exogenous  phenomena,  in reality,  policy  induced  shocks  or shocks  caused  by  the 
behaviour of economic agents may be more likely than usually reflected in the OCA 
literature. However, we will not discuss here why the country is subject to a shock; we 
will simply assume that the country concerned has been hit by a shock. Furthermore, 
for the purposes of the chapter,  shocks will be  relevant as  long as  they change the 
external  position of the  country.  Therefore,  by  analysing  the  determinants  of the 
external position of  the economy, we can work out how the economy should adjust to 
it in  order to  restore the equilibrium.  On the  other hand,  shocks of a structural or 
permanent nature are also possible. The cure in this case is productivity growth or, in 
other words, long-run adjustment. 
The  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  II  considers  adjustment  through 
quantities,  whilst  section  III  deals  with  adjustment  through  prices.  Section  IV 
considers long run adjustment via productivity. Finally, the conclusions are presented 
in section V. 
II.  ADJUSTMENT VIA FACTOR QUANTITIES 
Capital 
The fall  in the Marshallian quasi-rent of capital will be translated into a fall  of the 
expected return on investment. If capital were highly mobile, as is the case in EMU, 
ceteris paribus, the fall in the relative expected return on investment would lead to an 
outflow of capital, which would result in lower total investment and lower effective 
demand, thus reducing imports and to restoring the external equilibrium. Note that the 
external  shock  could  have  a  permanent  effect  (Krugman,  1993).  Consider,  for 
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are falling because of a wrong production specialisation of the country. Since highly 
mobile capital implies the equalisation of  the cost of capital across EMU, the relative 
expected  return  on  investment  will  not  recover  and  the  outflow  of capital  will 
continue. In other words, under perfect mobility of capital, the initial adverse shock 
may have permanent effects, by releasing a self-reinforcing process, which will result 
in lower relative growth in the long run, unless other adjustment mechanisms are put 
to work. 
It is worth noting that this is not an argument against capital mobility within EMU. It 
simply  highlights  the  need  for  alternative  adjustment  mechanisms  to  avoid  the 
possibility of  permanent capital outflows of adverse significant impact on a country's 
economy.  Furthermore,  empirical  evidence  suggests  that,  although  capital  moves 
freely within the EU, the actual impact and size of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
might  not  be  large  (European  Commission,  1996,  chapter  4).  On the  one  hand, 
although the importance of intra-EU FDI is increasing relative to trade, intra-EU trade 
flows were still  60.7 times intra-EU FDI  flows  over the period  1990-1992. On the 
other  hand,  leaving  aside  the  cases  of Belgium  and  Ireland,  where  FDI  inflows 
respectively represent 4. 7% and 9.4% of GDP, in the other Member States the share 
does not reach 3% of GDP.  For the purposes of this chapter, it is worth noting that 
FDI only represents 2.64% of GDP in Portugal, 1.75% in Spain, 0.64% in Greece and 
0.40% in Italy; other Member States record similar or lower FDI ratios. 
Labour 
Since the fall in exports will bring about a fall in the degree of utilisation of capacity, 
in order to restore the return on capital corresponding to  the initial situation, firms 
more directly affected by the slump in the external demand will try to reduce the share 
of labour  costs  in  value  added  to  increase  the  Marshallian  quasi-rent  of capital. 
Consequently, firms will fire  workers to restore the  long-run equilibrium, given the 
new demand conditions2. 
Concerning adjustment through labour, although this chapter does not directly deal 
with labour mobility, what has been said regarding capital also applies to workers. If 
labour is highly mobile, wages might not adjust to shocks even if  labour markets were 
flexible  enough.  The  slump  in  activity,  led  by  a  fall  in  exports,  would  decrease 
expected relative wages, which, by assuming that labour mobility is a phenomenon of 
an endogenous  nature  (Krugman,  1991,  and  Faini,  1994),  will  result  in migration 
towards countries or regions promising higher wages. As far as private consumption is 
concerned, migration would have the same effect as a fall in wages or an increase in 
unemployment. Private consumption would fall, thus depressing the effective demand 
and  restoring  the  initial  external  equilibrium.  However,  although  the  external 
equilibrium was restored and the economy was again in full  employment, the shock 
2  Note  that,  under perfectly  competitive  markets,  individual  firms  will  take  wages  as  given. 
Therefore they will proceed to an adjustment through quantities. 
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whereas relative wages remain unchanged across countries or regions3. 
Conclusion 
To  summarise,  as  pointed out by Krugman  (  1993 ),  shocks  could have  permanent 
perverse effects if factors were mobile and factor prices were equalised across EMU. 
An unfortunate country would not have lower factor prices for very long, since factors 
would move to other countries until factor prices were equalised. This country would 
therefore have no means to attract new activities, and the initial, seemingly transitory 
shock would have permanent perverse effects as far as real convergence is concerned4• 
However,  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  most  foreseeable  case  within  EMU  in  a 
reasonable future. Although increasingly important, FDI flows are still relatively low, 
and, as discussed elsewhere, labour mobility is almost nil in the EU. ·Consequently, 
under  EMU,  countries  will  have  to  rely  on  alternative  short-run  adjustment 
mechanisms through prices. 
III.  ADJUSTMENT THROUGH PRICES 
As we have already said, apart from relative cyclical positions, the external balance of 
a country depends on the relative real effective exchange rate. Given that the nominal 
effective exchange rate becomes exogenous to national governments within EMU, and 
that productivity is a rather long run phenomenon, the REER should adjust through 
real wages and output prices. A fall in real wages and/or output prices will improve 
the external position of  the country and restore the equilibrium. 
Wages 
Since labour seems to be rather immobile within EMU, wages should adjust to return 
to  full  employments.  Although a  deep  discussion on wage  flexibility  is  out of the 
scope  of this  chapter,  it  is  clear that,  under  perfect  competition and  high  capital 
mobility, flexible labour markets are  needed to  avoid permanent adverse effects of 
external  shocks  on employment,  otherwise,  the  initially  transitory  slump  will  be 
reinforced. If  capital mobility is high, to keep the country attractive to investment, the 
Marshallian quasi-rent of this factor should go  back to the level before the shock, 
which implies reducing the now relatively high labour costs. The only way to do that, 
while maintaining the initial level of  employment, is to reduce wages. If  wages cannot 
adjust, the return on capital will be restored by reducing employment, which, in the 
absence  of the  appropriate  income  policies,  will  depress  even  more  the  effective 
demand. Therefore, immobile labour and sticky wages could, ceteris paribus, lead to 
increasing unemployment and public spending, or to higher unemployment and lower 
3 
4 
5 
Because of  factor price equalisation. 
Growth would show the statistical properties of  a random walk (Blanchard and Katz, 1992, and 
Krugman, 1993). 
Unemployment would be equal to the so-called natural rate (Baldwin, 1996). 
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growth  if these  income  policies  are  not  enough  to  restore  the  level  of effective 
demand. 
There is therefore a case to ask whether such a theoretical scenario is possible within 
EMU.  As  pointed  out  by  de  Grauwe  (1993),  there  is  a  lot  of empirical  evidence 
suggesting  that changes  in  real  wages  have  in  fact  occurred  during  the  1980's in 
European countries experiencing large negative shocks. It is also likely that the fall in 
relative wages particularly affect certain categories of workers. Neven and Wyplosz 
(1995) suggest that external shocks, consisting of adverse changes in the patterns of 
trade  at  sectoral  level,  could  have  helped  to  increase  wage  dispersion  in  certain 
sectors. 
Prices 
Furthermore,  such  a  theoretical  framework  implicitly  assumes  that  markets  are 
perfectly  competitive.  The  consideration  of imperfect  competition  suggests  other 
adjustment channels. Product differentiation, as well as increasing returns, imply that 
prices are established on the basis of a mark-up on marginal costs, and that such a 
degree  of mark-up  depends  on  competitive  pressures  (Allen,  Gasiorek  and  Smith, 
1996,  and  European  Commission,  1996a,  chapters  4  and  5).  Under  imperfect 
competition, domestic producers may react to external shocks by reducing profit and 
export  margins.  Domestic  producers  will  react  to  increasing  imports  by  reducing 
mark-ups at home, which will result in at least a lower fall  in their domestic market 
shares.  Analogously,  domestic  producers  may  reduce  export  margins  in  order  to 
compensate for the fall in domestic market shares by increasing export shares. In both 
cases, this kind of reaction to external competitive pressures will soften the effects of 
adverse external shocks on growth and employment. Although the expected return on 
investment will likely fall as a consequence of the reduction in the mark-ups, such a 
fall  may not jeopardise the attractiveness of the country to  investment, since, under 
product differentiation and increasing returns, the Marshallian quasi-rent of capital is 
higher than that corresponding to  the  long-run equilibrium.  Furthermore, the fall  in 
pnces  may  foster  the  effective  demand,  thus  compensating  for  the  reduction  in 
margins. 
A  recent  economic  assessment  of the  Single  Market  Programme  (SMP)  provides 
interesting  empirical  evidence  on  pro-competitive  effects  of market  integration 
(European Commission, 1996). Allen, Gasiorek and Smith (1996) have shown that, in 
sectors particularly sensitive to the  SMP,  domestic firms  have reacted to  increasing 
competitive pressures of intra and extra-EU importers by  reducing price margins in 
order to maintain domestic market shares. This has resulted in less trade creation and 
thus in lower substitution of domestic production by  competing imports (European 
Commission,  1996,  chapter  4  ).  Analogously,  the  study  carried  out  by  London 
Economics (1996) on profit margins also reveals that market integration has triggered 
a relative decline in margins, which has been particularly significant in the sectors 
most affected by the changes in the competitive conditions led by the SMP (European 
Commission,  1996a,  chapter  5).  However,  such  a  fall  in  profit  margins  has  not 
reduced the capacity of the  EU  to  attract investments.  The  share of the  EU  in the 
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Commission, 1996, chapter 4). 
Concerning export margins,  there  is  also  empirical evidence  suggesting that under 
imperfect competition, exporters first react to external transitory shocks by adjusting 
export margins.  A  study  on the  impact of currency  movements  within the  Single 
Market shows that the adjustment to an external adverse shock may take place through 
prices rather than through quantities (see European Commission, 1995). Although this 
study has  been carried out in the  framework  of the  impact of changes in nominal 
exchange rates, as long as an appreciation could have the immediate effect of  reducing 
net exports, its lessons can be  applied to the issues of interest of this chapter.  The 
study  concludes  that  exporters,  being  the  subject of this  kind of shock,  prefer to 
reduce export margins, in order to maintain exports shares, rather than increase export 
prices in order to maintain profits. 
Conclusion 
All in all, highly integrated competitive product markets will help soften the effects of 
adverse shocks on growth and employment. If markets are imperfect and not easily 
contestable, the dominant position of  domestic firms may prevent quick adjustment to 
shocks or even be the source of  asymmetric shocks. The existence of  a significant part 
of the  economy  closed  to  international  competition  or  somewhat  protected  by 
government regulation may result in higher relative inflation, which will also affect 
the open sector of  the economy. This will result in less exports and more imports, thus 
worsening the external position of the country. Lower growth and effective demand 
will, ceteris paribus, increase unemployment. If  firms in protected or regulated sectors 
do not react by lowering their prices, the adjustment in the open sector of  the economy 
will take place through margins and restructuring. Sooner or later, the only effective 
way to reduce inflation and avoid additional adjustment costs in the open sector will 
be to increase market contestability through de-regulation. 
The  SMP has  set up the conditions for  quicker reaction through prices by making 
markets  more  competitive.  As  long  as  EMU  will  improve  the  functioning  of the 
Internal  Market,  we  can  expect  that  its  pro-competitive  effects  will  enhance 
adjustment  channels  through  prices  and  reduce  adjustment  costs  of transitory, 
asymmetric shocks. 
IV.  ADJUSTMENT IN THE LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY 
Transitory  shocks  are  not  the  only  matter  of concern  within  EMU.  Shocks  of a 
structural  or  permanent  nature  are  also  possible.  As  we  have  seen,  seemingly 
transitory shocks may become permanent. Moreover, the origin of  asymmetric shocks 
lies  in structural differences across  EMU.  In these cases short run adjustments are 
only a transitory remedy. The cure in this case is higher productivity and it only takes 
place in the long-run. 
6  From 28.8% over 1982-87 to 44.4 over 1991-93. 
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, Unfortunately,  as  stated by  Krugman (1994),  the  problem is  that we  do  not know 
much about why productivity growth varies.  According to  Barro and  Sala-i-Marti 
(1995), empirical analyses show that a number of  variables are significantly related to 
the  growth rate  of real  per capita  GDP.  Growth  depends  positively  on the  initial 
quantity of  human capital in the form of educational levels and health, on the ratio of 
investment  to  GDP,  and  on  R&D  spending.  It is,  however,  negatively  related  to 
measures  of distortion  of markets  and  political  instability.  All  in  all,  although 
correlation does not imply causality, and that we can not establish any ideal policy 
mix to enhance productivity, it seems that governments have an important role when it 
comes to explaining divergence in productivity across countries. 
The question is to what extent this role will be encouraged within EMU. The answer 
seems to be that EMU may reinforce the conditions for higher productivity growth. 
On the one hand, EMU is perfectly compatible with a series of Community structural 
policies aimed at enhancing productivity. On the other, if empirical findings  on the 
positive relationship between economic integration, measured as trade openness, and 
productivity growth does not show a spurious correlation, we can say that EMU, as 
long  as  it  will  improve  the  functioning  of the  SMP,  may  set  up  the  adequate 
framework to higher productivity growth across Europe. 
There is a case, however, whether such a higher productivity growth may be different 
across  EMU  members  and  result  in  agglomeration  effects  and  concentration  of 
economic activity in some of them but not in others. If, as suggested by Faini (1994) 
and Krugman (1991), labour mobility would be endogenous,  and depend on living 
standard  differentials  and  self-reinforcing  expectations,  productivity  growth 
differentials could lead to concentration effects, which would result in migration from 
the periphery to the centre. 
Again, the main issue is the likelihood of  this kind of shock at macro-economic level. 
On the one hand, as shown in another chapter, the possibility of huge agglomeration 
effects is relatively low within a reasonable horizon. On the other hand, the available 
empirical  evidence  shows  that  productivity  is  not  significantly  growing  faster  in 
countries like Germany, France, the UK, Belgium or the Netherlands, than in Spain, 
Ireland or Portugal (European Commission, 1996a, chapter 3). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Country-specific structural factors will be at the origin of  asymmetric shocks affecting 
the  external  position  of an  EMU  member.  We  have  described  in  the  preceding 
sections theoretical channels through which adjustment will take place. All in all, as 
shown in section III, highly integrated and competitive markets seem to be the key to 
soften the effects of  adverse asymmetric shocks. This seems to be particularly relevant 
regarding labour markets. Adjustment mechanisms in these markets are the subject of 
a separate chapter. 
Concerning product markets,  the  expected pro-competitive  effects  of the  SMP  are 
already working, and we can expect that EMU will enhance them. However, the above 
141 mentioned study on the evaluation of  the SMP has shown that a number of obstacles 
still remain (European Commission, 1996b  ).  On the one hand, a number of existing 
SMP measures are not fully working. On the other, there are still areas important to 
the creation of  a European-wide market outside the current scope of  the SMP. 
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ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND THE LABOUR MARKET 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
EMU will  be  a fundamental  change  for  macroeconomic  policy-making in the EU, 
with more limited capacity for autonomous policy-making by each Member country. 
To change the nominal exchange rate will no longer be an option for modifying intra-
EMU  real  exchange  rates.  National  authorities  will  lose  a  macroeconomic  tool, 
traditionally  used  to  accommodate  the  impact  of shocks  or  to  restore  the  cost 
competitiveness of production in inflationary economies. In the event of asymmetric 
shocks,  this  calls  for  more  flexible  product  and  labour  markets.  Otherwise,  the 
adjustment  to  shocks  will  be  more  slowly  and  with  heavier  costs  in  terms  of 
production and employment losses. 
Labour  market  flexibility  has  two  facets:  labour  cost  flexibility  and  flexibility  of 
labour supply (through changes in participation ratios and labour mobility). Because 
labour supply is expected to play a minor role in adjustment, the bulk of improving 
labour market flexibility in the EU will primarily depend on how flexibly wages will 
behave in EMU. 
Section II analyses the sort of labour cost flexibility, especially of wages, needed to 
offset economic  shocks  in the  absence  of adjustable  nominal  exchange  rates.  The 
traditional criticism that Europe's wage scales are sluggish and narrowly compressed 
is somewhat qualified in view of  recent evidence. Aggregate labour costs are currently 
relatively flexible  in the  long term in many EU countries.  However,  this  does  not 
always  reflect  the  appropriate  wage  flexibility  at  the  level  of sector,  region  or 
enterprise. Wages are also too slow to adjust completely, thereby conveying costs in 
terms  of output,  employment  and  unemployment  protection.  Such  short-run  costs 
combine with ongoing structural mutations of labour supply and demand to generate 
long-term joblessness and hysteresis of  unemployment rates in Europe. 
EMU is  likely to alter wage-setting patterns if combined with structural reforms in 
labour and product markets. National authorities, employers and trade unions in the 
EU are expected to adapt to the new policy regime and negotiate wages compatibly 
with technology, capital stock and business profitability. Although indirectly affected 
by EMU, differentials of labour costs will follow more closely productivity growth, 
driven  by  greater  wage  flexibility,  economic  integration  and  stronger  market 
competition. Fears of 'unrealistic wage convergence' in EMU, recently illustrated in 
re-unified Germany, are unlikely in the current EU setting. 
The  complex  institutional  and regulatory  set-up  for  wage  bargaining  in the  EU  is 
reviewed  in  sec.  II.C.  Wage  negotiations  follow  a  complex  multi-tier  contract 
structure,  with intermediate  levels  (sector,  region)  often taken as  reference  for  the 
lower tiers. Empirical literature finds no simple relationship between wage bargaining 
institutions and macroeconomic performance.  Thus, there  is  no  unique institutional 
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national wage-bargaining institutions are  likely to  coexist in EMU,  whereas  wage-
setting practices and behaviour will adapt accordingly. Nation-wide agreements will 
most likely set guidelines for wage bargaining while including formal clauses to allow 
for greater wage differentiation at the level of  enterprise or sector. 
Section  III  illustrates  how  labour  mobility  and  variations  in  labour  supply  will 
contribute to compensate for insufficient wage adjustment. Labour mobility in Europe 
is low compared with that in the USA. In the short run, wage-driven labour migration 
bear most of the  burden of adjustment  in the  USA.  In the  latter,  capital  inflows, 
attracted by lower wage levels in depressed areas, do  not seem to play a great role. 
EMU  can  be  expected  to  foster  labour  mobility,  although  to  a  limited  extent, 
facilitated by economic integration and the Single Market Programme. Migration will 
concentrate upon particular (often, highly-skilled) labour categories. However, unlike 
the traditional OCA literature, the low geographical labour mobility  should not be 
much of a problem to the well-functioning of EMU.  The role of labour mobility as 
adjustment mechanism has been reassessed recently, in view of the irreversibility and 
sunk costs associated with the decision to migrate. 
II.  WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND LABOUR COSTS 
Given the unemployment problem in the EU, to attain an appropriate degree of wage 
flexibility is desirable and necessary irrespective of  EMU. Wage increases, compatible 
with productivity gains, are a key element to reduce unemployment while raising the 
employment ratio in the EU. The moderate behaviour of labour costs will contribute 
to price stability, thereby easing the burden on monetary policy.l It will also help to 
distribute the total volume of work, as determined by the economy's macroeconomic 
performance, amongst higher numbers of individuals, hence raising the employment 
ratio in the EU. All in all, labour cost increases, compatible with productivity trends, 
will  foster  job  creation  and  contribute  to  reabsorb  the  current  mass  of labour 
unemployed  in Europe.  2  EMU  will  make  the  case  for  high  wage  flexibility  even 
stronger. 
Despite the fact that EMU will bring more stability, in terms of fewer policy errors 
and shocks, the  loss of the nominal  exchange rate will  call  for  more  flexibility  in 
labour  costs,  should  any  shock  occur.  The  sort  of labour  cost  (wage)  flexibility, 
whether nominal or real, depends on the nature of the shock.  Imagine a (negative) 
demand shock (e.g. a sudden surge in the households' propensity to save) in an EMU 
2 
Note that wage moderation and flexibility does not forcibly mean outright curtailing of wage 
levels, either nominal or real. In a context of  moderate price inflation, changes in relative wages 
can  be  achieved over time  through  wage  increases  being  closely  linked  to  inflation  and/or 
productivity trends. 
Whereas the (negative) sign of the relationship between employment and real labour costs is 
already well established, there is  less consensus about the scale of the response. Bean (1994) 
concludes that the price-employment schedule is fairly steep, at least in the short run. There is 
also ample consensus in that the sensitivity of labour demand to the total cost grows the less 
skilled labour is. See DG II (1996a) for a survey of  recent literature on labour demand. 
145 country.  Aggregate  demand  will  grow  sluggish,  or  even  recede,  unless  falling 
domestic demand is compensated with rising demand from abroad. This requires that 
domestic  production  becomes  cheaper  compared  to  that  produced  abroad.  Since 
currency devaluations are no longer possible, the worsening of the terms of trade will 
have to come from  falling  relative prices between countries.  If nominal wages are 
sticky, the adjustment will come slowly through recession and higher unemployment. 
Such adjustment costs will be lesser if mechanisms, other than recession forces, help 
to reduce relative domestic unit production costs through flexible nominal wages or 
productivity gains. 
In  case  of a  (negative)  supply  shock  (e.g.  sudden  technological  obsolescence  of 
productive capital stock), the equilibrium level of real wages may fall below the level 
prevailing  in  the  market.  If real  wages  are  rigid  downwards,  job destruction  and 
unemployment will soar and inflation will have to progressively erode the real value 
of wages, down to the new equilibrium level.  Such market forces will work slowly 
and with considerable economic and social costs. These costs will be even heavier if 
national  authorities  adopt  restrictive  macroeconomic  policies  to  return  to  price 
stability. Besides, the short-run costs from stabilisation may perpetuate over time. Part 
of the  unemployment may  become  structural  because,  say,  technological  progress, 
labour market regulations or human capital deterioration, may render the unemployed 
less  'employable'  and  price them out from  work  in the  ensuing economic upturn. 
Flexible  real  wages  are,  therefore,  necessary  to  speed  up  the  adjustment  of the 
economy to a supply shock in order to preserve a high level of  employment. 
A.  MACROECONOMIC AND  MICROECONOMIC  WAGE  FLEXIBILITY  IN  THE EU: 
THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Macroeconomic wage flexibility 
Macroeconomic  wage  flexibility  describes  the  behaviour  of the  total  wage  bill, 
conducive to strong economic growth, low inflation and high level of employment. It 
encompasses both the response of nominal wages to price shocks, commonly named 
as  wage-price inertia, and the sensitivity of real wages to  unemployment.  Different 
wage  elasticities  are  estimated  to  measure  this  response  according  to  the  policy 
criteria chosen.  3 
Nominal  wage  flexibility  matters  for  macroeconomic  price  stability.  The  complex 
dynamics between unemployment, wages and prices are commonly measured in terms 
of the  unemployment  rate  compatible  with  stable  price/wage  inflation  (named 
NAIRU/NA  WRU,  respectively).4  This  is  measured  in terms  of the nominal  wage-
3 
4 
Note that flexibility of nominal and real wages is sometimes confused in the debate. Real wage 
rigidity is  actually the opposite of nominal wage rigidity.  That is, nominal wage rigidity (i.e. 
low wage-indexation to prices) is  equivalent to real wage flexibility,  in that inflation outpaces 
nominal wage growth and erodes its value in real terms. 
Wage-unemployment  elasticities  are  estimated,  for  instance,  as  the  slope  coefficient  of an 
(expectations-augmented)  Phillips  curve.  This  aggregate  specification  relates  price/wage 
changes (NA  WRU/NAIRU,  respectively) to a measure of slack  in the  labour market (often, 
unemployment  rate).  Additional  variables  are  included  to  capture  productivity  trends  or 
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price elasticity, that is,  to  what extent nominal wages tend to catch up with price 
changes5  (i.e.  the degree of nominal wage inertia).  This response  depends on both 
wage  contract inertia (wage  agreements  being  negotiated to  last for  a  given time 
period) and real wage flexibility (how wages respond to unemployment) in the labour 
market 
Wage  contract inertia is  higher  in the  USA,  where  wage  bargaining  is  more  un-
synchronised and staggered over time and wage contracts typically have longer life 
(some  3  years)  than  in  the  EU,  with  more  synchronised  and  co-ordinated  wage 
bargaining of shorter-lived wage agreements (1-2 years).6 There are some indications 
that the  downward convergence of inflation rates  has  recently  led  to  some  move 
towards longer-lasting wage agreements in the EU.  Moreover, regulatory reforms in 
many EU countries have recently  sought to  reduce,  or remove  altogether,  built-in 
clauses  of explicit  nominal  wage  indexation  to  prices  (for  instance,  the  most 
conspicuous case has been the removal of  the scala mobile in Italy in 1992). 
Real  wage  flexibility  refers  to  the  responsiveness  of  wages  to  the  level  of 
unemployment, reflecting the economy's capacity to bring unemployment back to its 
natural level.  7 How wages and prices adjust in the economy, arouses controversy since 
both prices  and nominal  wages  appear  to  be  sticky,  most  certainly  downwards.  8 
Estimates of  real wage-unemployment elasticity abound in the literature. They tend to 
show that real wages in most EU countries are more responsive, in the long run, to 
unemployment conditions than the USA.9  OECD (1994) estimates that the long-run 
semi-elasticity of real wages to unemployment is markedly smaller in the USA and 
the  UK (1.0%) than in large  EU Member countries  and Japan  (3.0%-5.0%).  The 
contrast is even more striking with those estimates for Austria and Nordic countries 
(over 6.0%), which are notorious examples of centralised wage-setting (see section 
V). 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
structural features  in the market. OCDE (1996a) is  a recent summary of the  'state of the art' 
concerning NAIRU, from the viewpoint of  policy-making. 
In the long run, nominal wages tend to absorb changes in prices completely as money illusion 
disappears. Thus, the long-run nominal wage-price elasticity tends to unity in most countries. 
The key question is  how quickly this catching-up takes place,  in  other words, the  degree of 
formal or informal indexation of  nominal wages to prices. 
Wage  contract  inertia  depends  on  the  average  life  of wage  agreements,  the  degree  of 
synchronisation  and  co-ordination,  or  whether  there  exists  built-in  clauses  of indexation, 
upwards and downwards, in those wage contracts valid over one year. The literature is surveyed 
in Bean (1994). 
The natural rate of unemployment is commonly defmed as the unemployment rate compatible 
with wage-price stability, as determined by structural factors like e.g. labour market regulations, 
skill mismatch, or product market competition. 
Cf. Kempf (1992) for a recent survey of literature on nominal rigidity. Note, as well, that to 
adjust real wages does not necessarily mean to cut nominal wages. Freezing the wage growth in 
some countries/sectors is enough, in case of  positive inflation, to modify the relative wages over 
time,  as  needed.  Adjustment also  takes place  as  real wage  growth  lags  behind productivity 
gains,  so that employers fmd it more profitable to demand labour for any given level of real 
wages (i.e. the downward-sloping labour demand curve tends to shift outwards). 
Similar results are reported in Coe (1985), Turner et a/. (1993) and Bean (1994  ). 
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average, is much slower than in the USA and the UK.  According to  OECD (1994), 
half of the adjustment only takes some  1 year in the USA and UK whereas it lasts 
between 1.5 and 4.0 years in other EU Member countries. The faster adjustment in the 
USA and the UK results from the level of employment being more closely aligned to 
the  business  cycle,  that  is,  more  intense job turnover.  For  instance,  Haskel  et al. 
( 1997) find evidence that establishment have become more flexible over the last years. 
However, in practically all  (92%) UK firms,  such flexibility  comes from  adjusting 
quantities (employment, hours worked, or capacity), rather than prices, in response to 
a  shock.  This  tendency is  higher among  UK firms  showing  more  flexibility,  both 
internally (i.e.  easier re-deployment of workforce, or changes to  hours worked) and 
externally (i.e. lower dismissal costs).IO 
Even if  real wages in EU appear to be relatively flexible in the long run, the slow pace 
of adjustment is a problem since the short-run costs in terms of output, job losses and 
unemployment protection are increased. These negative sequels are likely to persist in 
time, as well, for the employability of individuals out of work for a long time tend to 
deteriorate  over  time,  feeding  long-term  joblessness  and  the  hysteresis  of 
unemployment rates in Europe. 
Microeconomic wage flexibility 
Changes of aggregate wages do  not always  reflect  an  efficient and  flexible  wage-
setting at the level of sector, region or enterprise. Changes in aggregate wages is the 
outcome of simultaneous changes in labour (wage and non-wage) costs, number of 
hours  worked,  or  employment  level.  The  pattern  of response,  in  terms  of each 
variable,  largely  depends  on  national  wage-setting  practices,  regulations  and 
institutions.•• 
A high level of employment requires that aggregate wage flexibility be coupled with 
sufficient wage flexibility at microeconomic level. Hence, enterprises, when faced to a 
business downturn, would be able, if deemed efficient, to adjust the total payroll via 
lower real labour (wage or non-wage) costs, rather than through quantity adjustment.12 
IO 
II 
I2 
'Flexible' firms  in the UK do  create more jobs in  upturns,  but they also  destroy them more 
intensely  in  downturns;  cf.  Haskel  et  a/.  (1997).  This  explains  the  fact  that  aggregate 
employment and output levels vary more closely together, with more stable labour productivity 
over the business cycle. Noticeably, Haskel et el. (1997) also find that wage adjustment plays no 
role  as  a response to  business  shocks  in  UK enterprises.  Onbe  explanation may be that UK 
employers care for giving incentives for employees to improve their effort at work (efficiency-
wage  approach).  A  flexible  set-up  for  wage  bargaining  is  also  likely  to  warrant that wage 
growth largely follows labour productivity trends. 
Short-work schemes are particularly important to enable wage flexibility and to stabilise wage 
and employment levels. Countries with generous short-work schemes (Italy, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Sweden) show acceptable levels of aggregate labour flexibility, even in presence of 
national wage-setting system relatively centralised, compared to the USA or the UK. See Van 
Audenrod ( I994  ). 
Another possibility is to introduce some degree of  flexibility of  working time. The latter cannot, 
however,  fully  substitute  for  wage  flexibility  because of technological,  regulatory and  other 
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Wage dispersion in the EU has been blamed as insufficient and a proof of poor wage 
flexibility,  inappropriate to  adapt to  ongoing  structural  mutations  in Europe's  and 
world economies (e.g. technological change, globalisation, or the collapse of Bretton-
Woods). 13 The criticism has gathered strength in the light of recent employment and 
growth trends in the US  economy. It has been suggested that there exists a sort of 
policy trade-off between preserving European-like wage compression and returning to 
high employment ratios. Moreover, the need to free up the wage scale and let it come 
closer to productivity differentials is felt to concern, in particular, the low-skilled and 
the new entrants with no  working  experience,  in order to  facilitate  their access to 
work. 
How compressed are Europe's wage distribution is a matter for empirical validation 
and  recent  data  on  wage  structure  offers  a  good  opportunity  to  do  so.  Wage 
differentials are clearly smaller in Europe than in the USA; cf. OECD (1996). However, 
the picture is less clear when comparing the situation within the EU. Recent evidence 
shows that the actual degree of wage dispersion in many EU countries is higher than 
often argued; cf. DG II (1996a). The degree of  wage dispersion throughout the earnings 
scale in all EU Members, except for P and F which show relatively more compression 
among  the  lower  wages.  Wage  dispersion  is  relatively  high  among  high-skilled 
occupations, larger firms, private-sector employees, males and part-timers, even when 
corrected for the difference in number of  hours worked. Whereas wages are relatively 
compressed in B, DK, S, I, NL, and FIN, this largely affects the lowest wages in the 
first  three  countries.  Finally,  markedly  contrasting  labour  market  institutions  and 
employment performance appear to coincide with noticeably similar degrees of wage 
differentiation (for example, in E, F, L, A, UK and, especially, IRL and P). 
Wage  distribution within the  EU  is,  therefore,  less  compressed than often argued, 
especially in some countries. Moreover, differences in labour market performance and 
institutions cannot be readily associated with observed patterns of wage dispersion, at 
least in terms of labour category, firm size, full-time/part-time work status, or gender. 
Similar ambiguity appears from evidence in OECD (1996). 
B.  WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND EMU 
Effects of  EMU on wage-setting behaviour 
EMU will change the behaviour of EU national authorities and make more credible 
the non-accommodative stance of  their macroeconomic policy-making. Individuals in 
the labour market are likely to be affected, as  well.I4  First, lower and more certain 
13 
14 
technical constraints to re-arranging working time. See Haskel et a/.  ( 1997) for a survey of the 
patterns of  response to demand shocks among UK establishments  . 
The dispersion of  gross labour costs (wages) matters for job creation and employment, whereas 
the analysis of labour supply regards the degree of disparities of net earnings. For instance, see 
Bertola-I  chino (1995)  . 
See, for instance, the discussion in Wijkander (1997). 
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parties.  Market competition will enhance the relationship between labour costs and 
job creation. Employers, aware that excessive wage growth will deteriorate the cost 
competitiveness and profitability of their business, are expected to  resist to concede 
wage increases exceeding productivity growth.  Trade unions, aware of the negative 
impact on employment from excessive wage pressure, are likely to scale down their 
wage  claims  and  bring  them  closer  to  productivity  trends,  in  exchange  for  less 
uncertainty on future inflation and an easier attainment of target gains of disposable 
income. 15 
One specific fear is that the EMU will worsen the problem of Europe's relative wage 
compression by triggering 'demonstration' or 'fair wage' effects across countries or 
sectors.16  In  other  words,  trade  unions  may  struggle  for  equalising  wage  levels 
upwards, irrespective of differences of labour productivity across sectors or countries. 
As  long as  this convergence of wages finds  no  support in narrower differentials of 
productivity,  the  wage  pressure  will  eventually  damage  employment  levels  in 
countries with soaring unit labour costs. The experience of the German New Lander 
stands as an example of  both this risk and its consequences for employment. 
This  scenario  of 'unrealistic wage  convergence'  in  EMU  may  be  less  likely  than 
apparent.  Unique  national  factors  are  behind  the  accelerated  wage  equalisation  in 
Germany.  Historical  and  political  reasons  explain  the  non-market  rate  applied  to 
converting  Ost-marks  into  DM  and  the  behaviour  of Germany's  trade  unions  for 
accelerating  wage  equalisation.  Excessive  regional  wage  disparities  were  feared  to 
trigger  labour  migration  flows  within  re-unified  Germany,  at  a  larger  scale  than 
desirable from economic, regional and social viewpoints. Massive budgetary transfers 
towards  the  less-productive  Lander  have  been  necessary  to  compensate  for  the 
employment consequences of accelerated convergence of regional wage levels. None 
of such factors can be reasonably expected to occur in the EMU and nothing suggests 
that they will be more plausible in the near future. 
On the contrary, both employers and trade unions are likely to bargain wages in EMU 
more compatibly with technology, capital stock and business profitability. Economic 
integration  and  strong  competition  will  also  favour  that  productivity  gains  are 
translated into lower prices and product quality competition, so that individuals gain 
in disposable income and living standards without the need for pushing for excessive 
wage claims. 17 
15 
16 
17 
The experience of  West Germany (prior to unification) and, recently, of  the Netherlands, Ireland 
and Denmark are examples of how  such credibility effects alter wage bargaining.  See DG II 
(1997). Such benefits for wage moderation have been somewhat overriden in DK recently, quite 
likely as a result of  some degree of 'overheating' at the peak of  the current business cycle. 
For instance, see Demertzis and Hughes Hallet (1995) or Jackman (1996). 
The Single Market has reduced the price-cost margins in some sectors. See DG II( 1996b  ). 
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In principle, the  degree of wage  dispersion in Europe  is  not likely to  be  affected 
directly by EMU, understood to be a fundamental change in macroeconomic policy 
regime.18  The  impact  will  actually  come,  in  an  indirect  way,  from  the  actual 
functioning  of EMU and the  evolution of growth  and  unemployment  differentials 
across  regions,  sectors  and  countries.  Moreover,  technological  progress,  economic 
integration  and  the  heterogeneity  of labour  will  continue  to  drive  productivity 
differentials,  hence  wages,  between  booming  technology-advanced  activities  and 
mature or decaying sectors. 
Labour cost differentials should follow changes of productivity differentials, so as to 
increase  employment in the  EU.  This  is  the  case  now and  will  be  so  in  a  well-
functioning  EMU.  The  scale  of  labour  costs,  matching  labour  productivity 
differentials,  will stimulate job creation while contributing to  efficiently reallocate 
resources and labour across occupations, sectors and regions.  It will hereby remove 
potential skill shortages of labour supply and will avoid triggering inflation strains.t9 
In the long run, changes in wage dispersion might contribute to drive human capital 
accumulation to meet the needs in the labour market, ensuring that wage differentials 
pay off  in those occupations or sectors under heavy demand. 
This line of reasoning relates to  differences  in the total  cost of labour.  It remains 
arguable how much of  the sought disparities of  labour costs will have to be passed on 
to  employees'  wages.  Wages  are  the  biggest  share  of the  total  cost of labour  in 
practically all EU Member countries.2o Thus, it might be expected that variations in 
the scale of labour costs may eventually translate, at least to some extent, into wider 
wage disparities themselves.  Such changes are most likely to  affect relative wages, 
rather than the absolute level of wages. As long as barriers to upwards mobility for 
wage-earners will disappear, individuals with lower relative wages can be expected to 
'move up the ladder' and benefit from higher levels of  employment and well-being. 
It is not surprising that both economic theory and evidence give no solid support for a 
simple relationship between wage inequality, economic growth and employment. For 
instance, wage differentials alone appear to have been less determinant than expected 
in facilitating  an even access to work for  different types of labour (OECD;  1994). 
Albeit  crucial,  wage  differentials  cannot  be  expected  to  work  in  isolation.  Their 
benefits  also  require  that  complementary  structural  measures  and  reforms  in,  for 
instance,  goods  and  services  markets  are  introduced.  Sub-optimal job and  labour 
18 
19 
20 
See Krugman (1994), Nickell and Bell (1996), or OECD (1996b). 
Wage dispersion, by contributing to high employment, will favour aggregate price stability by 
reducing the room for insider-outsider wage-setting behaviour to occur, common criticism to 
many EU countries. 
Total  labour  costs  comprise  both  wage  and  non-wage  costs  (e.g.  days  paid  not  worked, 
severance payments, social charges). Wages alone average some 50-60 per cent of  the total cost, 
with higher shares in DK, UK, IRL and L (70-80 per cent). Performance- or profit-linked wage 
premia/bonuses represent some additional 10 per cent in GR, E, A, D, I, NL, and B. Thus, direct 
wages, also including premia and bonuses, average some 65% of  the total labour cost in the EU, 
compared to 71% in the USA and 82% in Japan. Cf. DG II (1996a). 
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labour cost hierarchy is more or less compressed but also on factors such as lack of 
job vacancies,  barriers  to  labour  mobility,  poorly  competitive  goods  and  services 
markets, inefficient state aids, etc. 
All in all, it is reasonable to expect that a degree of labour cost dispersion, in closer 
correspondence  with  productivity  differentials,  has  a  role  to  play  in  promoting 
employment and economic efficiency in Europe. However, this should not be seen as 
the sole policy tool but to  work in close co-ordination with other structural reforms 
and policies. This is more the case since relative wages are likely to be less variable 
than often stated. Economic factors like e.g. long-lived wage contracts, heterogeneous 
quality of labour, the impact of wage levels on individual's effort at work,  and the 
respect of social standards, they all explain the relative rigidity of relative wages, as 
observed in reality.  Other mechanisms  are  likely to  compensate for  some efficient 
degree of relative wage rigidity at company level; for instance, short-run changes of 
business performance are partly buffered through varying patterns of working time or 
flexible profit margins, with less negative impact on the level of  employment. 
Further  analysis  on  patterns  and  trends  of earnings  distribution  and  mobility  is 
necessary,  in  consequence,  to  foresee  future  changes  of relative  wages,  and  the 
benefits generated therefrom, in EMU  and  the rest of the world.  For instance, it is 
crucial for policy-making to understand why the unemployed cannot underbid wage 
levels  in Europe's labour market,  if seemingly  negotiated  above  their equilibrium 
levels. Different reasons have been alleged in this respect:  inappropriate institutions 
and regulations (e.g.  allowing  for  insider-outsider behaviour)  or changes  in labour 
demand (e.g. technological change boosting the skill mismatch, thereby reducing the 
effective  pool  of labour  supply).  An  effective  policy  response  will  depend  on 
obtaining more clear and conclusive evidence in this respect. 
Wage flexibility and the burden for adjustment in EMU 
Wages cannot be seen as  the  sole adjustment mechanism since other elements also 
play an important role in facilitating the adjustment in EMU.  First, labour costs are 
only one of  the production costs and, often, are not the biggest. Second, EMU requires 
wage flexibility in order to  make producer prices responsive to demand and supply 
conditions  in the  markets.  But this  will  be  so  only  if firms  are  real  'price-takers' 
driven  by  strong  competition  in  goods,  services  and  factor  markets;  otherwise, 
inefficient oligopoly rents will absorb cost reductions and inflate mark-ups, at least in 
the  short run.21  Third,  a strategy based exclusively on curtailing wage growth may 
jeopardise productivity growth and human capital accumulation by making uncertain 
the return to investment. Fourth, since wages are the income earned by employees at 
work, their fairness, as perceived by employees, influences the individuals' effort and 
productivity  at  work.  Finally,  strong  market  competition  stimulates  technological 
progress  and  productivity-enhancing  mechanisms  to  improve  the  long-run  price 
21  Haskel et al. (1997) find, based upon the UK Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, that 92% 
of  firms respond to business shocks through changes in employment, capacity or hours and very 
few  of them  (only  7%)  change  prices,  even  in  the  long  run.  Practically  no  establishment 
reported to adjust wages as a response to a demand increase or decrease, even in the long run. 
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costs (e.g. intangible investment, quality-based competitiveness). 
It is important that structural reforms and policies effectively strengthen the capacity 
for job creation in EMU countries. Otherwise, should the fall in real wages not entice 
net job creation,  total  disposable  income  for  households  might  fall  in  excess  in 
response to  a shock.  Since the wage  share typically represents  60-70% of national 
income, domestic demand might contract further and aggravate the recession even if 
exports rise because of lower domestic  prices.  In  the  absence  of federal  budgetary 
transfers (present within each country), responsive job creation is the main channel to 
make domestic demand stable. 
C.  WAGE BARGAINING INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES IN THE EU 
It has  been argued that different practices and  institutions  for  wage  bargaining,  as 
observed in the EU, will no longer be able to persist in EMU and that to attain higher 
wage flexibility will require finding the best wage-setting arrangements for the labour 
market. 
Even  though  institutions  and  regulations  for  wage-setting  could  be  expected  to 
influence  wage  flexibility,  their  actual  impact  on  pay  determination  is  not 
straightforward.  22 Many features appear to matter as regards how flexible wage-setting 
institutions  and  regulations  work.  Just to  mention  a  few:  multiple-tier bargaining, 
strategic  co-ordination  among  employers/employees,  effective  coverage  and  ultra-
activity of wage agreements, pace-maker sectoral effects, the public sector's role for 
'guiding' wage agreements, or tax-funded short-time work schemes. 
The institutional and regulatory set-up for wage bargaining is fairly  complex in the 
EU.  23  Wage bargaining mainly concerns employees in private sector and,  often, in 
state-owned enterprises. Civil servants are subject to wage fixation by statute or law. 
Wage  bargaining  follows  a  complex  multi-tier  structure,  with  intermediate  levels 
(sector, region) often serving as  the reference for  negotiations at lower tiers.  Wage 
agreements  in  the  EU  often  observe  more  or  less  overt  guidelines  nation-wide, 
allowing negotiations at company/establishment level to adapt the real wage growth to 
the  company's  business  conditions  (drop-out  clause).  Most  frequently,  lower-tier 
negotiated wage growth comes to  'top-up' generally-agreed wage growth, so  that a 
sort of  wage drift emerges.  24 
22 
23 
24 
Zweimuller-Barth (1994) fmd little influence of labour market institutions as  they find rather 
similar wage patterns across  industries and countries,  irrespective of institutional and labour 
quality differences. 
For instance, see European Commission (1990) or, more recently, ETUI (1996). 
The wage drift from negotiated wage increases also depends on factors like, for instance, union 
wage premia paid to workers because of  job-reclassification, seniority premia, family subsidies, 
or incentive bonuses. The magnitude of the wage drift varies by country, sector, occupational 
category or existence of closed-shop arrangements. For instance, OECD (1994) finds that wage 
drift may vary between 5% and 20% above sector- or branch-negotiated wage increases. 
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for favouring employment-friendly wage behaviour.  Centralised and/or co-ordinated 
wage  bargaining  make  negotiating  parties  aware,  ex  ante,  of overall  trends  of 
productivity/unit production costs, thus contributing to price stability and the success 
of stability-oriented macroeconomic policies. They risk, in contrast, introducing some 
rigidity of  wage differentials which eventually slow down the efficient re-allocation of 
labour  in response  to  productivity  differentials.  Wage  bargaining,  decentralised  to 
company level, fares better from this efficiency viewpoint. It neglects, however, the 
externalities implicit to wage bargaining and expects that flexibility in the company's 
payroll will be attained ex post via market competition, labour/job turnover and output 
losses from industrial dispute. 
Contrary to the views prevailing in the early eighties, there seems to  be no simple 
causal  relationship  proving  that  decentralised  wage  bargaining  leads  to  superior 
performance in terms of aggregate real  wages and unemployment.  Similar patterns 
appear to result from both highly centralised and highly decentralised wage bargaining 
institutions.  25  Some  fears  were  aroused  by  the  conclusion  that  intermediate 
(sectoral/regional) systems (which are the most common in European countries) fared 
worst, although recent research has greatly dissipated such fears. Proportional income 
tax  or contributions  to  unemployment  protection  schemes,  thus,  appear  to  create 
externalities  which  reduce  the  problem  of insider-outsider  behaviour,  a  traditional 
criticism against centralised wage bargaining.  For instance, tax systems favour that 
trade unions realise that excessive wage growth will eventually erode the employees' 
disposable income via higher contributions to unemployment protection. The classical 
U-shape relationship between wage  bargaining and unemployment seems to  flatten 
out and suggests that the degree of  wage centralisation or co-ordination is actually less 
influential than previously assumed.  26 
This ambiguity is not cleared by  recent applied research.  27  Similar degree of wage 
moderation  appears  in  both  highly  centralised  and  highly  decentralised  labour 
markets. OECD  (1997)  finds  little  econometric  support for  any  causal  relationship 
between indexes of wage centralisation/corporatism and aggregate wage trends or, in 
general,  the  macroeconomic  performance  across  OECD  countries.28  This  is  not 
25 
26 
27 
28 
See Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Calmfors (1993) and OECD (1994). 
The sign of  the relationship between the degree of  wage centralisation and employment depends 
crucially on the substitutability between competing products in the market. Danthine and Hunt 
(1992) show that increased competition, via a higher elasticity of substitution of  between goods 
produced in partner countries, tend to flatten the Calmfors-Driffil hump. Moreover, Cahuc and 
Zylberberg  (1997)  show  that,  should  the  products  be  poorly  substitutable  or  even 
complementary, intermediate (sectoral) levels of wage bargaining lead to higher employment 
levels than fully  centralised or decentralised wage setting, so  reverting the Calmfors-Driffil's 
conclusion. 
See the up-to-date survey in Calmfors (1993), Bean (1994) and OECD (1994). 
OECD (1997) extends the analysis in Calmfors-Driffil (1988) and Calmfors (1993) to nineteen 
OECD countries in 1980, 1990 and 1994. It tests the relationship between a number of  measures 
of macroeconomic performance and indexes for union density, collective-bargaining coverage 
and wage co-ordination. Little significant empirical support for such causality is found, except 
for a robust inverse link between decentralised bargaining structures and earnings inequality. 
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surprising.  Research  has  focused  on  the  formal  structure  of wage  bargaining, 
neglecting its behavioural content. Economic and regulatory criteria cannot suffice to 
take account of the complex array of factors, not always quantifiable, determinant for 
wage bargaining, which are  deeply rooted in the  historical,  social  and  institutional 
features of  each national labour market. 
EMU  is  likely  to  affect  prevailing  wage-setting  practices  in  the  EU,  rather  than 
institutions.  EMU,  by  increasing  trade  competition and  economic  integration,  will 
make  domestic  production  more  substitutable  with  EMU  partners'  products.  The 
effect will be equivalent to introducing more decentralised wage-setting. Firms will be 
less able to pass wage increases onto final prices, whereas employees will be aware of 
the negative impact of  wage growth exceeding productivity gains. 
Different national  wage-bargaining  institutions  are  likely  to  coexist  in EMU.  The 
reason is that, most likely, it is the behaviour of both employers and employees when 
bargaining wages which will change to better take into account the mutated regime in 
which European negotiating parties will bargain.29 Nation-wide collective agreements 
can set common guidelines for wage setting and fix the framework for wage flexibility 
at lower negotiating levels. Thus, macroeconomic considerations will be incorporated 
favouring price stability, high employment and a quicker adjustment to shocks. This 
will  require,  however,  that  nation-wide  wage  agreements  include  formal  clauses 
allowing  for  greater  wage  differentiation  in  response  to  changes  in  productivity, 
sectoral shocks and business conditions at the level of  the enterprise or sector. 
III.  LABOUR MOBILITY 
Labour mobility and changing activity ratio, by  modifying aggregate labour supply, 
also contribute to adjust the labour market. Imagine a negative shock which depresses 
demand  and  production  levels.  In  the  presence  of mass  unemployment,  active 
individuals are likely to feel discouraged because of  the grim prospects of  receiving a 
(acceptable) job offer.  These  are  likely  to  drop  out directly  into  non-activity,  not 
registered as unemployed, or to migrate towards more prosperous countries/regions. 
As far as this fall in participation is ignored (which is often the case), the fast fall in 
unemployment  rates  biased  upwards  the  estimates  of real  wage  flexibility.  This 
statistical bias, caused by direct transitions from work to non-activity and viceversa, 
will be higher the more concentrated will be the risk of falling unemployed amongst 
specific labour categories individuals (e.g. prime-age women, first-job young workers, 
immigrants). 
29 
Some evidence, if any, is found to point to centralised co-ordinated wage bargaining systems as 
presenting lower unemployment rates and higher employment ratios. 
This  conclusion  is  robust  to  changes  in  the  size  of the  non-tradable  sector  and/or  the 
substitutability among products of different countries.  The non-tradable sector makes firm's 
profit margin (mark-up) more rigid.  To correct this bias, trade unions in non-tradable sectors 
may be called in to contribute to  funding the unemployment schemes. Cf.  Danthine and Hunt 
(1992). 
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markedly between Europe and the USA. In the USA, the scale of  this 'discouragement 
effect'  appears  to  be  rather limited and most of the  adjustment to  region-specific 
shocks takes place through labour migrating to more prosperous states (see Blanchard 
and  Katz;  1992).  30  In  Europe,  it  is  changes  in  the  participation  ratio  buffer  the 
variations in labour demand and since reallocation of labour operating only within, 
not between, countries. 31 
In principle, the reduction in labour supply and the downward pressure on relative 
wages from soaring unemployment increases the relative price of  capital and, thereby, 
entices capital inflows to the depressed area.  The US  experience is discouraging in 
this respect for job creation appears to be fairly unresponsive to changes in nominal 
wages.  Blanchard  and  Katz  (1992)  find  that job creation  and/or job immigration 
(  delocalisation) actually account for a small part of the adjustment in the US  labour 
market. 
A.  THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE EU 
Migration in Europe has decreased in recent decades32 and is low compared with the 
USA, where some 3 per cent of the population change their state of residence every 
year (OECD; 1994). Low rates of  migration, as long as it means low labour mobility, 
has been traditionally referred to prove that the EU is not an optimal currency area.33 
The reason is that, in the literature, labour mobility is identified to be the means to 
compensate  for  insufficient  wage  adjustment,  in  absence  of intra-area  adjustable 
nominal exchange rates. 
Migration data within and between countries is  commonly used as  a proxy of the 
mobility of active individuals. Net migration flows are assumed to represent one-to-
30 
31 
32 
33 
In the first year, 65% of  the adverse employment shock is absorbed by migration, only 0.05% in 
terms of  falling participation rate, and the rest of  the impact feeds into the unemployment rate. It 
takes half a decade for inter-state labour migration to make relative unemployment rates return 
to their pre-shock levels in the USA, whereas the response of  wage differentials takes somewhat 
longer  (10  years).  Similar  results  are  obtained  in  Elmeskov  and  Pichelmann  (1993)  and 
Bayoumi and Prasad (1996). 
See Elmeskov and Pichelmann (1993),  Decressin and Fatas (1994) and Bayoumi and Prasad 
{1995), who extend to  Europe the analysis  in  Blanchard and Katz (1992) for  the US  labour 
market. 
Migration flows  have declined both within and between European countries since the  1970s, 
with some traditional flows  even reverting their sign.  Half of the  immigrants into Denmark, 
Greece,  Spain,  Ireland  and  the  UK  are  nationals  returning  home  whereas  immigration  into 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg  come  mainly  from  other  EU  countries.  For the  whole  EU,  net 
immigration  flows  have  been  clearly  positive  in  1985-92,  especially  in  Germany,  the 
Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, largely from Central and Eastern Europe. See EUROSTAT 
(1995). 
See Bayoumi and Prasad (1995). By contrast, Gros (1996) argues that it is not the level but the 
relative  difference  between  migration  within  and  between  countries  that  matters  for  EMU. 
Otherwise,  the  traditional  Mundellian  argument would  point to  regions  being the  optimum 
currency areas in many European countries, because of observed low intra-country mobility. 
Moreover, he finds that migration between US regions appears not to be much higher than that 
between countries in the EU. 
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one  variations  into  labour  supply,  hence  unemployment,  in  both  the  host  and 
migrating economies. This methodological choice, albeit inevitable, is unsatisfactory 
and qualifies available quantitative evidence on labour mobility.  34 Thus, the decision 
to  migrate is not always motivated by employment reasons or income differentials 
alone, although these are likely to explain much of the migration observed. It is also 
not straightforward that migrating population (even if of working age) means one-to-
one variations of  labour supply.  35 
The determinants for the decision to migrate are not evident. In principle, migration 
seem to respond to unemployment differentials, rather than to  income differentials, 
across  regions.  Such  influence  decreases  the  higher  the  absolute  level  of 
unemployment  or  income.  Unemployment  risks  are  also  determinant  for  the 
prevailing type of migration in the economy.  36  Overall, this applies to both Europe 
and the USA,  although Eichengreen ( 1993) finds  that inter-state migration is  more 
responsive  to  wage  differentials  in the  USA (five times  higher than in the  UK or 
Italy). 
The  progressive  increase  of  wealth  and  living  standards,  the  spreading  of 
unemployment, and the development of national welfare states explain much of the 
low flows of intra-EU migration. However, economic factors alone cannot explain the 
traditional low level of  migration in Europe. This has been attributed to obstacles such 
as  language  barriers,  administrative  constraints,  non-recognition  of professional 
diplomas,  non-portability  of pension rights,  transaction  costs  and  restraints  in the 
housing market, limited cross-border transferability of social protection rights, or the 
inefficient functioning of national public employment services.  37 Such economic and 
administrative  barriers  to  cross-country  migration  cannot,  however,  explain  why 
migration is low within EU  Member countries as  well.  Social,  family  and cultural 
factors are likely to be of  influence here. 
B.  LABOUR MOBILITY AND EMU 
It is reasonable to expect that labour mobility will increase in EMU, together with 
increasing economic integration and the  Single Market Programme removing many 
obstacles to labour mobility.  However, the magnitude of the  expected rise  and the 
share  of the  labour  force  susceptible  to  migrate  will  most  likely  be  limited.  For 
instance, the US  experience advocates not to  expect major changes,  at least in the 
34 
35 
36 
37 
The analysis of 'economic'  labour mobility  is  not easy  since  data on migration  are  scarce, 
poorly comparable, and most often follow non-economic but political or administrative criteria. 
For instance, much of the 'legal' migration into the EU and the USA corresponds to granting 
residence permits to allow for family regroupment. Often, such immigrants are not entitled to 
receive work permits, at least in the short run.  Another phenomenon to bear in mind are the 
migration of  non-active population, namely, students and retired elderly people. Although both 
groups are necessarily registered to be migrants, they are, in principle, not expected to increase 
labour supply. 
In poorly diversified economies, international migration is the only effective way to diversify 
unemployment risks, even though it involves higher migration costs.  In economies sectorally 
and regionally diversified, the scope for inter-regional migration is greater. see Daveri and Faini 
(1996). 
See Faini (1996) or Razin and Yuen (1996). 
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dismantling.  38 Also, the higher propensity to migrate is not likely to affect the whole 
labour force except for specialised and/or highly-skilled categories of  labour. 
However, it is unclear whether low geographical labour mobility will pose a problem 
to  the  well-functioning  of the  EMU.  First,  comparably  large  monetary  unions 
(Canada,  Australia)  also  have  low  inter-regional  mobility.  Second,  geographical 
mobility is higher within concrete areas in Europe, fairly homogeneous in historical, 
social and economic terms (Scandinavia, Ireland and the UK, the Benelux, Spain and 
Portugal). Third, most important, the role of  labour mobility as adjustment mechanism 
has  been  recently  reassessed.  For  instance,  Melitz  ( 1996)  points  out  that  the 
appropriate degree of labour mobility depends on the nature of  the shock. In presence 
of permanent  shocks,  labour  mobility  helps  to  adjustment  through  the  necessary 
reallocation of production factors, whereas high labour mobility may run counter the 
necessary stabilisation in case that the shock is just transitory.  Furthermore, Buiter 
(1995) rightly points out that taking the degree of labour mobility as an indicator to 
assess whether a certain area is fit for creating a monetary union is misleading. Indeed, 
the sort of  reversible labour mobility, as stated in economic theory to substitute for the 
nominal exchange rate, exists nowhere in the world, given the irreversibility and sunk 
costs associated with the decision to migrate. 
38  See Eichengreen (1992) or Danthine and Hunt (1992). 
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161 (IV.l2) 
REGIONAL SPECIALISATION AND CATCHING-UP 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Concentration  and  specialisation  are  amongst  the  most  striking  features  of the 
geography of economic activity. All over the world, a number of particular economic 
activities are located in the same place, generally, albeit not always,  in some urban 
areas where the population is concentrated. 
These phenomena can be  observed within countries.  However,  when one compares 
countries, and especially industrialised countries, they do not seem to be particularly 
specialised  in  the  production  of certain  activities.  Krugman  ( 1991)  showed  that 
Member Sates within the EU are more similar than regions within the USA. He argues 
that this has  happened because  in the  Europe of the  nineteenth century  increasing 
trade barriers compensated for the fall in transportation costs and prevented domestic 
and foreign firms from fully exploiting economies of scale. 
The Single Market Programme (SMP) aims to eliminate all the barriers to trade and 
factor  movements  within the  EU.  The  benefits of Economic  and  Monetary  Union 
(EMU)  will  improve  the  functioning  of the  Single  Market  and  will  provide  the 
institutional  framework  for  the  EU  to  become  a  fully  integrated  area.  There  is, 
therefore, a case to  question to  what extent EMU may release the forces  leading to 
higher concentration and specialisation in the EU or, in other words, to what extent 
regional differences may wane or increase. 
This note tries to give an answer to these questions. Part A reviews the literature on 
new economic geography with a particular focus  on the impact of the SMP.  Part B 
deals more directly with the possible impact of EMU on Member States in a process 
of  catching-up. 
PART A:  THE LOCATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN AN 
INTEGRATED AREA 
Several  arguments discussed  in  section II  suggest that economic  activities  tend to 
concentrate in few central locations. However, additional theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence presented in section III give a less clear picture of  this tendency. 
II.  GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION 
Increasing  returns  is  the  main  driving  force  behind  geographic  concentration  of 
production.  In  the  framework  of what  is  now  known  as  "new  trade"  theories, 
Krugman (1980) showed that in a world characterised by increasing returns and by 
162 non-zero  transportation  costs,  in  the  absence  of trade  barriers1,  there  will  be  an 
incentive to  concentrate production of a commodity near its largest market, even if 
there is some demand for the commodity elsewhere. The main insight from this model 
is the 'home market effect' or the tendency of countries to produce and export goods 
for which they have a relatively large domestic market. 
The basic story proposed by Krugman ( 1991) to explain geographic concentration in 
relatively small regions within countries,  like the  Manufacturing Belt2  in the USA, 
Ontario in Canada or the Ruhr in Germany, strongly relies on this interaction between 
increasing  returns,  transportation  costs,  and  demand.  Given  sufficiently  strong 
economies of scale, each producer would want to  serve the national market from  a 
single location and would choose the one with large local demand, which minimises 
transportation costs. It  turns out that local demand will become larger where producers 
choose to locate, thus leading to a self-reinforcing process of  concentration. 
History plays a crucial role in the formation of  core/periphery patterns. For production 
to  be  concentrated  in  a  region,  a  series  of initial  conditions  must  be  fulfilled.  If 
transport costs  are  sufficiently  small,  and  increasing  returns  sufficiently  large,  the 
region with the largest share of population ("home market") will be the centre of the 
concentration  process.  It should  be  added  that  if transportation  can  also  exploit 
economies  of scale,  then transportation  costs  may  become  endogenous.  This  will 
mean lower transportation costs in the more concentrated region, which will in turn 
reinforce the advantage of  this region as the location of  the bulk of  economic activities 
of the  country.  All in all,  the  prospects  for  formation of a centre-periphery pattern 
depend  negatively  on  transportation  costs,  positively  on  the  size  of demand  and 
positively on the importance of economies of scale.  Under these circumstances, the 
final result could be the surge of  a "centre" of  production, which holds a large share of 
total GDP of the country, and a "periphery", sharing a relatively small fraction of the 
country's GDP. 
This  model  allows  for  an  explanation  of why  production  concentrates  in  certain 
geographic  areas.  However,  it has  not  enough elements  to  explain  why  particular 
industries  are  located  in  the  same  place.  Alfred  Marshall  gave  the  well  known 
argument of the existence of external economies to explain this phenomenon. Under 
external economies of scale, a firm's unit cost will be  a decreasing function of the 
output produced by the industry. Marshall points out three reasons justifying external 
economies. First, by concentrating a number of  firms in an industry in the same place, 
an industrial centre allows a pooled market for workers with specialised skills, which 
benefits both workers and firms.  Secondly,  an industrial centre allows provision of 
inputs and services specific to an industry in greater variety and at lower cost. Finally, 
an industrial centre generates technological spillovers, since information flows easily 
at local level. 
2 
As  it would be the case of trade within regions  within a country, or the  case  of the  Single 
Market. 
Within the approximate parallelogram Green Bay-St. Louis-Baltimore-Portland in a relatively 
small part of  the Northeast and the eastern part of  the Midwest. 
163 Krugman  (  1991)  has  reviewed  Marshall's arguments  to  bring  them  up  to  date  by 
stressing again the  importance  of economies  of scale  internal  to  the  firm.  He  has 
shown  that  the  advantages  of a  pooled  workforce  arise  from  the  interaction  of 
increasing  returns  at  the  firm  level  and  uncertainty  (asymmetric  shocks,  cyclical 
factors).  Analogously,  Krugman  argues  that  for  an  industry  to  support  specialised 
local suppliers, production of intermediate inputs and services should take place with 
some degree of  economies of  scale. It is also worth noting that localisation will tend to 
occur unless the  costs  of transporting  intermediates  are  particularly  low compared 
with those of transporting final  goods.  Finally, concerning technological spillovers, 
although he recognises its importance, Krugman suggests that this does not seem to be 
the main reason for localisation even for high-tech industries. 
Of great relevance for current economic activities, these main reasons developed by 
Marshall for localisation of  manufactures equally apply to services as long as they are 
tradable.  Non-tradable  services  will  simply follow  the  geographical  distribution of 
total production and  population.  Therefore,  they  will  show a rather low degree  of 
localisation.  However,  other  services,  like  banking,  insurance,  entertainment  or 
tourism, are tradable and location trends are apparent everywhere. In fact,  as argued 
by  Krugman  ( 1991 ),  the  most  clear  cases  of localisation  today,  big  cities  in 
industrialised  countries,  are  based  on  services  rather  than  on  manufacturing. 
Furthermore,  such trends  may  be  enhanced  today  by  technological  developments, 
namely in the field of  information transmission, since new technologies are increasing 
the degree of  tradability of  many services. 
III.  SMP AND  EMU:  THEORETICAL CONJECTURES AND  EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
Krugman  (1991)  notes  that  the  four  great  regions  of the  US  (the  Northeast,  the 
Midwest, the South and the West) are comparable in population and economic size to 
Europe's "big four  countries"  (France,  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  United  Kingdom). 
Therefore, under free trade within Europe the degree of  economic specialisation in the 
USA  and  Europe  should  be  roughly  similar.  However,  when  using  sectoral 
employment statistics at 2-digit, one finds that European countries are more similar 
than  regions  in  the  USA  (see  also  Ergas  and  Wright,  1994).  In  other  words, 
localisation has gone further in the USA than in the EU. Krugman (1991) argues that 
this has happened because in the Europe of the nineteenth century increasing trade 
barriers compensated for the fall  in transportation costs and prevented domestic and 
foreign firms from fully exploiting economies of scale. 
As  long  as  the  benefits  of EMU  (lower  transaction  costs,  greater  credibility  and 
stability of  monetary policy) improve the functioning of SMP, the EU will become an 
integrated area comparable to the USA. It is therefore pertinent to ask whether the full 
implementation of  the SMP and the EMU itself may reverse specialisation paths in the 
EU,  generating  a  "centre",  which  becomes  more  and  more  concentrated,  and  a 
"periphery"  with  less  and  less  relative  weight  in the  EU' s  economic  activity  and 
population. 
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It is  well  known that there  are  strong  differences regarding  purchasing power and 
wealth  among  Member  States,  and  the  poorer  regions  in  the  EU  are  in  general 
relatively  distant from  main markets.  Taking the  elimination of trade  barriers and 
benefits of  EMU as lower transportation costs or, simply, lower trade costs (Krugman, 
1993), the question is  then where will an industry chose to  locate  in the  EU,  in a 
central region where wages (and production costs) are high, but which has easy access 
to main markets, or in a peripheral region where wages are low but access to markets 
is not so good? 
Theoretically,  one  could  argue  that given  low trade  costs,  a  number of economic 
activities will want to  move from  the  current high-income  centre to  the  low-wage 
regions in the periphery. However, on the other hand, Krugman and Venables (1990) 
have argued that medium trade costs could reinforce the centre against the periphery. 
They have developed a typical intra-industry trade model of  the effects of integration 
on the  competitiveness  of peripheral  industries  whose  hypothesis  is  that  "while 
complete elimination of obstacles to trade always raises the competitiveness of the 
peripheral regions, partial elimination may in principle have a perverse effect" (p.58). 
With a partial reduction of trade costs, the peripheral  industry can hardly compete 
with the industry of  the centre which has advantages by exploiting economies of  scale. 
A further reduction in trade costs and a decline in relative wages allow the peripheral 
industry to regain competitiveness because of the exploitation of economies of scale 
due to  improved access to the  large market of the  centre.  Consequently,  wages  in 
centre and periphery diverge in a range of higher trade costs and converge in a range 
of lower trade costs. The graphical illustration is aU-shaped curve of the periphery's 
relative wage when increasing integration (see figure). Contrary to what is frequently 
expressed, the centre usually also gains from the catching-up of  peripheral regions and 
loses only in extreme cases of  economic modelling (Krugman/Venables 1995). 
Figure: The relation between the level of integration and the relative wage of the 
periphery 
wage of  the periphery 
in relation to the centre in % 
100 
0  ~--------------------------------------------------------~  level of  trade costs 
integration  level of  integration  fragmentation 
Source: Hallet, 1997, p. 29, based on Krugman/Venables, 1990, p. 73. 
165 Summarising,  we  cannot be  sure  about the  final  result,  since  it depends  on future 
possibilities of exploiting economies  of scale,  the  evolution of trade  costs and the 
evolution of  wage and productivity differentials between the centre and the periphery. 
Given  this  ambiguity  of theoretical  models  of concentration  and  localisation,  a 
complementary answer has to be found in empirical evidence, which, we have also to 
recognise, is not conclusive at all. 
Krugman (1993) points out that, since World War II, "the forces tending to generate a 
core-periphery  pattern  have  reached  their  limit".  He  then  suggests  that  "new 
technologies of  transportation and communication make it easier for industries to flee 
high  land  costs  and  take  advantage  of immobile  labour  in  peripheral  regions  that 
prefer to receive low wages at home rather than migrate to  take advantage of high 
wages at the centre".  This could be suggesting that past success is not always self-
reinforcing. 
In a recent paper, Sapir (1996) has carried out an empirical analysis of the effects of 
the SMP on the structure of trade and production in the EU.  He concludes that "by 
1992,  the  internal  market  programme  has  produced  only  relatively  modest  inter-
sectoral shifts in the pattern of specialisation within EC manufacturing". He suggests 
that this can be the result of  problems in the implementation of  the SMP or of greater 
intra-industry specialisation. Leaving apart problems in the functioning of  the SMP, a 
recent study by the CEPII (1996) seems to  show that although the bulk of intra-EU 
trade mainly consists of intra-industry trade, countries show quite different degrees of 
specialisation in terms of quality.  Peripheral countries like Spain, Italy,  Greece and 
Portugal  seem  to  show a  relatively  high  degree  of specialisation  in trade  of low 
price/quality manufacturing products, whilst "core" countries like Germany, France or 
the  UK  appear  relatively  specialised  in  high  price/quality  products.  Altogether, 
empirical  evidence  suggests  that  the  Single  Market  has  contributed  to  regional 
convergence within the EU (European Commission 1996, pp. 197 ff. ). 
Such specialisation trends entail intra-sectoral adjustment costs, which are lower than 
inter-sectoral adjustment costs associated with increasing inter-industry trade.  When 
looking at the evolution of inter-industry specialisation and agglomeration processes 
in manufacturing, Brulhart (1996) has concluded that there is still room for increasing 
inter-industry  specialisation  in  the  EU  in  labour-intensive  industries,  whereas 
agglomeration processes seem to have worn out in industries with increasing returns. 
However,  Brulhart  and  Torstensson  (1996)  have  found  a  negative  relationship 
between, on the one hand, increasing returns and, on the other hand, both industrial 
concentration in the "centre" and intra-EU, intra-industry trade.  They find empirical 
evidence that employment in scale intensive industries tends to be concentrated at the 
centre of the EU, and intra-industry trade is relatively low in these sectors. In other 
words, in sectors where there is a tendency towards concentration, inter-industry trade 
is increasing relative to intra-industry trade. 
Finally, concerning services, Buigues and Mogensen(1996) suggest that concentration 
of market services activities tends to follow geography; the further north, the higher 
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the  degree  of  concentration.  This  trend  seems  to  be  apparent  in  transport, 
communications and financial services. Additional evidence can be found in Bayoumi 
and  Prasad ( 1995),  who  claim that regional  specialisation in  the  EU  is  higher  for 
services than in the USA. 
PART B:  EMU AND CATCHING-UP 
The  possible  participation  in  EMU  of "catching-up"  Member  States,  frequently 
referred to as cohesion countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal), is sometimes 
seen with the concern that this might stop their process of catching-up and result in a 
need for permanent fiscal redistribution from more to less advanced economies. This 
part shows, however, that these concerns are without reason since, on the contrary, 
EMU will improve conditions to accelerate catching-up. 
The  most important effect of a  single  currency  is  an improved  functioning  of the 
Single Market by reducing transaction costs for the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital (section IV). This happens at the expense of  a loss of  the nominal 
exchange  rate  as  an  instrument of economic policy  whose  importance  is  however 
exaggerated (section V). 
IV.  REDUCTION OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
The  most important function of money  is to  facilitate  transactions by avoiding the 
inconveniences  of barter.  For  transactions  between  different  currency  areas,  costs 
occur for  at least one of the  partners whose  transaction is  carried out in a foreign 
currency in order to exchange  foreign  currency,  to  compare  prices  and  to  manage 
exchange rate risks. In other words, the mere existence of multiple currencies implies 
at least additional transaction costs strictly speaking (paid to an intermediary to move 
from  one currency to  another),  information costs,  multi-currency cash management 
costs (know-how investment and financial costs) and exchange risk hedging costs. To 
the  extent  that  these  various  transaction  costs  between  the  previously  different 
currency areas cease to exist within a single currency area, economic integration of 
goods and factor markets increases which tends to raise the quantity of  transactions, to 
decrease  price differences  and to  provide  static  and  dynamic  welfare  gains.  These 
integration effects are to be expected on goods, capital and labour markets. 
Goods markets 
The reduction of transaction costs brought about by monetary union and its resulting 
advantages for trading merchandises and services are higher for a country the more 
intensive  its  trade  with  partners  of the  monetary  union  is,  the  less  frequently  its 
currency is used for transactions, and the less developed its foreign exchange market 
is.  These conditions are clearly fulfilled for the small, open Member States Ireland, 
Portugal  and  Greece,  so  that  higher than  average  transaction  cost  savings  can  be 
expected for these countries. A study which estimates that EMU could save between 
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terms transaction costs can be 8 times more important for small open economies than 
for the largest Member State" (Commission of  the EC 1990, p.264). 
In spite of some uncertainties on the exact amount of transaction cost savings, it is 
certain that  a  single  currency,  similar to  a  reduction  of tariffs  or  transport  costs, 
increases the market integration of  the previously different currency areas. Economists 
usually  analyse  the  expected  effects  of economic  integration  on the  periphery  by 
asking if convergence or divergence of  per capita income prevails,  i.  e.  whether the 
income in the core or in the periphery will grow at a relatively higher pace due to 
increased integration. 
Income  convergence  through trade  is  predicted  by  traditional  approaches  of trade 
theory: trade and specialisation shift factor demand in favour of the relatively more 
abundant, cheaper factor until relative factor scarcities and prices have been equalised 
between countries.  Income divergence is maintained by approaches of regional and 
development economics based on models of  location theory (Giersch 1949) or circular 
causation  (Myrdal  1957),  both  referring  to  agglomeration  economies  as  a  crucial 
argument. The opposite propositions of  convergence and divergence theses essentially 
result from  differing assumptions regarding the  achieved level  of integration:  Low 
transaction costs result in convergence, medium transaction costs result in divergence. 
Taking the transaction cost level as an exogenous variable allows for a combination of 
convergence and divergence hypotheses to the model developed by Krugman et al. as 
presented above: Increasing integration of a peripheral region with a core region will 
first cause a divergence of per capita income and later its convergence. Thus income 
convergence through trade  can  be  expected if regional  competitive  advantages  go 
hand in hand with a significant reduction of transaction costs, such as provided by the 
combination of the single currency, the Single Market, a stability-oriented economic 
policy and a good provision of  infrastructure. 
Capital markets 
Participation in a community of stability with binding rules,  such as  EMU,  brings 
about additional confidence which is  "imported" from other participants. A country 
which  pursues  such  a  policy  independently  of other  countries  has  to  prove  the 
reliability of its stability orientation successfully for many years (or even decades) in 
order  to  gain  similar  confidence  from  financial  markets.  The  effect  of enhanced 
stability on a reduction of interest rates due to reduced risk premia is of considerable 
importance for  the  process of catching-up and  is  only to  a limited extent possible 
without participation in EMU. 
Lower transaction  costs  for  capital  movements  in EMU  will  have  a  considerable 
impact on price and availability of capital which is crucial for a process of catching-
up. Interest rates would diminish due to disappearing exchange rate risk premia, lower 
public sector borrowing requirements, increased efficiency of financial  markets and 
higher  international  demand  for  assets  in  euro.  The  merging  of several  national 
3  Dumke et al. (1996, p.67) estimate transactions costs reduced by EMU at 0.8% ofGDP. 
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markets  and  the  switch  to  a  real  international  currency  implies  deeper,  more 
competitive and more liquid financial markets with better access to capital. Due to the 
importance of  qualitative considerations of  financial and hedging instruments, demand 
for  national  bonds  and  equities  by  domestic  and  international  capital  holders  will 
increase.  The  rise  in  the  quality  of financial  supply  may  come  about  by  the 
development of new markets, the upgrading of financial technology, an improvement 
in independence and monitoring of Central Banks as well as the fading risk of future 
exchange control.  Therefore,  EMU will  benefit both private investment and public 
finance, in particular for SMEs and small European countries. 
In contrast, flexible exchange rates can encourage the appearance of crises caused by 
short-term capital flows.  When freedom  of capital movements  is  perfect and when 
national saving is  insufficient, as  is  often the  case  in catching-up countries, higher 
than  average  profitability  linked  to  stronger  growth  may  attract  massive  capital 
inflows. This can lead to an appreciation of  the nominal exchange rate which itself can 
easily  generate  speculative  dynamics  by  continuously  increasing  the  proportion of 
purely financial and short-term inflows related to expectations of capital gains due to 
appreciation. Then, there would be a high probability that the nominal exchange rate 
becomes over-valued, in this way threatening the competitiveness of the catching-up 
economy until expectations invert and the  sudden withdrawal of foreign  short-term 
capital would cause a financial crisis. 
Labour markets 
Transaction cost savings on labour markets are  less  straightforward to  identify.  As 
regards migration between countries, currencies are much less of a barrier to mobility 
than  language  or  culture  because  migrants'  income  and  expenditure  are  usually 
effected in the same currency.  However,  links to  the home  country tend to  remain 
through family or other financial obligations which require transfers between different 
countries and currencies. Due to emigration mainly in 1960s and 1970s, the volume of 
these  transfers  is  of macroeconomic  significance  for  some  cohesion  countries  and 
appears in the balance of  payments under the category "unrequited private transfers".  4 
Saving  costs  on  foreign  currency  exchange  for  these  transfers  may  hence  be  a 
particular advantage for cohesion countries. 
A widespread concern on the impact of a single currency on labour markets is that the 
reduction  in  information  costs  would  allow  to  easier  compare  wages  between 
participating  countries.  While  hardly  anybody  expects  an  induced  increase  in 
migration  towards  high-wage  countries  due  to  this,  it  is  frequently  argued  that 
collective  wage  bargaining  in  low-wage  countries  would  come  under  pressure  to 
adjust their wages to levels of  high-wage countries. The concern is that - as far as this 
upward adjustment of wages is not in line with increases in productivity - a loss of 
competitiveness  and jobs would  be  the  consequence  with  a call  for  EU  transfers. 
4  These transfers are particularly important for Portugal reaching a maximum of ECU 4 billion at 
the end of the  1980s which equals to more than  5% of GDP,  although declining since then  . 
While transfers to Spain are comparable in volume, given the size of  the economy their relative 
importance is much lower (less than I% of  GDP). Transfers to Greece vary between ECU 1 and 
2 billion whereas they are almost negligible for Ireland. 
169 However, it seems extremely unrealistic that catching-up Member States, implicitly 
assumed to  be subject to exchange rate illusion and until now unconscious of wage 
differentials, would put at risk their main competitive advantage of low labour costs. 
In general, upward pressure on wages  seems hardly to  depend on information, but 
rather  on  the  potential  of geographic  labour  mobility:  A  low  potential  of labour 
mobility as  it exists between the EU  Member States can therefore be  an important 
contribution to cohesion in a monetary union allowing its participants to converge on 
the  basis  of maintained  regional  competitiveness  by  wage  differentials  without 
causing desertion of low-wage areas (see Matthes and Hallet,  1997). In this respect, 
the German and the European monetary unions are hardly comparable because of the 
fundamental difference regarding the potential of geographic labour mobility which 
gave little room for wage differences between East and West Germany. 
V.  CATCHING-UP WITHOUT THE NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE 
The irrevocable fixing of exchange rates in a monetary union implies that the nominal 
exchange rate is no longer available as an instrument of  economic policy within EMU. 
In this context, the general question is if a change of the nominal exchange rate is an 
appropriate  instrument  for  economic  policy  to  respond  to  differences  in  country-
specific long -term development trends.  Two  arguments  suggest that the  process of 
catching-up can require adjustments of  the ~  exchange rate: 
1)  The traditional  and  best documented  one  is  the  so-called  Balassa-Samuelson 
effect: Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) argue that technological progress 
has  historically been faster  in the traded goods  sector than in the  non-traded 
goods sector and that the productivity bias for traded-goods is more pronounced 
in high-income countries. As a consequence, consumer price index levels tend 
to be higher in wealthy countries so that fast-growing countries experience real 
exchange rate  appreciation (  cf.  Froot and  Rogoff,  1995).  Consistent with the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, Baumol and Bowen (1966) underline that, within a 
country,  there  is  a broad tendency  for  the  relative  prices of service-intensive· 
goods to rise over time. s 
2)  Balance of payments constraints affect the real exchange rate in different ways: 
On the  one hand,  imports of investment goods  which are  hardly  available  in 
catching-up economies in the early stages and high domestic demand may cause 
a structural trade and current account deficit, thus giving rise to a tendency for 
depreciation.  On the other hand, this may be  a transitory phenomenon of the 
early stages of catching-up until supply-side effects set in,  increasing external 
competitiveness, and there are capital inflows as outlined above. 
Whatever the  framework  explaining the  need for  the  real  exchange rate  to  change 
during the catching-up process, many authors argue that the way it will materialise 
only depends on the exchange rate regime: through inflationary pressure under fixed 
5  There  is  a  heavy  overlap  between non-tradables  and service-intensive  goods.  However,  the 
presence of  a Baumol-Bowen effect is not sufficient to imply a Balassa-Samuelson one. 
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exchange rates, through changes of  the nominal exchange rate under flexible exchange 
rates. However, these views have to be subject to a critical appraisal. 
The empirical evidence in favour of  the Balassa-Samuelson effect is mixed (Froot and 
Rogoff,  1995,  or  Asea  and  Mendoza,  1994).  Since  EMU,  through  increasing 
integration, should enlarge the share of  traded goods relative to non-traded goods, the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, could be reduced. 
Although relative price changes can in general not be avoided in a catching-up process 
and are necessary in the context of structural change, there is no  inherent need for 
higher  inflation  rates,  the  latter  depending  rather  on  the  stability  orientation  of 
economic  policy.  This  is  especially  the  case  in  the  EU,  given  the  small  growth 
differentials and the long term character of catching-up which makes the increase in 
prices of non-traded goods likely to  be  slow enough to  avoid inflationary pressure. 
Already within countries,  growth is  not spatially uniform and rather takes place in 
growth poles  which  spread  their  positive  effects  to  other regions;  changes  of real 
exchange rates between regions within a country do take place, although not through a 
nominal exchange rate but through prices of non-traded goods and immobile factors 
of production. A monetary union, therefore, allows for adjustments of relative prices 
with regionally different inflation rates without causing an overall higher inflation rate 
in the entire currency area as has been evidenced by German unification. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Recent theoretical  literature  and  empirical  results  are  not conclusive  enough as  to 
allow for general predictions on whether centripetal or centrifugal forces prevail in a 
process of integration. A crucial variable seems to be the level of integration between 
the centre and the periphery, a high level increasing the periphery's attractiveness as a 
location for scale-intensive industries producing for an integrated market. 
A  single  European currency  has  - additionally  to  the  advantages  arising  from  the 
membership in a community of stability - the advantage of reducing transaction costs 
on goods and factor markets between participating countries. This effect will turn out 
higher in the peripheral Member States than in the core Member States and will, if 
accompanied by sound economic policies, favour the process of  income convergence. 
Growth differentials implied by a process of  catching-up may require some changes in 
real exchange rates, but do not necessarily have to rely on the nominal exchange rate 
as  an instrument of economic  policy  since  they  can  also  be  effected  by  changing 
relative  prices  of non-traded  goods  and  immobile  factors  of production  without 
implying an overall higher inflation rate. 
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PRODUCTIVITY AND INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past, inflation differentials have been quite wide among the European Union 
countries and the persistence of differentials of such magnitude is clearly impossible 
in  EMU  as  experience  has  shown.  Too  wide  inflation  differentials  created 
competitiveness problems which had to be corrected by an exchange rate adjustment. 
The topic of this note is to try to determine to what extent one should be worried by 
regional inflation differentials in the future EMU.  In the first section, in the light of 
empirical studies, the level of  real exchange rate variability in some selected European 
countries will be compared with similar indicators in the regions of existing common 
currency  areas.  Second,  the  main  reasons  that  can  account  for  different  inflation 
trends in countries will be analysed and if they are likely to jeopardise overall price 
stability  in the  future  EMU.  It will  turn  out  that  inflation  differentials  caused  by 
different productivity developments, are sustainable.  Finally, the focus is on current 
productivity trends in European countries with an attempt to arrive at an indication of 
the regional differentials which are compatible with a monetary union. 
II.  INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS  IN  EXISTING  MONETARY  UNIONS 
COMPARED WITH SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
As  the  graph  shows  inflation  differentials  are  compatible  with  a  high  degree  of 
monetary integration. In the quasi monetary union ("monetary association") between 
Belgium and Luxembourg the inflation differentials were between 0.5  and 1.0 % on 
average.  Similar differentials are observed for Germany and the Netherlands, in the 
eighties when both monetary zones became very integrated (European Commission, 
1990).  Even  in full  monetary  unions,  price  differences  can  be  observed.  This  is 
illustrated with the inflation differential among four old German Lander (Northrhine-
Westphalia,  Baden-Wiirtenberg,  Bayem, Hesse):  the difference between the highest 
and lowest inflation rate is about 0.5 % (maxD-minD in the graph). Including West-
Berlin, De Grauwe (1992) found that the average annual differences in inflation rates 
were in the range of 0.2%- 1.2% between five  German Lander from  1971  to  1990. 
The inflation differential between East and  West Germany,  was  very wide  (almost 
10 %)  after  unification  (  eastD-westD  in  the  graph)  because  of structural  price 
adjustment, but narrowed rapidly to 0.5 %. 
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The analysis of the sustainability of inflation differentials between countries in EMU 
has  often been conducted in terms  of the  degree  of real  exchange  rate  variability 
compatible  with  the  absence  of the  exchange  rate  as  an  adjustment  instrument. 
Various empirical studies have been made on implied real exchange rate differentials 
between sub-national  regions.  Since  regions  have  the  same  currency,  the  relative 
price movements have to occur through inflation differentials. Naturally, if  they have 
different currencies, the relative price movements could occur also through changes in 
the exchange rates. 
De  Grauwe  and  Heens  (1991)  calculated  that  the  standard  deviations  of yearly 
changes of the implied real exchange rate (measured by unit labour costs) were  1.22 
for German regions, 3.27 for Dutch regions, 2.48 for British regions during 1975-1985 
and 1.62 for Spanish regions during 1980-1985. 
In the case of Canada, Poloz (1990) observed that during 1980-87 the average yearly 
difference in inflation rates (CPI) between major Canadian cities were between 1 and 
2%.  Significantly more relative price variability was found in GDP deflator data for 
Canadian provinces as they reflect local production patterns. 
For  the  US,  Bayoumi  and  Thomas  (1995)  calculated  that  the  average  annual 
differences of inflation rates (GDP  deflators) varied from  0.5% to  2%  in eight US 
regions during 1963-1989. 
Based  on  different  time  periods  and  measuring  techniques  (unit  labour  costs, 
consumer price index, GDP deflator), an obvious observation of  these studies was that 
there were some regional inflation differentials in existing monetary unions, but that 
these differentials did not threaten the monetary union as the differentials were small 
and  corresponded to  necessary  equilibrating  mechanisms.  Some  of these  studies 
compared the level of implied real exchange rate variability in sub-national regions 
175 with some selected European countries.  Poloz (1990) showed that in Canada inter-
regional  relative  price  variability  has  exceeded  in  some  cases  real  exchange  rate 
variability in Europe, which by this criterion, would make a European monetary union 
no less  feasible than the monetary union within Canada.  The  study suggest that a 
monetary union was possible among a group of EMS countries : Benelux, Germany 
and Denmark, while it could be more difficult among all EMS-members as the RER 
variability remained very high between these countries. 
Making from the absence of  real exchange rate variability (or exchange rate variability 
not exceeding the one in existing monetary unions) the yardstick by which to measure 
sustainable  regional  inflation  differentials  in  EMU,  may  be  too  strict  from  an 
economic  point of view.  Indeed,  some  real  exchange  rate  movements  could  be 
justified in EMU to the extent that economies are faced  with different adjustment 
needs. But, this depends on the origin of  the divergent inflation performances, which 
is the subject of  the next section. 
III  FACTORS BEHIND PERSISTENT INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS 
Three main sources of  divergent price level trends may be distinguished. 
(1)  Inflation differentials and monetary policy 
While numerous determinants• of the persistence of inflation differentials in a fixed 
exchange rate system have been indicated, most of  them can be reduced in the end to 
differences in the credibility of  monetary authorities (De Grauwe, 1992; Giavazzi and 
Giovannini, 1989). As long as national monetary authorities with different reputations 
concerning  inflation  maintain  their  autonomy,  residual  differences  in  inflation 
expectations and therefore systematic differences in observed inflation will remain. 
With EMU,  the  ECB  will  be the monetary authority of the participating Member 
States  and  inflationary  expectations  should  be  the  same  in  all  the  participating 
countries.  Thus,  the new currency  should not be  affected  by the past inflationary 
experiences of individual countries and one of the important sources2 of persisting 
inflation differentials should disappear. 
2 
For example, Campillo and Miron (1996) suggest that institutional arrangements - central bank 
independence or exchange rate mechanisms - are relatively unimportant inflation determinants, 
while  economic  fundamentals  - openness  and  optimal  tax  considerations  - are  relatively 
important, together with prior inflation experience.  It could be argued that the credibility of 
monetary policy to a large extent shapes the way openness, the potential use of  the inflation tax 
or the past history of  inflation affect the actual inflation performance of  countries. A similar line 
of  argument can be followed for wages as a determinant of  inflation. 
Given the same level of credibility and the unification of  the money market leading to a single 
interest rate,  the monetary component in the explanation of inflation differentials cannot be 
large in  EMU.  A remaining monetary source of inflation differentials is  related to different 
money multipliers allowing banks in  a particular region to grant more credit starting from  a 
similar access to the monetary base.  However,  money  multipliers  are  not  likely to  be very 
different among regions of  the same monetary zone, assuming that reserve requirements are the 
same.  Differences in the money multiplier stemming from different currency/deposit ratios are 
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(2)  Inflation differentials and asymmetric real demand and supply shocks 
The theory of optimum currency areas stresses the fact that the loss of the exchange 
rate instrument will reduce the ability of  economies to absorb exogenous disturbances. 
If transitory  asymmetric  shocks  dominate  symmetric  or  permanent  asymmetric 
shocks, a monetary union would demand extensive regional price level variation to 
facilitate RER changes leading to regionally differentiated inflation rates. The issue of 
the response to shocks with a common currency and the adjustment costs related to 
the slower reaction of prices compared to exchange rates, is dealt with elsewhere in 
the study. 
(3)  Inflation differentials and productivity 
The best known structural factor which can produce systematic differences in inflation 
rates  is  rapid  productivity  growth  in  the  traded  good  sector.  A  country  which 
experiences technical progress in the traded goods sector can allow nominal wages in 
the traded goods sector reflect this without losing competitiveness. This wage increase 
will be transmitted to the non-tradable goods sector triggering a rise in the country's 
overall CPl. This high inflation must be  considered as  an equilibrating mechanism. 
Without it, the high productivity country would gain competitiveness and accumulate 
current  account  surpluses.  The  observation  that  price  levels  in  high  productivity 
countries  are  higher  than  in  low  productivity  countries  is  called  the  Balassa-
Samuelson effect. More formally,  3 
inflation differential corrected for exchange rate change = 
(share of  non-traded goods) x (productivity differential in traded goods at home and abroad) 
It forms a powerful explanation for persistent regional inflation differentials or with 
other words  deviations  from  purchasing power parity  implying  real  exchange  rate 
adjustments. These real exchange rate adjustments could be exacerbated in catching-
up countries, which in the beginning of  the process of  structural change are faced with 
a  real  appreciation,  reflecting  increased  foreign  investment,  followed  later  by  a 
downward correction in the real exchange rate to restore competitiveness. 
If  purchasing parity were to hold the right hand side of the above equation should be 
zero, meaning that the exchange rate change fully offsets the inflation differential.  In 
monetary union, where the exchange rate change is  zero, the equation suggests that 
r~gional inflation  differentials  are  proportional  to  productivity  differentials  in  the 
traded  goods  sector corrected  for  the  share  of the  non-traded  goods  sector  in the 
economy.  Equality  would  require  that  all  conditions  under  which  the  Balassa-
3 
expected to be small.  A differentiation of  this ratio could be produced by a higher preference of 
households for deposits relative to cash or by the possibility of  regional banks, because they are 
more efficient, to offer a higher deposit rate despite the equality across regions of the money 
market interest rate . 
See Burda and Wyplosz (1993) for a fonnal treatment 
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according to ·marginal  productivity,  the  same  (low)  productivity  in the  non-traded 
goods sector across countries, the same share of  traded versus non-traded sector across 
countries. 
IV.  EMU AND PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Productivity has varied considerably in Europe, both across countries and over time. 
Taking total productivity differentials as a proxy for productivity differentials in the 
traded goods sector, the average differential between the lowest (Greece) and highest 
(Ireland) average growth rate of productivity is 2.4 %, calculated between 1974 and 
1996.  Note that regularly in a single year the productivity differential was as wide as 
5 %.  Estimating  the  share  of the  non-traded  goods  sector  at  70 %,  an  inflation 
differential of 1.7 o/o  (= 0.70 x 2.4) would be compatible with observed productivity 
differentials. This result is in the same orders of magnitude as the one obtained by 
Canzoneri et al. (1996), who take account of some the simplifying assumptions made 
above (productivity in the non-traded sector, relative share of  the two sectors). In their 
study (covering 1970-1990) European countries could be divided into three categories 
on the basis of their trend inflation determined by productivity differentials.  Trend 
inflation in Belgium, Italy and Spain should be about 2% higher than in Germany; 
trend inflation in Portugal, Denmark, Austria, France, the UK and Sweden should be 
1% higher and trend inflation should be about the same in Finland. 
These calculations are also  in line with the Maastricht criterion on inflation which 
states that a maximum spread of 1.5% above the 3 best price performers should be 
observed. Furthermore, productivity differentials may overstate the permitted inflation 
differentials  because productivity indicators may be affected by other factors than 
technical progress;  this  distorts  the  measured productivity levels.  The  productivity 
differential  between  the  traded  and  non-traded  goods  sector  could  be  rather  the 
consequence of low productivity in the non-traded goods sector due to an expansion 
of the public sector, than the consequence of high productivity gains in the traded 
goods sector due to technical progress (Canzoneri et al., 1996).  Of particular interest 
is the "labour absorption hypothesis", by which the single market forces the traded 
good sector in each country to become more competitive leading to labour shedding. 
The  labour surplus  is  then  absorbed  by the  public  sector and  by a  service  sector 
protected from competition by legislation, distribution networks and tradition. Thus, 
the observed trends in labour productivity are consequences of "excessive" growth in 
public sector employment and/or inefficient protection of  the home goods sector. 
Determining  the  fundamental  microeconomic  causes  of the  trends  observed  in 
European labour productivity is particularly important as policy implications depend 
on them. If  the productivity trends reflect technological factors that cannot be affected 
by government policy, then observed inflation differentials are due to factors that are 
independent of  monetary policy and do not indicate a competitiveness problem. In this 
case,  inflation  differentials  in  EMU  are  consistent  with  fixed  exchange  rates.  If 
sluggish productivity gains in the home goods sector are to be attributed to excessive 
public  sector  growth  and/or  protection of the  service  sector,  then  convergence  in 
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inflation is needed among EMU countries in order to  avoid pressures on monetary 
policy.  One might expect countries with rapid real appreciations to put pressure on 
the common central bank for a loose monetary policy either to ease the financing of 
public deficits or to try to increase employment. 
Finally, these considerations suggest that the long-term inflation objective of  the ECB 
should be the average inflation rate in the participating EMU countries.  This would 
be compatible with some differentiation in the inflation rates and the  low inflation 
region  should  not  fear  an  inflationary  spill-over,  if the  differential  is  justified by 
productivity differentials.  On the other hand, targeting the best inflation performer 
would  hamper  growth  in  the  high-productivity  countries  and  their  catching-up 
process.  Furthermore,  the  difference  between  union  wide  inflation  and  the  best 
inflation performer depends on the size of  the union. If  a large number of  the Member 
States were included, the difference could be a full percentage point between the EU 
average and the lowest regional inflation rate . 
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